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THEOLOGICAL EDUCATION IN THE POSTWAR WORLD*

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We meet on the threshold of the postwar world. That world is much advertised, but little known. Shall we have another depression with the demobilization of war industries and the armed forces, or will the program of public works and the expansion of civilian consumption, steadied by accumulated war savings, allow the higher standard of living to continue? Will the great nations of the world join hands in mutual support of a more equitable and less chaotic international life, or will they spring at each other's throats as soon as the common enemy is beaten, and return to truculent competition for markets, airlines, and raw materials? Will those who have served so bravely and doggedly in our armed forces come back determined not to let it happen again, or will they leave the world to run itself and lapse into the apathy and the hedonism of the war-weary? Will our churches find new power through a united ministry to a confused world, or will they add to the confusion with rancorous squabbling? Will education find a new level of efficiency and a new vision of its task, or will it seek a return to the old routine, picking up the old academic disputes where it left off? Shall we see a more honest and realistic morality emerge, or will the let-down induced by war become a long-term degradation? Shall we look for juster treatment of the Negro and the Jew, or will racial bitterness be aggravated by efforts to repeal whatever gains were made during the war years in the status of our minority groups?

I declare I do not know the answer. To prophesy is precarious, to remain in indecision is fatal. This is the dilemma in the face of which we must act. I propose in this address to inquire what the tasks are that confront religious leadership today, what kind of ministers are needed, and how the theological schools should select and train them.

I

Theological seminaries are charged with the task of training religious leaders able to see the meaning of events about them, to analyze the prob-

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lems and clarify the spiritual issues which men must face, to bring the Christian gospel to bear on these issues, to give us the steadiness that comes with breadth and depth of judgment, and to help us come closer to our destiny under God. In the immediate postwar days this will be peculiarly difficult.

When governments distort and conceal the facts for years for war purposes, you cannot expect to find a deeper regard for the truth among the people. The minister and teacher whose job is to bring men face to face with ultimate truths and to teach men to subordinate their lives to the final fact about the world, which is God, will find the cutting edge of their words dulled by popular indifference. Before such apathy to truth prophetic utterance is well-nigh impotent.

The nation has now lived for three years in a state of emergency, in which the decisions have been for immediate needs and immediate action rather than for long-term plans. Such a life does not lead to the long view with which religion is concerned, but rather to a hectic materialism and superficiality. It is in some ways fortunate that Americans have not in this war been called to great heights of idealism, as in the First World War, from which to recoil in postwar disillusionment; but perhaps the cold realism of our generation has also a tincture of corroding cynicism in it. Against such cynicism the struggle to faith in a better future is arduous and painful. For many it spells the end of any faith in God or man. This too increases the weight of a minister's task.

In the face of such tasks the seminaries will be drawing many of their recruits from the discharged veterans. Some of these will be chaplains who have either gained a new depth of perception of the greatness and wretchedness of man, or have lost their own bearings in their efforts to be "one of the boys" or to wear down the powerful studied indifference of officers toward religion. Many will return to the seminaries to add a touch of grimness bewildering to a younger generation of theological students. The problem of the returning veteran finding his place in civilian life again will be a problem of the seminaries too. Tensions that are already being felt on our college campuses between ex-service men and other more idealistic students may be expected in our seminaries as well. Seminary administrators must keep a watchful and sympathetic attitude; and be prepared for new, unorthodox methods of teaching. The gap in experience between ex-service men and those who have come up through the usual academic channels may well require separate classes. Professors will have to reckon with men whose experience of the tragic and the shocking outruns their own, bringing with it a maturity and a detachment that belie the ages of these men.

This may well open the way for much profounder religious thinking,

and so for a finer ministry. At the same time, and by the same token, it will produce impatience with academic and religious cant. These men will, many of them, like the younger generation generally, distrust bigotry. They know that if you scratch a bigot you find a hypocrite. They know, too, that in many men of the cloth the cloth is shoddy. All of these attitudes are net gain for the Christian cause, provided that they help to distill the living essence of religious power, to pierce the camouflage and discover whether God is really there. Surely the seminary is the place where men and women can find whether religion is formality or a ferment. Much that passes for sophistication is merely an elaborate defense against God the enemy—the everlasting enemy of all pretensions. We must help men to probe these pretensions, to face God and their inmost selves. Only then will they be really fit to be religious leaders.

We American Christians take proudly for our own the bravery of our European brethren, but have we thought what made them brave? Martin Niemoeller could speak out for spiritual freedom, and the *Gestapo* waited for him at his door. What inner wrestlings and what root of faith prepared him for the act? Bishop Berggrav dared, in the face of Quisling's power, to propose that clergy change the collect that called for obedience to the authorities, and since remains surrounded by barbed wire. How, in the Bible that he loves, has he found strength? Kaj Munk might write and preach with power to gird his Danish flock against oppression, and disappear to his mysterious death. Whence came that power? What tireless searching made it his? When Hendrik Kraemer called Dutch churches to stand together and face the invading terror in their midst, he landed in a concentration camp and his health broke. Where was *his* "present help in time of trouble"?[1]

Such questions we must ask ourselves if we would understand these men, or count their courage in our heritage. Unless a theological school can bring its students into the classroom to wrestle with such questions of spiritual power, can it be said that our job is well done? We meet the murderous cross fire of racial bigotry with a Christian faith in brotherhood. How deep is that faith among our ministers, our educators, our church members? Is it a thin veneer of social decency, ready to crack and peel away when the heat is turned on? Or do we know enough the power of fellowship, rooted in God the ultimate "bond of souls,"[2] to stand firm to the last, come what may?

[1] For a gripping account of these contemporary martyrs see Hugh Martin (and others), *Christian Counter-Attack* (New York, Scribner, 1944).

[2] The phrase is, of course, a translation of a theological term for God in Thomist thought: *nexus animarum*. For a profound treatment of this aspect of God see Peter Wust, *Die Dialektik des Geistes* (Augsburg, Filser, 1928).

When we are challenged by the sexual immorality that war enhances, we may answer with a pious assertion that continence and fidelity are Christian virtues. But do we know what fundamental law of life should make them so, and give validity to marriage vows? Unless our moral sanctions find a deeper root than convention, where shall we stand when public opinion shifts toward greater laxity? This is an area where careful, sympathetic thinking is demanded; and our ministers need consummate wisdom in handling the issues involved. The students are often perplexed themselves and need criteria for a Christian judgment in the face of modern developments in science that give the problems a new setting.

Most ministers have in their churches parents rebellious or else hopelessly resigned at the loss of some young man or woman in the war. What can be said to make them face the bleak tragedy of death and turn it into deeper truth that gives new purpose to their lives? If religion cannot help us to face death, has it not sacrificed its greatest and its ultimate power? Dostoievski, having lived among the dead and dying in Siberia, knew well that the man who cannot face death cannot really live; for it is death, the final integer of life, that makes us know life's meaning. What but scrupulously honest inquiry can yield the answer; and where, more than in a theological school, should such inquiry be made?

The immediate postwar years will tell whether we are going to make of Christianity a refuge in despair or a source of courage for a new and better day. There is a sense in which Christian living is an affair of the immediate present, for it is in the next step, the immediate decision, that each of us must express his faith in acts. Brooding over the remoter future may serve only to paralyze action in the present moment. We shall then fail to do our duty because we are confused by vague, unmanageable fears. Dorothy Sayers, the English novelist (and latterly religious writer) says of the crisis in Britain in 1940:

> We survived because we wouldn't accept the future at the hands of contemporary prophecy. We were nearly lost by the people who brooded so much upon the decline of the West and the horrors of conflicts to come that they became quite incapable of taking any steps to do anything at all. We were saved by the people who lived for the day, attacking each bomber as it arrived, extinguishing each fire as it broke out, propping up each thing as it fell down . . . concentrating on each energy as the moment demanded, "doing the next thing."[3]

Dean Shailer Mathews of Chicago used to tell the story of being with a driver who had lost his way in the open country between Northfield, Minnesota, and St. Paul. Having left the main road they could not find their direction in the darkness. Finally they saw a signpost at a crossroads, and painstakingly the driver lit a flickering match and held it high.

[3] Quoted from one of her letters in the *Christian News-letter*, No. 216, for September 6, 1944.

The signs pointed one way to New Orleans the other to Montreal! But still they didn't know which way to turn next.

The theological seminary must train men to cope with immediate realities; and this will require work in sociology and in economics, in psychology and in parish administration. Not that we can sacrifice the central task of understanding the Christian movement and the Bible which explains its birth. But a gospel of the kingdom of God without alert awareness to contemporary life is like gazing at a star without our wagon being hitched to it. The living present is the field of action for faith. Taking thought for the morrow may lose for us our passing chance to make our faith a force.

II

But this is only a half-truth, for the present problems are inextricably interwoven with great movements in the life of society. We live in the present moment, but we live also between the ages, between a dying world and an order yet unborn.

Today is Reformation Day. On this day in 1517 Luther nailed his famous theses to the door of Wittenberg's Castle Church. It is therefore fitting that we Protestants should take stock of where we are. The Reformation was one movement within a larger social revolution. The Middle Ages were dying. The rise of cities at the assembly points of the Crusaders, the loss of labor in the terrible Black Death epidemic, the disintegration of the loyalties that had bound the people of Europe to the papacy and the fiefs of their overlords, all helped to bring on this decline. A transition was being made, which, as the historian Pollard[4] puts it, was "the substitution of competition for custom as the regulating principle of the relations between the various classes of the community." This shift from custom to competition explains much of the nature of Protestantism as well as of modern culture. For the church it issued in a competitive sectarianism, from which we have not yet recovered. In the economic realm it produced the laissez-faire theories and the ruthless mutual extermination of late nineteenth-century commerce. Politically it aggravated the international anarchy of perpetually warring states.

Today another great shift is taking place: a shift from competition to coöperative control. Its beginnings are seen in the political blocs, in the business trusts and financial combines, in the federations of churches. In the face of the threatening chaos of intensive competition, it is not surprising that efforts should be exerted to force coöperation from above. This may be seen in the growth of totalitarian government regulation in Russia, Italy, and Germany, and to some extent in this country. One is

[4] *Cambridge Modern History*, ii, p. 489.

reminded of the story of Judge Gary when, as president of the United States Steel Corporation, he said once to his directors, "Gentlemen, I want your coöperation. In fact, I shall insist upon it." The outstanding task of our generation is to work out the problems of coöperative control in society, locally, nationally, and internationally. If we are to steer a course between anarchy and tyranny, we must learn individual and group self-control in the interest of our fellowmen.

When a group like a labor union, a nation, a manufacturer's association, or a church holds its members in line for a program whereby it may aggrandize itself at the expense of other groups, then it controls its members, but as a group it does not exercise self-control. The result is a struggle between groups for power, and the effects of this conflict are disastrous in direct ratio to the power which the groups possess. Modern methods of organization only accentuate the terror of our situation, as total war so horribly demonstrates. Within a nation the power thus built up by groups that do not hold legal control can only manifest itself in revolution. This is the prospect that confronts us in America politically, racially, and economically. The only alternative is to merge the interests of these groups in some coöperative venture. Thus a war is able temporarily to ward off revolution, but only temporarily. During the war these groups consolidate their power; and thus at the end of the war the prospects of revolution are increased. We may try to harness this power to some new venture such as an imperialistic program of national destiny. This, however, gives promise only of a still more terrible war in the next generation.

But war is destructive, as well as productive, of power, and first it destroys spiritual power—the power of truth and honor and humane brotherhood and humility before God.

Here surely is a challenge to religion. This challenge will never be met by pious mouthings about good will, nor by glibly announced blueprints for peace. The futility of such utterances in face of the steady growth of power among the unscrupulous is one of the perils of piety in our time. The churches can meet this challenge only if their leaders are intelligently aware of the trends of power in society, and at the same time capable of delicate dissection of men's souls, including their own. Modern psychology has made no greater contribution to our thinking than in its uncovering of the unconscious motives which distort our aims and confuse our best efforts. This is the area in which the greatest as well as the least of men need and welcome help. Here lies the region where hypocrisy and self-deception rob men of power. For the depths of their own lives are their meeting points with the ultimate realities; and only in the acknowledgment of those ultimate realities can they find the self-fulfillment that they seek.

This is why the final folly for a man is to gain the world and lose his own soul.

We come back, then, to the need for coöperative control. When men discover at last that their own deepest interests are inseparable from that common humanity which they share with all men everywhere across the globe, they will learn also that that common humanity is in turn rooted in the universe of which this spinning planet is but a part. And when men try to find their meaning in the universe, they cannot escape the question of God. Now, the question of God is not only man's query about God, whether there be one, but also a question addressed by God to man.

Every single event is a converging of indeterminable forces upon a point-instant of time; and therefore every life is a focal point of activities which it has not set in motion for itself. Thus each man confronts the origin of his own actions, and may declare himself the plaything of the fates that press upon him from the past. Then he seeks to escape responsibility, and if he can convince himself of being irresponsible, control and coöperation alike are at an end. But society cannot survive on this philosophy, for we know that social life is dynamic and that, as the present was once a future, so there is still a future before us in terms of which we have to act decisively. What of this future?

Does it not come about in part, at least, by the movement of the ages through the decisions that we make? Here our inner nature and the outer world are brought together. If they combine productively, the result is human self-fulfillment; if they war against each other, the result is failure. How important it is, then, that men should ask what forces move around them and within, reaching toward the future. The full answer to this question is hidden in mystery; but we have clues.

Some of these clues come from science; and scientific humanism is the effort to use these clues to shape a better world. Thus science can tell us much about the intricate mechanisms of interdependence among the lower forms of life, often running into many generations before the cycle is complete. In the intestines of the wood-eating roach live protozoa that can digest the cellulose in the wood tissue and thus keep their own host alive while he feeds them; but "in order that the molted individual could become reinfected with protozoa, it was necessary for such an individual to live in a family or social community." Among some insects that pass through metamorphosis this process may require three generations.[5] Such clues, while not in themselves conclusive proof of a divine ordering, certainly hint at the principle of coöperation as inherent in the structure of our world.

[5] The quotation is from an article in the *American Naturalist* LXXVII (1943), pp. 97-118, by Professor Alfred E. Emerson, to whom I am also indebted for the last statement.

More significant than such analogies furnished by science is the painstaking search of scientists themselves for an understanding of the bases of social life. Here intelligence and consecration to the truth are blended and play their part in coöperative control for the betterment of mankind. I know of no better example today of self-control in loyalty to the facts and in concern for human values than the vast network of scientific research where "long-suffering, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, meekness, self-control" are the characteristic attitudes among the fraternity. The churches do not compare with science in producing these virtues. Let us then beware of the fluent ecclesiastical attacks on "secularism," and of the shallow self-esteem which it serves to engender among church folk. There is no cure for this except adequate training in at least one science for every theological student before he comes to the seminary. By such training I do not mean the attendance upon lectures covering a scientific field, but actual discipline in the techniques of the laboratory or the observatory, where men can learn scrupulous accuracy, patient correlation of data, careful interpretation, self-abnegating surrender to a better theory than one has held oneself, rigorous rejection of attractive hypotheses that contradict the facts. Beside such disciplined thinking the glib inaccuracies, hasty inferences, careless generalizations and unwillingness to yield to truth which characterize so many of our pulpits make a poor showing indeed. The intelligent laity are fully aware of this discrepancy. One need only compare a scientists' conclave with a ministers' meeting to dramatize the sad fact.

In the midst of the stupendous changes through which we are passing the church is at present incapable of giving the needed leadership. It is riddled with internal dissension. A quarreling church is no instrument of redemption for a quarreling world, but rather a menace, for religious quarrels are of all the most bitter. The ecumenical movement, bringing together the official bodies of some eighty great church groups around the world, has barely penetrated to the lay membership of our churches, and when it does, it encounters a great apathy. And of course the Roman Catholic Church refuses to have any traffic with this World Council of Churches, watching its development with more political sagacity than Christian concern,[6] garnering her temporal power patiently for a more propitious future.

The great heritage of the Reformation was the demand for expression of Christian faith in the responsibilities of the daily round, in the workaday world, each believer bearing his own burden of obligation which bound him directly to God. This heritage is now threatened with innocuous

[6] See Pope Pius XII's encyclical *Mystici Corporis Christi,* of June 29, 1943, for an instance of this arrogance.

desuetude. It remains "a religious revolution half accomplished."[7] Protestant theological seminaries face the task of realizing the dream of the Reformers in terms of the twentieth century.

That dream was rooted in the Bible. There men found again a new orientation for life. Some, also, saw in it detailed prescriptions for detailed conduct, lapsing again into the legalism of the lesser Pharisees. Some saw in it merely a system of doctrine to be proclaimed as a new "tradition of the elders" regardless of new facts learned. But others caught from it a radical alteration of their perspectives and faced its soul-searching challenge to answer whether Jesus Christ had brought history to a new crisis by his teaching, and placed society in judgment by his death. These men defied the powers that ruled their world and once again put Jesus at the centre of all life for men and states. They reconsecrated daily living to the will of God, finding that will revealed in Christ. And when at last they too fell victims to the new institutions they had made, the Reformation movement almost died still-born. It is for us today to bring it back to life.

Yet this we cannot do unless their revolution is achieved at last. Our message must be made clearer and more intelligible to our day; and its meaning more honestly reflected in our lives. If our religious leaders have lost this vision in the welter of ecclesiastical self-aggrandisement or in the fog of ignorance, surely the people will perish. The minister who thinks himself called of God to this leadership assumes a burden terrible to be borne, but he is hopeful in the promise that God is not merely waiting at the dawn of creation but is calling us out of our tents to go with him to greater heights. God *moves* in history, and anyone who loiters when he calls is lost.

This is the challenge of our cause to us. In repentance and humility we must respond or fail.

III

If our theological seminaries are to produce leaders ready for their day and their grave responsibilities, we must be clear what kind of men we are to send out.

Such leaders must in the first place be educated men. Ignorant enthusiasm is no match for the complexity of the problems religion faces today. We need men with thorough and reliable knowledge of what religion is and of what is happening in society. We need men with disciplined minds. This is not so easy as it sounds, for much that now passes for general education is really a superficial acquaintance with great books or big ideas, on the assumption apparently that if the apple is big enough one small bite of it is bound to be nourishing. By the disciplined mind I mean

[7] The phrase is used by Pollard to refer to Reformation England under Edward VI, *loc. cit.*

the capacity and the determination to pursue the facts, to discriminate them from half-lies, to organize them for use in tackling a given problem, judging what is relevant and what irrelevant, to concentrate attention on the bull's-eye, and see the problem through to the end. In an age when popular education has advanced, the training of the minister must advance apace. We are losing the intelligent laity from the churches because our ministers are as a whole intellectually inadequate. We need an educated ministry.

We need, too, an ecumenically minded ministry: men who know the Christian church around the world, and care more for the common faith of all than for the peculiarities of their own sect. This is a day when the wounds of the world cannot be healed by the rancor of bigotry; and the powers of darkness are too much for little minds. One of the glories of this wretched time has been the growth of Christian unity in the face of common peril. That unity must be preserved in the face of common opportunity. The faiths that unite us are deeper than those that divide; let us not forsake the depths for the shallows.

The church needs men with an alert social consciousness of the new age, men who are not content with ecclesiastical statistics or with "book larnin" even of the Bible. Men and women in the pews are also living in the market place; and more of the time. From that public place they draw the stuff of which their decisions are made; and woe betide the minister who does not walk there and become conversant with its barter and its gossip. One of the healthiest things in the American churches is the lack of familiarity with biblical and dogmatic phraseology, for it forces the leader to think and speak in contemporary terms. It may be less sonorous but it has the tang of human reality. But behind this is something deeper: the feel for the struggles of the worker, the perplexities of the employer, the dreary despair of the unemployed, the suppressed anger of the persecuted, the hearty laughter of simple folk. These, too, the minister must know; and to understand them he must be aware of tides and currents of the age in which we live. Only on such an understanding can he have leadership matched to the fateful hour of decision, and give to his gospel the urgency of a call to repentance for the sins men understand.

Now as always we need pastors, shepherds of the soul who know its whims and its pitfalls; men who care more deeply for a man in need than for themselves. We need men versed enough in psychology to know how easy it is to compound a failure through bad counseling; and sensitive enough to find the motives of their parishioners to which these folk themselves are blind. Such men must have a healthy mind themselves, not to project their own disturbances on other minds. They must have what George Eliot called a "flexible imagination," capable of entering into

another's way of thinking. Then perhaps they can do something to allay the tragedy of increasing insanity in our modern life; and help men to a deeper inward unity from which a better poise may come.

We need ministers who understand the Christian faith, its biblical foundations, its historical development, its present relevance and status. Here, after all, is the platform of their candidacy for leadership in human life today. This tells what makes them Christian. The theological ignoramus in the pulpit cannot know even himself. But to know the creeds alone in isolation is not to know the faith either. Some years ago I went fishing, taking with me an anchor, which I dropped in a likely place, only to find presently that it did not hold because the rope was not tied to my boat. So it is often with theology. We have a theology, solid and firm, but it is not attached to our own day and so it cannot hold us steady. Irrelevant faith is futility. Consequently theology can never be merely expository; it must be apologetic. It must relate itself to contemporary science, philosophy, literature, and social thought.

One of the major problems of the minister is his relation—if he has wit enough to maintain any at all—with the other agencies for human betterment in his community. Here is a well-developed field of community organization in which he needs to be trained. How often does Christian charity pauperize a family on which the local United Charities office has a full case history! And how often are the energies of good people in a corrupt community scattered and dissipated for lack of some coördination. On this our ministers have to learn the hard way, having received no instruction in our seminaries.

In saying that the theological schools must train ministers, let us add at once that this job cannot stop with the professional degree. One of the major tragedies of American church life is that keen minds get rusty in the ministry. This is in part a sad result of multifarious so-called duties which burden and confuse the pastorate. The minister may often lose his touch with scholarship and solitary thought, becoming simply a chore boy of his church. But much of this is due to his laziness, or poor budgeting of time, or lack of library or other stimulus to study. If the future of the ministry is to be saved, then more must be done to keep the minds of the ministers alive. Refresher courses can do part of this; but more systematic courses carried through the year are needed too. Here is a chance for new directions of extension work. We want a growing ministry.

Theological education is one of the oldest specializations within the higher studies. It therefore requires specialists; and these men should be found and their special training begun within the seminary. Too often we have chosen theological professors for their piety or their ecclesiastical prestige rather than for their scholarship. (Not that the alternatives are

always mutually exclusive; for many great scholars adorn the pulpit; but too much church politics is played with professorial chairs.) We must train up our seminary teachers and, in coöperation with the universities, afford them opportunities for postgraduate study. We have done a fair job of this in the biblical, theological, and historical branches. But much can be done in the so-called practical field, where more recent academic disciplines have grown up, like psychology and sociology to help with pastoral work and religious education and parish administration; or study of intercultural relations to help with missionary work; or economic and political science to help with special problems in social ethics.

There is a neglected duty of the divinity schools which is no less necessary than it is unwelcome to the churches. It is the responsibility for continuing critical examination of our religious institutions. The seminaries have often been censured by the ministers and church boards for being too critical; but the truth is that we have held our fire too long, and the power of the churches is suffering accordingly. Institutional inertia needs constant, helpful, critical surveillance. This is not to say that the seminaries do not require in turn critical scrutiny and correction from the churches. We suffer from our institutional inertia too. But this direction of criticism has not been conspicuously lacking.

The seminaries must, I believe, make more provision for the training of the laity. The advancing education of our people confronts the minister with a task which he can scarcely cope with. Our denominational agencies of adult education are doing little except through an occasional mission study book, and this written by a specialist. Why should not more institutes be held for lay men and women, either in the seminaries or in the community. The eagerness of our laymen for such instruction warrants its further cultivation; and it is quite logical that our seminaries should furnish more of it as a service to the churches. When such lectures and discussions through institutes are supplemented by reading courses, a great extension of the seminaries' influence is possible.

IV

The theological curriculum will provide primarily, however, for the comprehensive and thorough training of prospective ministers and teachers. This training should assure that the student will have a knowledge of his Bible, not as a Sears Roebuck catalogue of unrelated proof texts, but as a library of documents of our Judæo-Christian faith, to be understood as man's word about God in terms of successive historical events, and as God's word to man as the perennial spiritual problems of the race are encountered in its pages. This biblical study will be carried on with the finest critical tools available from linguistics and from history; but it will

also reckon with the theological and ethical messages of the Bible. After we know the reliable text of the Scripture and its authorship, date, and occasion, we still have to ask, "What does this say to *me*?" If the answer is "Nothing," the Bible has merely antiquarian interest. If the Word has a relevant word for us, we ought to find out what it is. This means a needed revival of biblical theology.

The theological student must have a broad and accurate knowledge of the history of the movement in which he serves. There is no better ballast for a flighty mind than history. Was it not William Penn who warned us to "have a care where there is more sail than ballast"? Legend and fact must be scrupulously distinguished. Even though the former may have greater homiletic attraction, it cannot have greater homiletic value. The story of the church must be learned in terms of the broad scope of the movement to which we are now forced by the ecumenical interests to be sensitive. We must always read the past with the concern of the present; and so church history must always be rewritten and restudied. Much of our recent church history among free churchmen has carried an anti-ecclesiastical bias. With the recovery of our sense of corporate Christian life and its importance, we may have to reëxamine our historical instruction with that in mind.

And again, the student must be firmly anchored in personal faith. This is not a matter simply of being able to repeat some system of theology learned by rote in the classroom. Candidates for ordination sometimes appear with a credo cribbed from a class notebook, and yet devoid of personal meaning for themselves. This is a travesty on faith. By a deep personal faith I mean a man's hard-won convictions on which he stands ready to commit his life. They may be couched in language of his own, possibly stumbling where a classic phrase could quickly sum it up. But it is *his*. If he can go only a little way with the great affirmations of the creeds, let him work with what he has, and use it as a nucleus of some more extended theology to come for him as life and thought require. The important thing is that the preacher shall leave the seminary with a clear statement of what are his cardinal faiths. It is part of the work of the faculty to see that his statement is subjected to friendly but rigorous scrutiny, so as to help him make it clear and strong. But in the last analysis it must be *his*.

It must also relate itself to the other great faiths of our time. In a day of global thinking and a will to understand the other cultures of the world, we must know what Hinduism and Buddhism, Mohammedanism and Judaism, Confucianism and Shintoism have to say. How can we glibly say to a skeptical generation that Christianity is the only hope of the world, if we do not even know the other proffered solvents of man's ills. How

can Christian loyalty be purged of bigotry, save by fair-minded study of these other faiths?

The products of our theological seminaries must know the art and the science of pastoral counseling. No facile piosities will help the man whose life is hag-ridden by some insane fear; nor simple common sense resolve the complex of a deep-hidden feeling of compulsion rooted in early unconscious life. Well-meant advice may ruin mental health. It is essential, therefore, that adequate knowledge of mental hygiene should be gained by the prospective minister to enable him to detect a serious mental disorder and to direct the patient to expert medical care. We cannot, and we should not, turn out amateur psychiatrists. However, sufficient understanding can be given to the theological student to help him to prevent the development of psychoses in his parishioners (and in himself).[8]

After a period of excessive informality and casualness in worship and preaching, we are today coming to a new appreciation of these central functions of the minister. Their relation to biblical and other literary resources, their psychological relation to the motivation of Christian living, their exacting demands on the leader when he acts not merely as an individual but as the representative of a great tradition, should all be carefully studied and mastered. Here, if anywhere, the minister is a specialist whose domain is not trenched upon by any other profession. Slipshod preaching, use of cheap, tawdry music, and the bad habit of regarding acts of corporate worship as "preliminaries" (I have heard them called that) to the sermon, betray a lack of public responsibility. Much more can still be done in our seminaries, not in the way of merely imparting what have been tragically miscalled tricks of the trade, but in studying great historic preachers and the meaning of worship. The antagonism between prophetic consciousness and priestly ministrations has been greatly exaggerated; their mutual supplementation and dependence should be recognized.

The impact of the church on the local community is very inadequately studied in most of our seminaries. Here the student should know the great social ethical message of Christianity, in terms of its theological foundations and of its concrete implications. At the same time, he should know how to secure social facts so that he does not "talk through his hat." Some knowledge of social-survey methods and the interpretation of survey data should correct careless utterance and action where a local strike, a corrupt city administration, a resurgence of organized vice, or a dangerous racial conflict call for courageous leadership. A clearer understanding of principles of group work will help him to deal better with his people and with other agencies like the Christian Associations and the

[8] For well-informed and sane discussion of this matter see *Religion and Health* by Seward Hiltner, and *The Cure of Souls*, by Charles T. Holman.

settlements. Thus general principles, reliable facts, and sound methods can be combined into effective community leadership.

Into the community children are being born who will help to make its future. To train them in Christian attitudes will demand the best available knowledge of education and psychology, and test the pastor's grasp of what are the foundations and the aims of Christian life.

V

How can we hope to do this stupendous job with our seminary students? Let us frankly recognize at the beginning that, despite the promising group of young men we attract, some of our students are simply not prepared for the rigorous demands of such a program. We must therefore select our prospective students much more carefully. At present we lack satisfactory criteria of vocational guidance in this field; and depend far too much on loosely formed judgments of ministers and college teachers who "sense" in a student a good ministerial prospect. What traits of personality are needed? What aptitudes and skills are required? Until we know better what is good "material" for religious leadership, we are too haphazard in the use of funds committed to us for scholarships. When we have this, then we should recruit for the ministry more aggressively.

One drawback here has been that in vocational-guidance programs in high schools and colleges the ministry is neglected for politic reasons: the sects will protest whatever representative of another sect is selected to present the claims of this profession. At last we are, I believe, in sight of a solution of this difficulty. The American Association of Theological Schools is an interdenominational body, and could send its representatives to campuses to participate in such programs. He would speak neither for a particular seminary nor for a particular denomination, but for the Christian church. Students could then be referred to their own denominational seminaries for catalogues and for specific arrangements for training. (Of course, most of our denominational seminaries now have interdenominational student bodies anyway, and a Baptist's soul would not be in too great jeopardy if he went to a Methodist or Presbyterian school by mistake.) When I proposed such coöperative recruiting several years ago to the Midwestern Section of that Association, Dr. Palmer of the Chicago Theological Seminary and I were authorized to inquire among the state colleges and universities of our region whether they would welcome such a nondenominational approach to their students by this official body. The response was instantaneous and enthusiastic to a degree beyond our greatest expectations; some even asking when our representative could come. The time is ripe to move ahead at this point; and many students,

confronted by the claims of an intelligent and courageous ministry upon their vocational decision, would, I am sure, respond.

Once in the seminary the theological student should work intensively at his studies. When they are as heavily subsidized as our ministerial students are, we should be able to command their full time. Too many are working long hours on outside tasks that make no contribution to their training. Too many are actually making money out of a seminary course, while they are beneficiaries of funds given to make their studies possible. Too many students are marrying before or during seminary training, not in order to share their preparation with their wives, but either to exploit their wives as homemakers and even as breadwinners, while they enjoy their intellectual development, or else to have the comforts denied to other professional trainees while the school foots a lot of the bill. I am not objecting to early marriage as such, but to the use of seminary funds to support it. We are in danger of training men for special privilege rather than for special service. A radical review of our scholarship program and of our students' outside work is called for. When a student can boast of clearing a thousand dollars on his seminary course—to quote an instance once reported to me—the administration may well examine its own trusteeship of its funds. We need the whole of a student's time.

This is not to say that all of his time will be spent in the classroom and the library. There is a place, a sorely needed place, for an apprenticeship of these candidates for the ministry. I do not mean that we should send them out to do the chores for lazy incumbents in the pastorate. I mean that we should find experienced ministers who will give the time to train these students in a parish; showing them how the job is done, what resources may be drawn upon in the pastor's study and in the community, letting them do supervised work in the church, giving wise counsel and criticism, and sending them back to school with a clearer appreciation of the tasks ahead and the skill and knowledge required to do them well. The seminaries might well pay such associate teachers, and expect correspondingly careful reports for the guidance of the student and faculty. Gaps between theory and practice, and the chilling disillusionment that often unnerves the seminary graduate in his first church, might then be avoided.

Meanwhile, a seminary is itself a community; and in its life are built up the attitudes, good and bad, that shape a man's career. Much that passes for personal freedom in the academic community is simply irresponsibility. Petty rivalries between the teachers make cynics of the students. The special subsidies of which I spoke may rob a student either of self-respect or else of moral sensibility. The critical habit of mind, so central to good scholarship, may lose its contact with appreciation and become a

supercilious callousness. More definite cultivation of the devotional life is desirable. Where is it harder to conduct a service of worship than in a theological school? Surely here, if anywhere, a group of men and women should find it possible to live as a little Christian community, learning its disciplines and its aspirations, realizing its values and its needs, getting a kinesthetic appreciation of what a Christian society might be. Worship and work would be one.

It is possible that, in the light of what I have already said about the fields of study, we should consider making the seminary course a four-year course. With subsidies reduced, this should not be impossible. The faculty would need to be augmented somewhat. However, it might be well for schools to specialize, so that for the first three years the school would give the student a general theological education, allowing him to go for his final year to another school which specialized in some one field of skill and knowledge. In turn other schools would send their men to this one to specialize in some other line of training for the common religious task.

And finally, provision should be made for the continuing education of our graduates. The alumni associations ought to be incorporated as educational institutions, as Vassar alumnæ have already been. Then dues would be in the nature of low tuition fees and to support a member of the staff of the school who would arrange refresher institutes, work out the details of their reading programs, and answer queries about lines of private study, possibly making available for a small rental fee small working libraries on special topics; or referring them to other schools which specialize in the problems with which they are concerned. From time to time through a coördinated program of institutes, held across the country under the auspices of the Association of Theological Schools, these men in active service could receive stimulation and guidance for continuing study, and enjoy again the scholar's life enriched by wide experience in the field.

But at the last we come back again to the calibre of our own men in the ministry, to their integrity, their intellectual eagerness, their independent thought, their depth of conviction, their steadiness of aim. The other day there came across my desk an inquiry from the Office of Price Administration, in the course of which they wanted our assurance that we at Crozer Seminary would not increase our costs of production or the price of our product! Whether we can do much about the *price* of our product I doubt. The churches determine that. But we can quite legitimately improve the *quality* of our product. This is our urgent task. This is our glorious opportunity.

THE DIVINE IN HOMER

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HOMER's *Iliad* and *Odyssey* are great works of fiction. Rightly understood they possess an artistic unity and beauty that is characteristically Greek. As epics, however, they were unique in their greatness among Greek works; and as moral forces, as molders of mankind, they are unique in the history of the world. The *Odyssey* is entertaining and has a plot that culminates in the downfall of the wicked, the plot that Aristotle calls ethical. It illustrates poetic justice. The heart of man, however, is sore and rebellious just because he cannot count on justice in this world. The best things in life are the flashes of joy and courage and insight that beckon and reward the individual, yet seem always to elude the attempt to imprison them in any institutionalized form of social security. The *Iliad* has a tragic plot. It depicts great and noble moments in individual lives that are not successful as society counts success. The real tragedy is not the death of a hero; it is the destruction of a sublime illusion. Shakespeare's Othello loves the ideal Desdemona. When that ideal is tarnished, the clue of life is lost. The inner tragedy of Othello was cause, not effect, of the strangling of Desdemona. Her death in the play, however, results in turn in a strengthening of the tragic discrepancy between ideal and actual. For the tragic sense of life is a sense of the tremendous power of ideals, a sense of something whose worth transcends all defeat by circumstance. It is chiefly in tales of defeat that human nature appears most divine. The spell of tragedy is strong in the *Iliad*, and just because the *Iliad* is tragic, it is profoundly moving and inspiring to a degree that is impossible for the success story.

The tragic plot as exploited by Homer determined the important rôle of fiction in European life and literature. Fiction in the Chinese world, for instance, is comparatively unimportant. Aristotle's dictum, that fiction is more philosophical than history, measures the difference between European and Chinese philosophy, which draws its lessons from history and does not deal fictionally with the tragedy of defeated ideals. Ideals in China were embodied in ritual and duties; society was a part of the harmony of nature to which the individual should conform. Hindu and European philosophy in contrast recognize a gulf that separates the inner and the outer world. The Hindu concludes that the outer world is an illusion and retires within himself; but even the world of desire and personality is also found to be an illusion, and so the devout Hindu, who eliminates illusion, must in the end cease to strive or to differentiate him-

self at all as a separate person. The Hindu individual does not seek to mold society because both individual and society are illusions; and illusions are not precious in the east as they are to the childish westerner. Contrast the Semitic conception of God manifesting his power in this world, so that disobedience to God is the great sin. With such a start all disputes resolve themselves into arguments about the nature and will of God; and the true believer, though he declares that God is infinite, is often chiefly concerned to impose his own limitations on others in the name of God. History is accordingly forced into a religious mold, and God is somehow seen at work in this world. Hinduism, on the other hand, excludes history as Confucianism excludes fiction. Confucianism sees goodness in man and happiness in life and labor, not a curse. One should be polite to the spirits but not effusive. They are a part of the unknown with which man and history are not concerned. How different from Jewish history, which treats men merely as instruments of God. Now the Greek world had something of all the others in it, for it was unique in possessing philosophy, history, and fiction, all three. Its fiction was also unique in the world in that it was profoundly concerned with man's place in the universe. Furthermore there was a third unique element in Greek life, in that fiction of the highest order guided the Greek imagination long before history and philosophy came into being. Neither priests nor kings troubled the free play of Greek imagination. The Greek was hot for certainty and curious about God, man, and nature. Tragedy seems to give but a dusty answer; yet tragedy is itself a triumph over despair, for it frees the inner man from involvement in essential disaster, as long as he truly strives for the ideal best. Tragedy clears the mind of cant; it adds to the spiritual potential of its audience. Philosophy and history, when they came, flourished in Greece as nowhere else in the world partly because they too had learned to separate the ideal and the actual and to see both steadily and to see them whole. It was Homer who freed the Greek mind and made it creative to the end of time. The sense of tragedy is as marked in Thucydides and Plato as it is in Homer.

Hence it is not surprising that wherever the Greek spirit has spread, it has produced an awakening or a renascence of creative forces in all departments of life. Its working is perennial, and it is only now effectively penetrating the orient through the medium of modern European influence. It is true, I think, that apart from science and philosophy, the writers of Europe who influence the orient are largely authors of fiction. They are heirs of Homer rather than of Thucydides, the critical historian, or of Plato, the religious philosopher. Furthermore Greek history and philosophy in fact generally follow the lead of Homer in depicting men

as responsible agents who suffer from mistakes rather than from ill luck or perverse destiny, and in glorifying within man the divine power of controlling or rising above circumstances by forethought, self-mastery, and spiritual freedom. Man's great source of weakness, his besetting sin in Greek tragedy, is ignorance of his own limitations. Those limitations are regarded as ultimate and as imposed by the nature of things. No priest or institutions can quite remove them or guarantee salvation. Man must do the best he can and heroically suffer the consequences with calm of mind and fixity of purpose.

The ideal of the *Odyssey* is social; the punishment of sinners against a social moral code is its dominant theme. It also, however, glorifies the woman Penelope, who clings to her ideal of loyalty to her husband far beyond the point that any social code had set. She is exalted as an individual of superior standards who sets her own mark and maintains it. There is just a suspicion of tragedy in her recognition of Odysseus when she laments the wasted years of their long separation. The gods had rejoined them, but an incurable sense of loss remained. The part played by the gods in the *Odyssey* is comparatively simple. Athena takes a personal interest in Odysseus and helps him. Poseidon is personally interested, for no ethical reason, in punishing him. The council of the gods, headed by Zeus, recognizes that Odysseus deserves help, and Poseidon ultimately yields to the general will, which Athena executes by advising and encouraging the human characters who are to succeed.

The part of the gods in the *Iliad* is much more important and much more complex. There is a family of gods rather than a council, and Zeus as *pater familias* imposes his decisions upon his wife, brothers, and children; they on occasion deceive, disobey, or scold him. Zeus alone is morally responsible. He is resolved that Troy must fall because Paris violated the code of hospitality when he stole Helen, but Zeus at the same time supports Achilles in his quarrel with Agamemnon. Achilles is the nobler of the two in character, though Agamemnon has power, wealth, and an inherited kingship to reinforce his appeal to Zeus. The defeat of the Achæans gives the Trojans a temporary respite, but this is necessary if the cause of personal worth, represented by Achilles, is to be vindicated. Hera and Athena are not interested in vindicating Achilles. They have a personal hatred for the Trojans. Only in the last book of the *Iliad* are the gods united in council to impose a moral code on mankind. They order Achilles to cease to maltreat the body of Hector and to accept ransom forgetting his wrath. Thus the position of the gods in the *Odyssey* as a council who act together to further justice is foreshadowed in the older poem. Poseidon, who exceptionally in the *Odyssey* plays the part of devil sending disaster and trial to torment the hero, is prefigured in

the *Iliad* by the many gods who act spitefully or rebelliously in opposition to Zeus. Aphrodite favors the disgraceful and sinful Paris, Apollo slays the Achæan Patroclus; and Athena in turn coöperates with Achilles in the defeat of Hector. The gods are not only a family; they have their personal likes and dislikes.

In a way, however, the gods of Olympus are also organized, not as a family nor politically, but as an epitome of human life, or rather as a confused apotheosis of the realms of nature and the departments of society in combination. Zeus is the weather and rules the air from Mount Olympus, but he also is patron of kings and kingly men. He is the court of honor to which Agamemnon and Achilles appeal; his verdict is disclosed when the battle goes against Agamemnon. Thus began the European tradition that kings may not be absolute, that they too must obey the code. Poseidon is a sea-level Zeus who rules ocean and rivers and causes seismic waves on land. Athena and Hera are city-goddesses. Athena is not quite yet the embodiment of united force and reason that she became in later times. She and Hera still retain the theriomorphic epithets "owl-faced" and "cow-faced" that are usually translated "gray-eyed" and "lustrous-eyed." Athena is also patroness of women's crafts, such as spinning and weaving, as Hephæstus is of the smith's craft. Hephæstus is incidentally a personification of fire as Zeus is of meteorological phenomena or Poseidon of water and sea, but the patron of smiths cannot rank with the patrons of kings. The divine smith was lame like his human counterparts, and they were lame because only lame men would resign themselves to the inferior status of a smith. The myth that Hephæstus was lamed when he was thrown from heaven by angry Zeus is an explanation that is itself explained by the facts that it was invented to explain. In China today lame men become smiths and blind men ballad singers. The patron of singers and seers in the *Iliad,* Apollo, is for some reason not blind, perhaps because he is armed with the bow of an angel of death, but there are many blind seers and poets in Greek legend. Apollo, lord of song, besides the enchantment of music and verse and the cant of the seer, also presides over medicine, which was once no doubt largely incantation. As patron of medicine he is also god of disease and slays men by invisible arrows. It is his sister Artemis who slays women in their beds. Thus she too had a bow and was a huntress. The popular gods of religious ecstasy and recreation, Dionysus and Demeter, whose worship was important in later Greek life as a means of solace and salvation for the individual, are hardly mentioned in Homer.

Hermes was an athletic young man, patron of those who go abroad: diplomats, merchants, thieves, and souls of the dead. His name might be translated Mr. Post or postman, for he is a personified boundary post

or tombstone. He appropriately conducts Priam to the hostile camp in Book 24 of the *Iliad*. Earlier in the poem Iris, the personified rainbow, carries messages from gods to men. Ares, the god of blind violence, who does not know in which army he is fighting, and Aphrodite, who does not care in whose arms she is lying, are too unruly to be accorded much respect in Homer. In the *Odyssey* they are guilty of adultery. Married love among the gods was represented by Zeus and Hera, though Hera was at least once guilty of using the technique of Aphrodite.

Thus Homer had many excuses for bringing gods into his story. It is worth noting that the designs of the gods and their movements, while known to the poet and his hearers, are unknown to his characters except by inference unless the gods announce themselves or appear visibly in their own proper form. It is a natural inference that plague was caused by Apollo or that Paris was saved by Aphrodite. A man shipwrecked as often as Odysseus must be hated by Poseidon. Either good luck or bad luck could be attributed to a god. Natural traits and acquired skills also had their patron gods.

When so much of life is found to be determined by unknown and superhuman forces, it is not surprising that Homer found it convenient to introduce gods as natural causes. For literary convenience he also introduces an occasional miracle into his plot. Apollo conveniently preserves the body of Hector for delivery after many days to Priam. Athena in person introduces Odysseus to his son Telemachus, who might have found it difficult to recognize him without divine assistance. Priam himself points out that no soothsayer could have persuaded him, as did the divine command of Zeus, to go unarmed to visit Achilles in the hostile camp. Homer thus warns the young not to trust soothsayers too far, and not always to imitate the heroes of fiction.

The gods are also helpful when a hero must act out of character. In the *Iliad* Athena makes Achilles circumspect when circumspection is necessary. If he had acted in character, he would have slain Agamemnon at the beginning of the quarrel. The same goddess makes the circumspect Odysseus courageous beyond his wont in the later poem. The ending of the *Iliad* becomes moral when the gods enjoin upon Achilles a respect for the dead that was not a part of his savage code. The immediate obedience yielded by Homer's heroes to divine commands is a lesson in humility for his heroes. It also makes it possible to interpret the gods as natural forces working in the human heart. When Aphrodite bids Helen go to Paris, however, Helen is rebellious; the effect is to make her an unwilling sinner, a victim of fate rather than a bad woman. Paris is by contrast a willing sinner. Hence he can never be treated with respect as Helen is by all in the *Odyssey* and even by Priam in the *Iliad*.

Observe his polite formula: "I blame, not you, but the gods for your action."

The important thing to note in Homer, however, is the personal responsibility of his heroes and the moral clarity of his depiction of character in a crisis. The suitors of the *Odyssey* are left with no excuse for their sin in wooing Penelope while her husband lives. Agamemnon, since he acted alone in taking Briseis from Achilles, fully deserved the quarrel and defeat that followed. Achilles chose for himself glory in preference to long life. He was a free agent in his decision to avenge Patroclus in spite of Thetis' warning that he must himself die soon after Hector. Hector was twice advised by Polydamas to be cautious. Both times he refused, and on the second occasion disaster followed. Hence shame impelled him to face Achilles' spear rather than the taunts of Trojans who might blame him for their losses. Thus the moral choices stand out in high relief among the scenes in Homer. Nor is the sense of social obligation ignored; it is Agamemnon's arbitrary action that justifies the rebel Achilles. When he too would be arbitrary, he is warned by the gods and yields. In the *Odyssey* it is chiefly the social code that is honored. Even the gods conform to the code. Poseidon's continued persistence in enmity to Odysseus is a transparent literary device. Another notable literary device enables Homer to glorify Odysseus even when all the gods were against him in the period of his wanderings before the opening of the *Odyssey*. Homer puts the account of these wanderings into the mouth of Odysseus himself. He naturally never confesses his sins or discloses the fact that he was being punished for violation of shrines at the sack of Troy. He represents himself as plagued, not by the Olympians, but by natural obstacles or by savages such as the cyclops or by Circe. Narrator and actor are one; the poet need not comment.

Homer's gods are immortal, carefree, and irresponsible. His men in contrast must take the consequences of their acts. As a rule they act in character without explanation. It is only at great moments that Homer depicts the thought that precedes action. In such cases a soliloquy makes it clear that the hero's code of honor requires him to act as he does even at the cost of life. Homer's best men take it upon themselves to be loyal to an ideal or at times to create a new standard of conduct. Thus they achieve a certain divinity and an immortality of glory. The ancient critic noted that Homer's men are like gods while his gods are like men. Yet his men are gods only in spirit, not in power. Human divinity is linked with fallibility. Both Achilles and Hector are victims of their own mistakes. Homer underlines the lesson that man does not control the universe. At the same time his men control their own choices and are slaves neither to heredity nor to environment nor to chance nor to custom.

Thus Homer fostered the cult of the individual, which has long flourished in Europe and now begins to inspire, startle, or dismay the east. Note, however, that the individual who is glorified in Homer is a moral individual, one who regards conscience, honor, and the warnings of the gods, as well as the judgment of mankind.

It is with no desire to belittle other writers of fiction that I have celebrated the unique achievement of Homer as the inventor or at least perfecter of fictional tragedy. His work has been continued in Europe by dramatists and novelists: Æschylus, Sophocles, Shakespeare, Tolstoi, and others. In some respects these followers surpass him, but it is part of his greatness to have begotten sons capable of adding to his gift. Fiction uninfluenced by Homer, that is, Asiatic fiction, will probably not appeal to an American audience as superior in moral quality, whatever the verdict of the orient may be. The Hindu epics celebrate superhuman characters who move in a world of miracles. Hence they seem to lack the moral relevance of a character who must act in a world that sets bounds to his knowledge and power and must make his decisions with acute awareness of those limits. We miss the spiritual power that makes character the key to destiny. The Chinese novel, in spite of Chinese failure to appreciate it, is excellent fiction, but it lacks the scope of Homer's conception. The actual world engulfs its actors. Action is too much forced by circumstances. The element of divine creativeness is absent or unstressed. Buddhist pessimism dominates the mood of *The Dream of the Red Chamber.* This great novel contains much psychology but not the psychology of action. The human spirit does not break its chains or rise from the tomb. Chinese drama tends to emphasize feeling at the expense of thought, and so does the Japanese. The Japanese No-drama certainly clears the mind of weakness, but to an outsider it seems to chain the spirit to a formula of uncreative self-surrender. The Japanese code demands loyalty to persons or to an ideal that is not subject to rational scrutiny. Action becomes a branch of æsthetics and loses the sanction of redemptive accomplishment. In the Lady Murasaki's novel, *The Tale of Genji,* there is a tragic sense of life which deepens as she proceeds, but here again man is imprisoned within a prescribed pattern of behavior and belief that denies freedom to the individual will. The westerner demands a code that is tolerant of new religious and ethical insights. The overthrow of the powers that be by a man of superior insight and virtue would not accord with Japanese notions of propriety. When in Japanese drama the peasant Sogoro wins release from taxes for his community and suffers at the same time the penalty of crucifixion, noble and good though he is, he is not a successful rebel like Æschylus' crucified god Prometheus, nor does he effect an atonement between God and man. He merely saves

a few men for a brief time without producing any permanent change in an iniquitous system. Prometheus is the symbol of reason and humanity, ideals that made Greek life in its great centuries creative and progressive. Though Homer's Achilles is not a personification of reason, yet his wrath serves a reasonable purpose, to teach the stupid Agamemnon that arbitrary use of power defeats itself, that spiritual and moral forces cannot always be disregarded, and that Zeus favors the magnanimous.

Our notion of the importance of the individual is reinforced and extended by the blending of Christianity and its emphasis upon personal regeneration and spiritual life with the Greek concept of action as occurring in two worlds at once, so that inner values may tip the scales against outer pressure. Modern science again with its emphasis on experiment as against authority has also confirmed our cult of the individual, for it is always an individual who experiments and pins his faith to the result. A code that encourages the individual has comparatively little to fear from personal initiative, for flexibility and change, being included in the concept and framework of society, do not challenge the common purpose. In the east those individuals who defy authority are only too likely to be diverted through rebellion to a pattern of arbitrary action. It is hard for anyone brought up to regard all personal decision as bold presumption to overstep the bounds of custom without disregarding any and all limitations. Only when a new educational method has conquered the orient will the union of power and moderation, of wisdom and reform, of interest in others with tolerance of differences become a successful ideal. It will, of course, not be hard for the orient to improve on western practice, if it tries. If in this way the world attains spiritual unity and a common purpose, it will be a world of men awake, for, as Heracleitus said, the sleeper has a private world of his own. The great awakeners of mankind are prophets and poets and philosophers or scientists. Of these Homer is first in time among his peers in the domain of fiction—not the fiction that entertains, but the fiction that fixes action in an artistic mold and dominates the imagination of afterages.

THE SATOR ACROSTIC

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In the study of the relation between early Christianity and its contemporary environment, as in every other field of inquiry, attention must of necessity shift continually from the larger issues and established inferences to the minutiæ of fact and back again. Only in this way can the proper perspectives be maintained, and factual information uphold its prerogative as the ultimate test and determinant of all theory. An interesting example of this salutary interplay between fact and hypothesis is provided by the recent discussion of what is commonly known as the "Sator Rebus." The text consists of five five-letter words arranged in a square as follows:

S A T O R
A R E P O
T E N E T
O P E R A
R O T A S

Technically speaking it is not a rebus at all, but a reversible, four-way acrostic, that is, an acrostic that can be read in any one of four different directions beginning with the *S* of *sator,*[1] and in four opposite directions beginning with the *R* of *rotas* if the sequence of the words is reversed.[2]

Until quite recently the earliest evidence for the existence of this acrostic belonged to the fourth century A.D., but from that time on and down even into modern times it has been in continuous use over an amazingly wide area, particularly as an apotropaic formula in Christian contexts.[3] As an acrostic there is little to distinguish it from other similar aphabetical *jeux d'esprit* of antiquity, save perhaps that, beginning with a noun in the nominative (*sator*), having a verb in the middle (*tenet*) and concluding with a noun in the accusative (*rotas*), it bids fair to make connected sense. This certainly cannot be said of most of its ancient or modern counterparts. The difficulty in this case is that the second word is obscure in its meaning, and the fourth in its relation to the rest of the formula. Numerous attempts have therefore been made to "solve" the acrostic, whether by interpreting the meaning and relationship of the

[1] Horizontally and vertically from left to right beginning at the upper left, and horizontally and vertically from right to left beginning at the lower right.

[2] Horizontally and vertically from right to left beginning at the lower left, and horizontally and vertically from left to right beginning at the upper right.

[3] For a survey of the known instances of its occurrence cf. the article of G. de Jerphanion, "La formule magique 'Sator Arepo' ou 'Rotas Opera,' vielles théories et faits nouveaux," reprinted in his *La Voix des Monuments,* 1938, pp. 38-76.

several words or by using the numerical equivalents of the several letters.[4] None of these interpretations can be said to be convincing.

In 1926 a further addition was made to the list of the proposed solutions by F. Grosser, who suggested that the acrostic is a cryptogram invented by Christians to represent certain religious symbols, particularly the cross and the Lord's Prayer.[5] In support of his suggestion he showed that if the words of the acrostic are broken down into their component letters these can be rearranged as follows:

A
P
A
T
E
R
A P A T E R N O S T E R O
O
S
T
E
R
O

This solution was so striking that it was subsequently accepted, sometimes even as correct beyond the shadow of a doubt, by many scholars of distinction.[6] Though this verdict is here to be disputed, it should be said in favor of the proponent of the suggestion and of those who first accepted it, that at the time the earliest evidence for the existence of the acrostic was still of the fourth century, and that the creation of the cryptogram was assigned to the period of the great persecutions. This provided a measure of verisimilitude for the solution, for not only were the circumstances of the period conducive to cryptic utterance by Christians, but the elements of the solution, the cross, the *Pater Noster*, and the alpha and omega were so well established as symbols of the Christian faith that their combination in the fashion proposed was at least conceivable.

[4] For a brief statement of the literature on the subject cf. F. Dornseiff, *Das Alphabet in Mystik u.Magie*, 2 ed., 1925, pp. 79, 179.

[5] "Ein neuer Vorschlag zur Deutung der *sator*-Formel," *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, XXIV (1926), pp. 165-169.

[6] Cf. *e.g.*, O. Weinreich in his review of Grosser's article, *Gnonom*, VI (1930), pp. 365-367: "Zweifel an der Richtigkeit der Lösung unmöglich" *ibid.*, p. 366; M. I. Rostovtzeff, *Excavations at Dura-Europos, Report V* (1934), pp. 159-160: a more cautious statement of acceptance; and Jerphanion in the article mentioned above.

Grosser's solution would probably have passed into the archives and have been filed away for general reference had it not been that in the decade which followed additional examples of the acrostic from much earlier times kept coming to light. The first to receive attention was a group of no less than four examples from a portion of the Temple of Azzanathkona at Dura, more particularly from a room used by the *actuarii* of an auxiliary cohort of the Roman army from the middle of the second century on, the period to which the texts belong.[7] If Grosser's solution is correct, the repeated occurrence of the acrostic at Dura is a significant indication of the spread of Christianity in the Roman army, as Rostovtzeff quickly realized. The validity of the solution thus became more than a matter of passing interest. Still greater importance began to attach to the solution when in 1936 della Corte discovered an instance of the acrostic in the course of excavations at Pompeii, and by the discovery was led to identify another text found there in 1925 as a fragment of the same formula.[8] Here now, by reason of Grosser's solution, the acrostic became the touchstone for the appearance of Christianity in the ancient Roman city, being widely hailed because it appeared to provide one of those extremely rare ocular demonstrations of processes and developments so clear to the historian on general principles but so hard to document from factual evidence.[9]

Probable as it is that there were Christians at Pompeii between A.D. 50 and 79,[10] the period to which the local instances of the acrostic belong, it is on general grounds again most improbable that they should at this time have invented a formula along the lines suggested by Grosser. A moment's reflection will show why this is so. The proposed solution implies that the acrostic is a device intended to conceal something too dangerous to write in any other way. The need for such concealment might conceivably be argued from the episode of the Neronian "persecution," though not with the same force as in the case of the Decian persecution, but the theory of concealment is difficult to combine with the fact that the acrostic is prominently displayed on a column of Pompeii's palæstra, and is followed by three lines of text in the same hand, a text of which we have as yet no official rendering, but which seems to contain the name of the writer of the graffito and the concluding word *Vale*.[11]

[7] Cf. *Report V*, pp. 159-160, and *Report VI* (1936), p. 486. One of the texts is in Greek.

[8] M. della Corte, "Il crittogramma del 'Pater Noster' rinvenuto a Pompei," *Atti della Accademia Romana di Archeologia*, Series III, Rendiconti, XII (1937), pp. 397-400.

[9] Cf. *e.g.*, F. V. Filson, "Were there Christians in Pompeii?" *Biblical Archæologist*, II, 2 (May, 1939), pp. 13-16 and M. Burrows, *What Mean These Stones?* 1941, pp. 33-34.

[10] M. della Corte, "I Cristiani a Pompei," available only as a reprint from *Rendiconti della R. Accademia di Archeologia Lettere e Belle Arti della Società Reale di Napoli*, XVII (1939).

[11] Cf. the reproduction of the column and the inscription in Fig. 1, p. 398, of della Corte's article already mentioned.

The solution implies furthermore that by the third quarter of the first century Christianity had already developed to the point where the cross and the *Pater Noster* were standard symbols capable of combination, and that the alpha and omega formula was already so well known that it could be represented without further ado by Latin *a* and *o*.[12] In other words, seen from the angle of Grosser's solution, there is really little difference between the highly developed Christian symbolism of the third and fourth centuries and the symbolic representations of the Christian faith that may have developed in the very first generation of its history.

The development of Christianity in the apostolic and immediately subapostolic ages appears to the present writer to run counter to these implications. Of course there were magical practices, signs, and developing formulæ, but what is known about these things from New Testament texts such as Paul's letters, the Apocalypse, and the Acts of the Apostles, from noncanonical products of early Christianity such as I Clement and the Shepherd, and from the differences between the earlier and the later phases of Christian catacomb decoration, all points toward an initial tentative groping after forms and symbols of expression rather than to the rich complexity expressed in Grosser's composite design. More specifically, it is clear that the alpha and omega formula (and perhaps also the aleph-tau formula) was used in religious documents by Christians of the Eastern church before the end of the first century A.D.[13] It is not evident, however, that the symbolism would have been quite as clear in the West at this time, that the possibility of its attachment (in duplicate!) to a *Pater Noster* cross would have suggested itself until after both symbols had been in existence independently for some time, or that its rendition in a Latin context by the use of Latin *a* and *o* would have been intelligible. Similarly, it is conceivable that the importance attaching to the death of Christ in the Pauline theology and the developing use of the *sphragis,* or "seal," in connection with cult practices,[14] might have led to the symbolic use of a cross such as that which Maiuri found at Herculaneum, supposing it to be Christian.[15] What is not clear is that by the middle of the first century the symbol would have been sufficiently divorced from the object symbolized to permit its representation in an equilateral form and by an

[12] The importance of the Greek language as the standard idiom of Christian utterance and communication in the western world up to the period of Minucius Felix makes the use of Latin in the formula surprising, if not strange.

[13] For the alpha and omega formula and its association with the *Aion* speculation cf. the article by Kittel in *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament s.v.* and the literature there quoted. For the aleph-tau formula and its use in connection with Isa. 44:6 by the Tannaim cf. *ibid.*; on the possibility of its use by Paul cf. D. Atkinson, "The Sator Formula and the Beginnings of Christianity," *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library,* XXII (1938), pp. 419-434.

[14] Cf. II Cor. 1:22 and F. Dölger, *Sphragis, Studien zur Geschichte u. Kultur des Altertums,* V, 3-4 (1911).

[15] A. Maiuri, "La Croce di Ercolano," *Rendiconti della Pontificia Accademia di Archeologia,* XV (1939), Figs. 6-8, pp. 13-16 of the reprint form, the only form in which it is available.

arrangement of the letters of the alphabet.[16] Again it is evident from the Pauline letters that the words "Our Father" were an element of the liturgical language of the churches, irrespective of their use in the developed forms of the Lord's Prayer.[17] Yet it is not clear that these words could at this time (that is, before the use of the initium: *Pater Noster* as a convenient mode of reference to the Lord's Prayer in the Latin environment) have stood alone outside a larger liturgical context, especially since the standard form of isolated reference to deity in prayer was, as Paul and Mark testify, the simple "Abba, Father" (Gal. 4:6; Rom. 8:15; Mark 14:36). Finally, the lack of any relation between the cross and the Lord's Prayer on the one hand, and the distinction between the Father and the Crucified on the other imply that only when the cross and the *Pater Noster* have become formal symbols can they be thought to have been combined in the way Grosser proposes.[18]

General considerations of this type have impelled at least one scholar, Jerphanion, who had previously accepted Grosser's interpretation, to drop it when the Pompeian material came to light.[19] His example has not been followed widely to date. The difficulty is twofold, first that generalizations do need to be revised continually to fit the factual evidence at our disposal, and second that the Sator acrostic, broken down into its constituent letters, does provide the material needed to construct a *Pater Noster* cross with *A's* and *O's* attached. The last-mentioned is the one point that seems to leave scholars most completely at a loss, perhaps for the very reason that they are scholars. It appears to suggest that only the discovery of a pre-Christian Sator text (not a remote possibility by any means) will finally settle the issue. Actually, however, the point is not difficult to cope with and will readily betray its inherent weakness to anyone who can combine a modicum of antiquarian knowledge with a fair understanding of the gentle pastime of acrostic making. For the making of acrostics has by no means ceased, nor has it changed throughout the centuries, because

[16] Neither the *labarum* (supposing that it had something to do with the cross) nor the so-called "blasphemous crucifix of the third century, nor the cross of Herculaneum (supposing that it is a Christian symbol) was equilateral. Indeed, the earliest literary reference to the cross as a symbol, in the *Epistle of Barnabas* (9:8), associates it with the form of the Greek letter *tau, i.e.,* T.

[17] The words occur regularly in the formula "Grace be to you and peace" in the salutations of Paul's letters and elsewhere in Paul only in two passages in the Thessalonian letters (I Thess. 2:16; II Thess. 3:11-13). These passages I am inclined to regard as formal prayers, the earliest Christian prayers of which we have evidence. The introduction of the word "our" as a modifier of "Father" in the Matthæan form of the Lord's Prayer and in that of *Didaché* 8:2 is part and parcel of the use of liturgical form.

[18] To the extent that Grosser originally had a third-century setting in mind for the creation of the *Pater Noster* cross of his solution he has become the victim of circumstance by reason of the discovery of the Sator acrostic at Pompeii. What has been said about the solution up to this point should therefore be taken to apply only to those who accept it while maintaining the first-century origin of the supposed cryptogram. Incidentally, it is the combination of the several elements in a design such as Grosser's, rather than differences on matters of detail, that appear to render insufficient the discussion of Atkinson in the *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library* referred to above.

[19] Cf. his article, "A propos des exemplaires trouvés a Pompei du carré magique 'Rotas Opera,'" reprinted in *La voix* des monuments, pp. 77-89.

its laws are fixed by the resistance which language naturally offers to those who venture to make its elements yield artificial patterns. When it is the origin of an acrostic that is at issue, the voice of the acrostic maker should be heard for whatever it may be worth in the court even of scholarly opinion.

Seen from the angle of the maker of acrostics there are three fallacies in the recent treatment of the Sator word square. The first is the assumption that as an acrostic it needs solution, and has actually been solved by Grosser's suggestion, the second that it might with some degree of likelihood have been constructed from a *Pater Noster* cross with attached *A's* and *O's*, and the third that it must of necessity express coherent meaning in the combination of all its several elements.

The most important thing to be said in connection with the first of these matters is that an acrostic is not primarily or fundamentally a puzzle any more than a rebus is a word square. True, there are rebuses the pictorial elements of which are set in a pattern of squares, and there are acrostic poems the text of which propounds a riddle, but the function of the rebus is still to conjure up a word or its first letter by a picture or description of the "thing," and the function of the acrostic is to arrange letters in such a way as to spell words in other directions than horizontally from left to right. A word square being only a complicated form of acrostic, one does not normally and should not approach it in search of some concealed utterance. Nor does it appear that any of its familiar examples from antiquity, whether Greek, Latin, or Hebrew, *e.g.*,

αλφα	R O M A	פרשנו
λεων	O M	רעבתן
φωνη	M O	שברכש
ανηρ	A M O R	נתבער
		ונשרף [20]

require such examination. The cryptic element enters the picture when more meaning is looked for and seen in the arrangement of the words than they are capable of expressing or were intended to express. In large measure this is a procedure that has its roots in antiquity, for the ancients used acrostics and particularly word squares as apotropaic devices. The Alpha acrostic reproduced above was so used and appears on occasion in juxtaposition to the Sator acrostic as Leclercq shows. This does not mean that it needs to be *solved*. It means that generations steeped in alphabet speculation and numerology could not regard the square merely as the product of human ingenuity. It was so striking that it participated some-

[20] For the three texts cf. Leclercq in Cabrol, *Dictionnaire s.v.* "Amulettes"; E. Diehl, *Pompeianische Wandinschriften*, 2 ed. (1930), no. 856, p. 65; *Jewish Encyclopedia s.v.* "Acrostic."

how in the pattern of things and thus had dynamic significance. The analogy here is the Pythagorean number speculation as the Gnostics developed it, and the tendency of the Christian evangelists to find "mysteries" even in the parables of Jesus.

In a sense Grosser's own proposed solution of the Sator acrostic is but a perpetuation of this ancient practice. It is really not a solution at all, but only one of those amazing products of letter juggling that have made alphabet speculation the occult science it has been down through the centuries. One indication of this fact is the thoroughly improbable situation which it creates for the builder of the Sator acrostic. This will be dealt with below. Another is the fact that the twenty-five letters of the acrostic can, in sport at least, be rearranged to produce still other similar "solutions," as for instance:

A
P
A
T
O
R
A P A T O R N E R O E S T
E
R
O
E
S
T

Of course this is sheer nonsense and bad Latin to boot, but for the purposes of a *reductio ad absurdum* one could if necessary maintain that a cryptic reference to Nero's "virgin birth" is no more or less inane than many of the things which, according to Suetonius,[21] were being bandied about at Rome at the time, and that a "solution" which uses all twenty-five letters of the Sator acrostic is superior to one that leaves two *A's* and *O's* over.

In connection with the second and the third objection made above to the treatment of the Sator acrostic it is important that one should know something about the various types of acrostics, how they are produced, and what is the degree of difficulty involved in their construction.

From the point of view of the builder the making of acrostics is primarily a test of ingenuity and the reward the delight offered to the

[21] *Nero* 39 and F. Bücheler's comment in *Rheinisches Museum*, N. S. 61 (1906), pp. 307 f.

eye when it discovers familiar combinations of vowels and consonants while moving in other directions than merely from left to right in a horizontal plane. In the case of acrostic psalms and poems, as in the case of the familiar formula

Ιησους
Χριστος
Θεου
Υιος
Σωτηρ,

the additional word-forming combinations revealed to the eye are limited to those composed of the initial letters of the several lines. Technically these are the simplest of all acrostics to construct, and here a maximum of sense can be conveyed because the restrictions imposed by the demands of the acrostic purpose are at their minimum. In proportion as the builder by his own decision increases the extent of his acrostic commitments, he necessarily reduces at once both the chances of the successful completion of his design and the chance of conveying coherent meaning by the words chosen.

Of the various types of acrostics the word square is the most demanding, for it sets limits to the number of letters in a line and to the number of lines. There is in existence an ancient acrostic square having as many as twenty-five letters to a side.[22] Here, however, the additional word-forming combinations are limited to the letters of the first, thirteenth, and twenty-fifth vertical rows and to two diagonal rows intersecting in the middle of the square. These rows, moreover, can be read only from top to bottom. Acrostics in which every vertical row is intended to form a word are more difficult and necessarily of much smaller compass. Squares of four- and five-letter words are the most common. The Alpha acrostic given above is an example of this type. Even the unskilled amateur can produce such as this, though he may be surprised to learn how many squares well-begun cannot be completed, and doubly surprised if he tries to make the words of his square contribute to the expression of an idea. Yet the example in question is actually only a two-way acrostic, for the letters make words only when read horizontally from left to right and vertically from top to bottom.

More difficult and consequently more satisfying to the builder are squares composed of five-letter words, and among these again the most difficult those which, like the Sator acrostic, can be read in four different directions. Here the chances that the builder will succeed in his efforts are greatly reduced and those of making all five words contribute to

[22] For the text cf. the article of Leclercq in Cabrol, *Dictionnaire s.v.* "Acrostiche."

the expression of a predetermined idea very small indeed. Abraham ibn Ezra, to whom the Hebrew acrostic quoted above is credited, succeeded, and the modern, having special acrostic dictionaries at his disposal, can succeed likewise.[23] Yet the task is not as easy as it seems, and the temptation to descend to the use of proper names and thereby to depart from purist standards one that is ever-present.

The bearing of this upon the subject under discussion is twofold. It shows first how utterly unlikely it is that any word square was ever made the way Grosser suggests that the Sator acrostic was made. The difficulties of the undertaking being what they are, it is virtually inconceivable that anyone should ever have ventured upon such an enterprise in the effort to find room and place for a collection of four *A's, E's, O's, R's,* and *T's,* two *P's* and *S's,* and one *N.* The acrostic builder begins rather with a word, the letters of which he makes the beginning each of another word of the same length. The word he begins with may be such that the resultant acrostic can be read in no more than two directions, as in the case of the Alpha acrostic given above. To create a four-way acrostic he must begin with a word which, when reversed, still makes sense, as in the case of the Roma-Amor square already mentioned. To build a five-letter word square that can be read in four different directions he must have in addition to his reversible word for the outer frame, a palindrome to provide the major axial element of the filling. So, for instance, anyone constructing such an acrostic in English, might begin with the word *dates* and its reverse *sated* and by adding the palindrome *tenet* (borrowed in this case from the Sator formula) create the following pattern:

D A T E S
A E A
T E N E T
E E E
S A T E D.

Having proceeded to this point he would find himself stymied by his inability to fill the remaining gaps in the design and thus have to begin with another reversible word of five letters.

What has been said above bears not only upon the improbability of the procedure which Grosser has imagined in accounting for the origin of the Sator acrostic, but also upon the general range of the attempts that have been made to make sense out of it. Probably the most unique feature of the Sator square is its extremely wide distribution and its persistence down through the centuries. Such distribution and persistence

[23] Cf. P. M. Pearson, *The Acrostic Dictionary,* 2 ed., 1901.

are inconceivable apart from the assumption that some value other than that of a particularly successful product of the acrostic maker's art attaches to the text. Of course the value need not be the same at all times and in all places, and in part at least persistence is due more to the extent of initial distribution and frequency of usage than to continued recognition of its real meaning. Our own use of the ancient *abracadabra* formula as a standard metaphor for magical gibberish is a case in point. In accounting for the initial distribution and for the use of the Sator square as a magical charm some importance undoubtedly attaches to the tendency to believe that the interlocking of its several words could not be fortuitous and must be dynamic. If moderns can be impressed with the importance of the fact that the letters of the acrostic rearranged can yield a *Pater Noster* cross and find this fact absolutely cogent for the interpretation of the square, how much more will ancients have been impressed by the nature of the text as one that actually can be read in four different directions! But this is necessarily only a part of the picture. More still is needed.

Once the text had established itself as a magic formula, its adoption and perpetuation in Christian circles is readily explicable without the hypothesis of Christian origin. The palindrome *tenet* that forms a cross in its centre, the *sator* who could readily be identified with Christ as the *sower* of the gospel parable, and the *rotas* (wheels) that may have conjured up reminiscences of Ezekiel are enough to give the acrostic an assured place among the paraphernalia of Christian magic. That Christians were ever able to explain all its elements is more than dubious and quite unnecessary to its perpetuation. Behind this period of Christian usage, however, lies a still earlier one in which it was known as far east as Dura on the Euphrates and in which it therefore already had some specific significance. To ascertain the nature of this significance and with its help to reconstruct the circumstances under which someone might conceivably have been impelled to construct the acrostic, this is the real riddle of the Sator square.

At present the evidence available is not sufficient to permit a final solution of this riddle. We have one general indication of circumstances that may bear upon the construction of the acrostic. This is supplied by the nature of the localities in which its earliest instances appear. The one from Pompeii came to light on a column of the city's palæstra. Those from Dura belong to a room associated in the period of the texts with certain detachments of auxiliary troops. The soldiers inscribed upon the walls of this room not only formal dedicatory inscriptions and copies of the Sator acrostic but also in graffito form lists of names, a representation of a gladiator, and certain designs that appear to be magical in

significance.[24] The common denominator of these occurrences of the acrostic is the environment of the man of physical prowess. It is this type of man, most probably, who has either taken to himself or had constructed for himself the Sator acrostic so far as present indications go. Because of the diffusion of Christianity among the military by the third century A.D. it is not at all impossible that the meaning which the acrostic had for the soldiers of the Dura garrison had been implemented along the lines previously suggested by associations with Christian symbols of a supposedly prophylactic character. The fact that the interlocking *tenet*s made a cross may have been suggestive in this connection. However, in the case of the example from Pompeii such implementation appears to be ruled out by what we know about the state of contemporary Christian symbolism generally. Here recourse must therefore be taken to pagan formulæ and devices. In general it may be said on this point that men of physical prowess in the Roman period were no less devoted to the use of charms and magical prophylactics than are the professional athletes of today. The *tabellæ defixionum* made out for the charioteers who competed in the circus, assuring them of victory by bringing disaster upon their competitors, are cases in point.[25] Conceivably the Sator acrostic, in the environment in which we first find it, served as a charm for those who associated themselves with it and as a prophylactic against those who did not have it. Whether it was created by or for the strong men of the imperial age of Rome cannot yet be said. Additional evidence bearing upon their life and manners, their phobias and "lucky stars," may eventually clarify the picture. The only thing that can be said today, and that may or may not be of relevance for the question at issue, is that in such magical texts as the *tabellæ defixionum* the Greek *κατέχω* and its Latin equivalent *teneo* are common words.[26] Perhaps the acrostic was purposely constructed about *teneo* as a key word.

[24] Cf. in general *Report V*, pp. 151-165, and *Report VI*, pp. 482-493. For the graffito of the gladiator cf. *Report VI*, Fig. 31, p. 483, and for the magical designs *ibid.*, Figs. 33-36, pp. 496-499.

[25] Cf. A. Audollent, *Defixionum Tabellæ*, 1904, texts 275, 277, 282, 283.

[26] Cf. R. Wünsch, *Defixionum Tabellæ*, IG III 3 (1897), *passim* in the index *s.v.* *κατέχω*.

CATHOLICISM IN THE ANGLICAN MODE

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EVERY now and again a chance remark, overheard on street or at some gathering, starts one thinking, and thinking hard. Such seems to have been the case with President Hutchins, of Chicago, who told in a recent number of the *Christian Century* about his overhearing a fellow passenger in a street car remark, "It looks like the duration will be longer than the war." And, for the writer, such was the case when he heard, quite by chance, a summer resident in the community where he was taking services in the Episcopal church say to a friend, "That man who's at the Episcopal church—why doesn't he go to the church next to the station, where he belongs?" The "church next to the station" was the local Roman Catholic place of worship. The remark started one thinking, and thinking hard. And perhaps, for some readers of this journal, who may have been wondering about those of us who are Anglican Catholics, but who are too polite to put their wonder so bluntly, the results of one's thinking may be of interest.

First of all, there are Anglo-Catholics and Anglo-Catholics. There can be no doubt that some of us seem to be so Roman in our outlook, both ceremonially and doctrinally, that only a quibble about papal authority separates us from submission to the Holy See. But for the writer—and, he ventures to assert with confidence, for the great majority of those who with him would claim to be Anglican Catholics—Rome has very little real attraction. Naturally one must admire the devotion, the piety, the liturgical excellence of the Roman Church, not to speak of other splendid qualities. But the *spirit* of Rome does not attract us at all. Rome secures its dogmatic unity by the simple expedient of excommunicating everyone who disagrees; the resultant unity, therefore, is hardly very impressive. Rome has a rather fascist air, although many Roman Catholics hate fascism as deeply as do the rest of us. Rome seems to make a most unhappy distinction between a religion satisfactory for the masses of people, and a religion such as that professed by M. Jacques Maritain in our own day, or Baron von Hügel in an earlier decade. In certain ways, Rome may be said to encourage, or at least to countenance, a rather unfortunate superstition and commercialism in devotional practices, even if theologically neither would be at all allowed as valid. Rome is not only cautious about newer thought, which might be a good thing; it is often positively frightened of it, which is a bad thing. And so one could go

on: the spirit of Rome, as we see it, is not attractive to the Anglo-Catholic.

What in fact the summer resident, who has been quoted at the beginning of this essay, meant by her remark was that in sermon, and more than that in ceremonial practice, the object of her comment had acted "catholicly"—that is, he had preached a series of sermons on "The Catholic Faith," and in celebrating the sacraments had worn the ancient vestments and employed the traditional acts of devotion which express that faith. He had been quite free to do so, but all this was unfamiliar to her and she did not like the unfamiliar, especially when it looked, externally, and sounded, to one a little prejudiced perhaps, a bit like Roman Catholic phrases or actions.

But much more seriously, what can be said for Anglo-Catholics? How can we justify our position? What contribution have we to make to the religious world, and more particularly to the American scene?

The immediate answer to the first of these questions is that for us, the Episcopal Church is actually a "Catholic" communion, by which we mean that its Prayer Book, like its ministry and creeds, belongs to the central traditional stream of Christian life, and while influenced greatly by Reformation thought and theology is much more deeply on the Catholic than on the Protestant side. We have pledged ourselves to the faith set forth in that Prayer Book, and while we should not wish to absolutize the *book,* we should most certainly wish to insist that in loyalty to its general tendency and theological line we are obliged to hold to Catholic views.

This, for us, means that the historic faith in the triune God, the incarnate Lord, the atonement, the Church as the mystical body of Christ, the sacraments as the means of grace, is our priceless heritage. Most of us are quite prepared to allow for considerable reinterpretation and to welcome development of this faith; but to it we are committed, and for its maintenance and defense we are pledged, while its propagation is the ministry to which in fact we were ordained.

But the historic faith requires an outward expression, and this is achieved in the Church's worship, supremely in the Eucharist conceived as sacrifice and sacrament. Here again, restatement may be in order; but here again, "it is the mass that matters," and we contend for the centrality and adequacy, as Christian worship, of the Eucharistic act. The adornment of that service by music, ceremonial, vestments, even incense and bells and other means of "enrichment," seems to us not only appropriate but necessary, at least in the sense that the Eucharistic Lord is to be worshiped and offered in that setting which most perfectly expresses his "worth."

Ancillary to this rite, the other sacraments find their place. The age-old tradition of devotion, which finds that absolution following upon confession in the presence of a priest is the normal way to receive the assurance of God's forgiveness; the use of oil, with prayers, in illness; marriage as a sacramental rite, rather than a mere civil ceremony performed by a clergyman—here once again, we feel that the Prayer Book and Anglican tradition are with us and we rejoice in the renewed sacramental sense in our communion.

And as to the ministry—none of us, one hopes, would feel that there is something precious about the "Anglican three-stringed lute"—bishop, priest, deacon—were it not an historic form of ministry which both gives us continuity with the Church's great past and links us with "the holy Church throughout all the world" in our own day, as could no other external sign which is also a means of grace. Many of us are glad to discuss this matter with our brethren, sure that some way can be found both to preserve this external symbol of apostolic continuity and catholic community and at the same time to recognize, in their own kind, the several other ministries. But we must hold that which we have been given, for it is not ours but belongs to the great Christian tradition of which we are but a fragmentary part.

For those who know the Episcopal Church from the inside, there can be no doubt that "the movement is *up*." That is, the trend in the parishes and in the seminaries is in the Catholic direction; we who are Anglo-Catholics would say that this means that the Episcopal Church is coming more and more genuinely to realize and express its true nature. But this is coupled with an equally genuine liberality of scholarship and theological thought, and what has variously been called "liberal Catholicism" or "dynamic Catholicism" or "a modern Catholicism" is more and more coming to the fore.

That kind of Catholicism, in the Anglican mode, may be—and some of us are sure that it is—our peculiar contribution to the religious world, to the American scene as well. And some of us, too, are sure that such a Catholicism can be very good friends with Protestantism, and (if Rome will have it so) with Rome as is already the case with Eastern Orthodoxy, and so point the way towards that growth in love and understanding which one day will be rewarded when God, in his good time, grants us that "peace and unity which is according to his will."

THE DIVINE WILL

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THE PHRASE "will of God," considered only as relating to mankind, at once suggests agelong controversies over ideas preserved in our theological books in such words as *foreordination, predestination, determination, eternal purpose, determinate council, freewill, immutability,* and words of similar implications. The purpose in this discussion is not to revive the old controveries but to examine the basis in the original Greek of the New Testament words for the meaning of "will of God." Does it mean that a certain life and destiny of man was a divine, immutable plan, an arbitrary determination and command, or was it a divine desire and request?

What did "will of God" mean to Jesus and to the New Testament writers? Doubtless not exactly the same thing to any two of them, to say nothing of an identical conception common to all of them. But there must have been a basic conception which they all shared: Did it mean to them a fixed and unalterable purpose, or was it what God *desired* for men? Was it an arbitrary plan and decree whose execution was guaranteed by an almighty Autocrat, or was it the desire of a benevolent Creator for his creatures which might or might not be realized?

I have no intention or desire to reconsider the multitudinous arguments pro and con on foreordination and predestination. I am here raising the question whether or not certain Greek words used in the New Testament justify the conception often understood from the phrase "will of God." Is it *determination* or *desire?* Put the question this way: When Jesus said, "I came not to do mine own will but the will of him who sent me," and when he prayed, "Not what I will but what thou wilt," was he thinking of what the Supreme Ruler of the universe had *determined* for him, or was he thinking of what his Father *desired* him to do? When he said, "If any man willeth to do his will, he shall know of the teaching, whether it is of God," did he mean that if any one *determined* to do what God had *decreed* he would know? Or did he mean that if anyone *desired* to do what God *desired* him to do, he would know? When Paul says that God "would have all men to be saved," does he mean that all men are *destined* to be saved, or is it his thought that God *desires* all men to be saved?

It will be noted that the alternatives suggested above are in each case radically different, and that man's outlook on life and his attitude toward God are vitally affected by his choice between these alternative conceptions. But whichever conception you choose in the passages quoted,

the authority is the same in either case; for both conceptions have been drawn from the same words, namely, the Greek noun *thelēma* and the verb *thelein*. In the one case these words are interpreted to mean *will, determination, purpose,* which is a secondary meaning of the words; and in the other case they are understood to mean *wish, desire,* which is their primary meaning. What was the thought of Jesus and the New Testament writers in their day when these words of our Greek New Testament were in general and daily use? A few illustrations are in point. If *determination* was the primary meaning, certain passages would require for clear meaning the following translations in which I am italicising the words which would render the Greek word *thelein:*

Matt. 5:42 "From him that *is determined* to borrow from thee turn not thou away."

7:12 "All things therefore whatsoever *ye are determined* that men shall do to you, even do ye also to them."

8:2 f. "Lord, if *thou art determined,* thou canst make me clean . . . *I am determined;* be thou cleansed."

9:13 "*I am determined* to have mercy and not sacrifice."

19:21 "If *thou art determined* to be perfect, go, sell that which thou hast. . . ."

20:32 "Jesus said, What *are ye determined* that I shall do unto you?"

26:15 "What *are ye determined* to give me, and I will deliver him unto you?"

Mark 6:48 "He cometh unto them, walking on the sea; and *was determined* to pass by them."

10:35 f. "Teacher, *we are determined* that thou shalt do for us whatsoever we shall ask of thee."

Luke 10:24 "Many prophets and kings *were determined* to see the things which ye see, and saw them not."

John 3:8 "The wind blows where *it determines.*"

5:6 "Jesus saith unto him, *Art thou determined* to be made whole?"

12:21 "Sir, *we are determined* to see Jesus."

15:7 "Ask whatsoever *ye are determined* to have and it shall be done unto you."

Rom. 13:3 *"Art thou determined* to have no fear of the power?"

16:19 *"I am determined* that ye shall be wise. . . ."

I Cor. 7:7 *"I am determined* that all men shall be as I myself."

II Cor. 5:4 "Not for that *we are determined* to be unclothed. . . ."

Jas. 2:20 *"Art thou determined* to know . . . that faith apart from works is barren?"

It will be noted that the above selections are made from most of the New Testament writers to indicate how general was the use of the words we are discussing. Many more passages with the evident meaning given above could be cited, but these are sufficient to support the thesis of this paper that in the New Testament conception of "the will of God," regularly expressed by *thelein* or *thelēma,* "determination," "decree," and "command" in the theological sense must be rejected. If such conceptions represent fact, the evidence must be found elsewhere than in the Greek words we are discussing. It cannot be seriously questioned that in all the above quotations *wish, desire, be willing* better express the sense than *determine.*

The noun *thelēma* occurs in the Greek New Testament more than sixty times and the verb *thelein* more than two hundred times, and their use is not materially different from that in classical Greek. It is admitted that in many instances of their occurrence in the New Testament, as elsewhere, the meaning of determination yields an intelligible sense; but a meaning must be more than intelligible. The inappropriateness of the meaning suggested by the translations quoted above is evident. A detailed examination of every passage in which these words occur in the New Testament justifies the following conclusion: With the exception of two occurrences where *thelein* seems to be used idiomatically (Acts 2:12; 17:20), there is not a single instance where the meaning of some shade of *desire* is not agreeable to the context, and in many cases it is required and usually so translated. On the other hand, there are many instances where the idea of determination is not appropriate. In some cases it is out of the question, and in no case is it absolutely required. The verb always means a choice and sometimes includes or implies the intention to seek to consummate it; but it never suggests a guarantee that the choice will be realized, for such a suggestion must come from other words.

It is abundantly evident that the translators of the American Standard Version did not find "determination" to be the primary or dominant

meaning of the verb, as is indicated by their varying translations of it. Twenty-seven times they have changed *will* of the Authorized Version to *would; desire* is used thirty times, and *would* ninety-six times. In other cases, besides the word *will*, they have used such words as *be willing, wish, be minded, mean, be disposed, be pleased, prefer,* and *had rather.* These interpretations sound like anything but determination. And since our translators have not tried to make more emphatic the idea of determination but the opposite, it is only fair to assume that when they use the word "will," they mean it in the sense of "wish" or "desire," which indeed is the first definition given to the word in Webster. We cannot build a doctrine of theological determinism on *thelēma* and *thelein,* no matter where they are found. If the context indicates that the desire expressed by these words results in a purpose to realize it, it is just that and no more. At the utmost the words cannot be pressed beyond the meaning of what the subject purposes; and in no case can it be shown that such purposing guarantees its fulfillment. If "determination" were the primary meaning of the words, we should certainly have in at least some of the more than two hundred and sixty instances of their use in the New Testament, passages with this as the only possible meaning. This is not the case, but in every instance some shade of the meaning *desire* satisfies the context.

If it be said that *thelein* in classical lexicons and commentaries has sometimes been defined as meaning *determine,* it is sufficient to reply that manuscripts of Greek literature for many centuries were in great part preserved and translated by churchmen, and it was natural that theological bias should affect their interpretations. Besides, it must be noted that although our verb may sometimes reach the point of expressing purpose, however absolute that may be, nothing in human experience justifies the view that purpose can ever guarantee its fulfillment. The volitional will is only the power to choose, never the power to execute. The latter must be expressed in different words. This means that whatever state of mind *thelēma* and *thelein* represent God as having, it is never that of predestination, which, in the orthodox view, means more than determination.

The sum of all the foregoing is that "the will of God" for men, according to the uniform usage of New Testament Greek, is to be interpreted, not as determination of what man shall be or do, but as what is desired of and for him. This view is clearly supported by reason and human experience as well as by the whole tenor of the Old and the New Testaments and has a very practical bearing on man's conception of God, of his relation to God, and his attitude toward God. It will never satisfy man to be told that God's autocratic and arbitrary decrees and commands are justified by his wisdom and their beneficence guaranteed by his love. Out of our human relations we are learning that both love and wisdom have

more effective instruments than commands and compulsion. To admit this is to bring us to the heart of the main question suggested by this discussion.

Jesus made it as clear as day that his conception of religion was that it was spiritual, a matter of the heart. Sin and righteousness were to him not acts but attitudes. It was "out of the heart" that evil comes, and true worship was of the spirit and not conditioned or limited by time and space. The essence of religion was not doing but being. It can be elicited but not commanded or compelled. Autocracy and arbitrariness, decree and command, represent force. Desire and entreaty are the condition and method of love. Decree and command may secure an enforced obedience (but not moral!). When man has the conviction that he is the object of divine love and not the slave of an autocratic master, that the divine plans are what are *desired* for him and not what is *demanded* of him; then, whatever response he makes springs from the heart. Serving God from fear or from a feeling of compulsion is very far from true religion and true righteousness. Such a religion would never satisfy the ideal of Jesus or of Paul—or ours! *The heart of religion is the heart's desire.* " 'Tis not what man does which exalts him but what man would do." One can will to do what he does not desire to do, that in fact which is even revolting to him. I cannot believe that the God of Jesus desires, much less decrees, that man shall be put in any such position. The essence of true religion is spiritual attitudes which are not subject to commands but must be elicited by the character, the love, the desire and appeal on the part of the one toward whom such attitudes are to be taken.

Some of the prophets of Israel sensed the true nature of religion and righteousness that were acceptable to God. It was a distinct advance on the conception of the Levitical priests to whom the dominant element in religion seems to have been obedience to commands. The real prophet saw the shallowness of this and pleaded for a heart religion. "I desire mercy and not sacrifice," that is, "I want you to have a heart!" So said Hosea, and Jesus quoted him with approval. Jeremiah saw the day coming when the law would be put into men's "inward parts and written in their hearts." Men would not need to render obedience to commands from without, merely service performed by the hands, but would be motivated from within, that is, desire. "The love of Christ constraineth us," says Paul: not the command of God but an urge from within, a love for Christ.

It is true that the Old Testament writers have expressed what they conceived to be the will of God in the form of commands. This is quite understandable; but all forms of expression to the contrary notwithstanding, the whole tenor of the Old Testament shows beyond controversy the

clear conception on the part of all the people that the will of God for Israel could be realized only if Israel consented and coöperated. "If thou shalt hearken diligently unto . . . God to observe and to do all his commandments, . . . God will set thee on high above all the nations of the earth. . . . But if thou wilt not hearken . . . to observe and to do all his commandments . . . all these curses shall come upon thee" (Deut. 28: 1-15). Any Bible reader knows how representative this is of many passages. It was undue emphasis upon isolated passages taken more or less literally in both the Old and the New Testaments that gave us a harsh and rigid Calvinism.

Nothing in the newer scientific discoveries and conceptions of the nature of matter and force is at variance with the age-old belief that man was created in the likeness of his Maker. As there is much latitude for conceptions of the nature of that Creator, so likewise is there for that *like*ness. But reason, science, and experience have guaranteed to us that since like begets like, any just conception of man's Creator must include as a minimum all that is inherent in the nature of man. This means that man is related to God *by nature and in kind.* This relation and likeness is the only possible basis for a true religion. Also this alone makes possible any fellowship between man and his Maker. Fellowship is a *mutual* sharing, and, may we add, there is no such thing as the "lion's share." Fellowship is measured by the minimum shared by any one of the parties to it. It is no lopsided affair. Hence, it is based on the possibility of a moral and social equality. In such a relation there is no room and no need for decrees, commands, and penalties. Here rights, love, desire, loyalty are always mutual. The moral values shared by each are equal.

It is a widely conceded claim that no Hebrew prophet before Jesus ever saw divine truth in so clear a light as he saw it. To him, God was not a master but a partner. To contend otherwise on the ground that he said, "I came not to do mine own will but the will of him that sent me," is to beg the question, since it is the contention of this discussion that to Jesus "the will of God" was "what God desires," not "what he determines." The agreement, the harmony, the oneness which again and again Jesus claimed to exist between him and his Father show beyond dispute that he conceived a mutual relation of moral and social equality. Nothing he said must be pressed into the meaning that he believed it was predestined, decreed, and commanded that he should do what he did and experience what befell him. The reader must be reminded of Jesus' constant use of rhetorical exaggeration, daring and extravagant speech, sometimes even to the extent of affirming the impossible.[1] Full account taken of this would settle some controversies.

[1] See the writer's *Overstatement in the New Testament,* Holt, 1931.

Jesus conceived that the ideal relation between man and God was the same as that between himself and his Father. Jesus is represented as praying that his disciples might all be one with the Father as he and the Father were one. These words seem to me to have been often strangely misunderstood and used to prove that Jesus prayed for church union! I cannot believe that he had any such thing in mind. It is certainly not clear that he was even asking for harmony among his disciples, a condition that would inevitably follow the realization of his petition, namely, that the disciples might all be one with the Father as he himself was; and we have already noted what he conceived that oneness to be. This sort of mutuality seems wholly incongruous with a relationship justifying decrees and commands. Jesus himself must have felt something of such incongruity. After saying to his disciples, "Ye are my friends if ye do the things which I command you," he immediately adds, "No longer I call you servants . . . but I have called you friends. . . ." Friendship, like fellowship defined above, is a mutual relation of moral and social equality. In such a relationship "command" must be interpreted as desire, request, appeal, entreaty. This indeed must be the interpretation of *all* divine commands if man's moral freedom is to have any meaning. Do not insist upon the word "command"; for in the Greek language, as in English, the imperative use of the verb expresses command, exhortation, entreaty, or permission, and each is expressed by the same form of the verb.

The reader may still feel that something is to be said for a divine plan for man independent of what man may do. In addition to "will of God" he will recall such New Testament expressions as "ordained to eternal life," "according to the eternal purpose," "foreordained according to the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his will," "the immutability of his counsel," "the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God," and other expressions of like import. Let all biblical scholars answer whether these expressions make out a clear case for a predestined life and destiny of man. Very many more passages may readily be adduced as evidence for the opposite view. If one insists on literalness here, he will get himself into a hopeless tangle; for hundreds of passages may be cited as examples of hyperbolic, rhetorical style characteristic of all biblical writers in which they overstate and exaggerate facts; and the writers themselves would have refused to assent to a literal interpretation of their words in such cases as it would represent them as contradicting themselves.

True religion is not the product of a genuine fear of God. Love is the most potent moral force known to man; why then is it not the divine instrument and method? It must be; and this is a most profound religious truth, rarely believed and more rarely appreciated. True religion and

morality will progress in proportion as man realizes his *likeness* to God and conceives him as a partner on that basis. That man is tending in that direction is indicated by his changing conceptions of God as he seeks to find a God whose nature harmonizes with the best in his own nature and with his moral needs and experiences. Man's truest love, his sincerest loyalty, his deepest devotion, and his heartiest coöperation will be elicited only to the extent he conceives that he is the object of God's *love* and *desire* and not of *decree* and *command*. What would Jesus' sacrifice have been worth had it been decreed? It does not satisfy the mind to be told that Jesus was "willing." If so, why decree? In that case you would still have the relation of master and slave. If a divine command in the strict sense was necessary, why free will at all? Why not God's will accomplished by compulsion? When Jesus said, "I must," as he often did, it was only a sense of moral compulsion from a conviction and desire within his own heart with his own sense of personal freedom and responsibility. He thought of his Father's will as desire, and that was why he was willing. This was the secret of his consciousness of oneness with his Father and the secret of his confidence in his own final triumph. If it had been decreed, it would not have been *his* triumph, nor could there be any such for us. All moral victories are personal and possible only to *free* spirits.

IS THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH DEMOCRATIC?

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THOUGH today men of good will in the Christian churches are far more interested in coöperation and unity than in conflict, they cannot delude themselves with the idea that peace has been attained. The author of a recent selection of The Catholic Book Club[1] dedicates it to his father "who carries on the fight." The fact that conflict has been and may be so distasteful is no adequate ground for avoiding the responsibility of taking part in it. For, non-Romanist Christians are involved, though Mr. Hughes gives a false perspective of the issues by presenting the opposition simply as between certain secular liberals and their ideas on the one side and "the Church,"[2] by which he means the Roman Church, on the other. There are now, as there have been for centuries, other Christian churches and other liberals (appreciative of religion) in opposition both to the secular liberals and to the Roman Church. Agreeing with much which Romanists say against secular liberalism, it is necessary to make clear why the position of the Roman Church cannot be accepted as the only alternative. Not a few readers of this paper will agree with its writer in profound appreciation of and thankfulness for the part taken by the Roman Church in the past, as now, in the cultivation of reverence for and the worship of God. Not a few have sincere respect for the many outstanding saintly personalities who officiate in that Church. Such worship of God and such personalities may be regarded as what are of most importance in any church. But what we are concerned with here, though of secondary significance to these, are nevertheless important fundamentals for modern life. These we have received largely as a heritage from the past, achieved through the efforts and sufferings of the very liberals the Romanist condemns. We are unworthy heirs if we do not defend and carry further what they gained.

Even during the past fifty years many have had fears of the political influence of the Roman Church. Though there is some evidence to justify those fears, one may be more impressed by its political weakness. Mr. Hughes himself provides us with a passage which, by analogy, may be used as an illustration of this. Referring to the World War of 1914-18,

[1] *The Church and the Liberal Society*, by Emmet John Hughes, Princeton University Press, 1944.

[2] In this essay for the sake of uniformity *church* will be spelled in upper case when referring to the Roman Catholic Church, whether or not specifically qualified by *Roman* or *Roman Catholic*. —The Editor.

he says that "the Socialists of all nations almost unanimously abandoned their allegiance to a faith that claimed to be supra-national and took up arms in their respective nations with the zeal of patriots" (p. 261). But the Roman Church "itself stood forth as the only supra-national power when war struck the Western world in 1939" (p. 266). However, it is quite clear that the members of that Church, like the Socialists of 1914, took up arms in their different countries and as patriots are fighting one another. The Church has made pronouncements of ethical principles. Surely we cannot consider it to be incompetent to make explicit judgments of the rights and wrongs in the present situation. Is it that it was unwilling to make them for the guidance and direction of its members? Or, is its power over its members known to be too feeble to get obedience to any requirement to abstain from all fighting or only to fight on the side which the Church might judge right, so that it avoided making any such judgment? As a supranational power it has shown itself as ineffective as Socialism is charged to have been. But a further question suggests itself: Is the Roman Church not wholeheartedly sympathetic with the democratic attitudes of the peoples opposed to Fascism and National Socialism?

Mr. Hughes defends democracy from the Christian standpoint. In recent times it has been shown sufficiently often that in its ethical teachings Christianity involves principles implied in the modern use of the term "democracy." Those principles are the common property of Christians. That the Roman Church has recognized and taught them does not prove that that *Church* itself has been and is democratic. A survey of history proves that the development of modern democracy has been through the influence more of non-Romanists than of Romanists, and indeed not infrequently in face of opposition from the Roman Church. The important question which must be considered here is not whether *Christianity* in its ethical ideas involves some fundamental implications of democracy—a view which, accepted, is left undiscussed—but whether the *Roman Church* has been and is democratic. For this question to be understood it has to be borne in mind that though the term "democratic" is often used today in a vague manner for what is called "a way of life," it also includes, as its etymology indicates, "a way of government." Has the Roman Church stood, does it stand today, for the democratic way of government? That it is not itself democratic in this sense may be the reason why it has so often been indecisive in the modern period, has sometimes been allied with antidemocratic governments or offered no serious opposition to them. Its indecision in the present world situation has been painfully obvious. Did not the Catholic Centre party in Germany in the days of the last Kaiser join with the Prussian Junkers in the "blue-

black block" checking the democratic parties? Was the papal concordat with the Fascist government merely a one-sided affair? Did the Church call on its members in Italy to oppose and to refuse to take part in the aggressive policy of the Fascists towards Abyssinia, or their "stab in the back" on France? It is a Christian assertion: "By their fruits shall ye know them"; and a Christian principle that a sin of omission may be as serious as one of commission. Yet, in spite of so much indecision and lack of effective power, we have to guard against subtle Romanist influences with possible effects on political development.

In its own constitution the Roman Church is not democratic in the sense of involving representative election, of being a community governed *by* its members. The election of the pope is by cardinals who do not owe their position as electors to any election, direct or indirect, by the general clerical and lay members of the Church. Has any Romanist ever tried to describe Roman Church government as democratic because of such papal election? It seems rather that, though there are the outward forms of an election by the cardinals, the theory is that it is God who appoints the pope. His authority is not exercised on the basis that he owes his position to the free electoral decisions of the members of his Church. Could one find anywhere better than in the papacy a pattern for Fascist and National Socialist forms of government? In their repudiations of democracy Fascism and National Socialism have represented Il Duce and Der Führer as having been brought into power independently of popular election. Il Duce and Der Führer have been secular popes. The government of the Roman Church is a hierarchy, like theirs has been, with authority not coming democratically but emanating from above. At least from the time of the definite formation of the monastic orders the Roman Church has insisted on obedience as expected and required.

Not being democratic in its own organization, the Roman Church has not been evidently enthusiastic for state democracy. Now that through the efforts of liberals it has been achieved in some countries, the Church must recognize it in them. Some individual Romanist writers may even try to give the Roman Church some credit for its attainment! Yet, in fact, history shows the Romanist hierarchy for long bound up with those nondemocratic forms of state government which were finally overcome by the efforts of the liberals. These fought the idea of "the divine right of kings"—an idea with which the Roman Church was associated in those periods when papal approval, even papal coronation or benediction, was required for kings and emperors. Though in some instances bishops joined with temporal lords to curb arbitrary rulers, as long as the rulers supported or at least did not oppose the Roman Church, that Church recognized their authority and did nothing to promote the idea or the

actuality of their replacement by elected representatives of the people. From the standpoint of the hierarchical government of the Roman Church such writers as Mr. Hughes are right in fighting liberalism. For, from its standpoint, there is as little ground for accepting "the divine right of popes" as there was for holding "the divine right of kings."

It might, perhaps, be replied that the Roman Church is concerned with religion, and that as God is so much more interested in religion than in the affairs of the state, he does appoint the popes, and they thus have a "divine right." But can we accept such a compartmental view of divine activity? Further, is there any reliable evidence that he actually does appoint popes in the specific sense meant? The non-Romanist answers these questions in the negative. In a chapter on the Church Militant, Mr. Hughes refers to the definition of "the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception" (1854) and to "the declaration of Papal Infallibility" (1870). Perhaps he means to imply that the acceptance of these is necessary to be a Christian—or even to be a nonsecularist liberal. We are not interested in what must inevitably be a futile debate of these doctrines: all that we contend is that according to our conception of God a man can be as religious without as with them. Yet the insistence on these two doctrines together may be for their supposed significance relative to the non-democratic status of the pope. Do they not appear to be props to give support to the Roman Church as a nondemocratic organization, not merely supranational but also suprarational, even *super*natural?

What is important for our present purpose is to consider the actual attitude of the Roman Church toward certain fundamentals championed by liberals which are now regarded as aspects of the democratic way of life. Foremost among these, upon which so much else depends, is the freedom of thought and speech. It is futile for Romanists to try to deny that in the past the Roman Church endeavoured to restrict these with reference to the physical world of nature. When it had the power to control the civil authority it was able to initiate suppression and persecution. The Roman Church cannot suppress the records of the sufferings of scientists imposed on them at its instigation. Since in some countries the civil authority was emancipated by the efforts of liberals from the influence of the Roman Church, these freedoms of thought and speech have led to the great achievements of modern natural science. This charge cannot be pushed on one side by any contention that the Church has stood for the rights of reason, as might well be seen in the works of Aquinas. Nor does it suffice to maintain that now Romanists themselves welcome and use modern science. These freedoms were attained not by the help of but in opposition to the Church.

Even today it retains aspects of this attitude of the past. It claims

the right to engage in education. That claim can be admitted to the same extent and in the same manner that the state claims a similar right. The Church may reasonably undertake the education of its members with regard to their participation in the Church, as the state may insist upon educating its citizens for their place within the state. But there is a great and fundamental difference between the education provided by a democratic state and that given by the Roman Church. For in principle and predominantly in practice the former encourages and gives scope for freedom of thought and expression, while the latter is the inculcation of the dogmas and traditional teachings of the Church, with condemnation as heresy of views in opposition to them arrived at by freedom of thought. Romanist education is indoctrination. The experience of the past has amply justified the conclusion that such indoctrination in childhood may be very effective. This type of procedure has also been followed by the Fascists and National Socialists. As stultifying freedom of thought, it is in its very essence opposed to the attitude of democracy, for it trains for adherence to the concepts of the dominant hierarchy. Within the Roman Church there is today as great a lack of freedom of thought and speech regarding religion as in earlier ages there was concerning the physical world. Fortunately, owing to the liberals of the past and the present, there is much freedom of thought and speech regarding religion in wide circles outside the Roman Church. That it still suppresses freedom of speech within itself may be evidenced by the treatment of the "Catholic Modernists." It still endeavours to prevent some freedom of thought by its continuance of the *Index Expurgatorius.* It has even sought by political influence and law to check the dissemination of scientific knowledge relative to sterilization and the control of conception to which for its own reasons it is opposed.

The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom. The fear of the Church is of the essence of spiritual slavery. Not even the liberals can free us from the former, but they did lead many to freedom from the latter. For centuries the ideas of excommunication, of interdicts, and of penalties to be imposed by the Roman Church have had no terrors for non-Romanists. With this more wholesome environment of non-Romanists, it may be wondered how many Romanist laymen today are affected by such fear. In spite of the Church's rejection of divorce (with its subterfuge substitution of "annulment"), how many Romanists avail themselves of civil divorce? Notwithstanding the Church's fulminations, do Romanists make use of the divinely given knowledge of contraception? We do not know. But in view of the violence of the Church's condemnation we may form an opinion.

Liberals have not yet led us entirely to freedom from want, but they

have pointed the way in which it may be more nearly approached by democratic changes in social and economic organization. The Roman Church with all its charities has not been able to bring such freedom to any adequate extent or with security. It has not been in the forefront to get those changes brought about. This may be because, as capitalism thrives best when there is a margin of unemployed labor, so the Roman Church gets some recruitment in numerical strength and has a self-satisfying impression by its many charities. Was there not something even of a "divine" impatience in modern labor's cry: "We want justice and not charity"? Even though Romanists may now admit and support such changes, they have not been leaders in initiating them. They accept some of them when they come, and can do no other. Within the relatively short period in which it has been able to function systematically, within its conditions Russian communism has done more to approach the attainment of this freedom from want than has the Roman Church with all its charities in its long history. It is becoming a fashion—again *following* a trend of the times—for Romanist writers to join in a criticism of capitalism, but not in such a manner as to suggest that the Church would support its overthrow.

It is quite possible, even probable that the Roman Church is one of the most wealthy corporations in the world. How it attained the beginnings of and developed this wealth need not be discussed. But it is interesting to note that Romanists high in the hierarchy have recently emphasized "the right of private property." There are good ethical grounds for allowing some private property. One may venture to believe that any form of government which may be evolved will admit some. But surely the land, the buildings, and all the paraphernalia of the Roman Church are of the nature of a communal property under the control and in the administration of the pope and others in the Roman Catholic hierarchy. Its priests and other members have some private property, but what is there for the service of the Church as such is not theirs as individuals and may only be used by them for its purposes. The development of democracy may similarly lead to the policy that all upon which the political community depends is to be communally owned and administered by its officials for the community. But in that the officials would be appointed by the duly elected representatives of the people to administer the property as the people direct. In the Roman Church the property is administered by the hierarchy without representative control by its members, much in the same way that the communal property may perhaps be controlled and administered by the dictatorial hierarchy of present Russian communism. In its steps to obtain freedom from want for its subjects democratic government, concerned with the secular affairs of economics,

may bring changes with regard to the holding and administration of property. In any case, in so far as it provided effectively against want it would deprive the Roman Church of many of its "charitable" activities.

The indictment contained in this paper as a whole is a serious one, and it is made with reluctance. Mr. Hughes in his book is right in maintaining that Christianity goes beyond secular liberalism and that some of its ethical ideals are in accord with those of democracy. But Christianity is not identical with the Roman Church. To the Romanist his Church may appear as a great institution. How does it appear to God? The answer one may accept to that question depends on his idea of God. In that ultimately may lie the fundamental difference between the Romanist and the religious non-Romanist. As the Romanist like Mr. Hughes rejects the inadequate and secularist position of nonreligious or anti-religious liberals, so the religious non-Romanist revolts from the Romanist implications concerning God. From the point of view of his conception of God as concerned with the whole of mankind, the Roman Church is to God after all only one among many institutions and movements. If in its own way the Roman Church—and any other church—is a "divine" institution; so also may the state be in its own way. The non-Romanist reluctantly sees the papal hierarchy "motivated primarily by concern for the welfare of the Catholic Church" instead of for the well-being of mankind. Yet, though the Roman Church has maintained its "neutrality" in the present situation, it will no doubt welcome the freedom from persecution by the Nazis which the democratic countries exercizing their responsibilities of definite judgments and actions hope among other things to gain for the members of the Roman Church. It is of the essence of the attitude of liberals, religious and other, that they will also rejoice when Romanists have obtained that freedom. From the Roman Church let us turn to some of its sons: St. Francis of Assisi, Savonarola, de Lamennais, and George Tyrrel.

PROPHET WITH HONOR

HARMON M. GEHR
Church of the Restoration, Philadelphia

"I CALL that mind free which jealously guards its intellectual rights and powers, which calls no man master, which does not content itself with a passive or hereditary faith, which opens itself to light whencesoever it may come, which receives new truth as an angel from heaven, which, whilst consulting others, inquires still more of the oracle within itself, and uses instructions from abroad not to supersede but to quicken and exalt its own energies."[1]

In a time that is characterized by mechanistic psychologies, materialistic philosophies, neoörthodox theologies, and totalitarian dictatorships, words like those quoted are as refreshing as a cup of cold water in the midst of a meaningless battle. Yet they were uttered by a man who intimately knew conflict between intellectual systems and the contention of powerful world forces. In our troubled time we do well to turn to the career of one who obeyed and defended the mandates of his own spirit.

William Ellery Channing was minister of Boston's Federal Street Church for forty years, and during that time he came to occupy a position of national prominence. In Boston his prominence was natural as he was the descendant of an old and respected family and had married into a family equally old and respected. Once a Brahman always a Brahman. Doubtless this social fact protected Channing when he adopted and forwarded views that would have cost other ministers their pulpits. Possibly his urbane eloquence protected him; a velvet glove always covered the steel hand of his prophecy. His physical inferiority may have helped him retain his honor; a man who weighs only one hundred pounds and is in bed much of the time has a natural defense against chivalrous foes. Most of all, however, it was Channing's complete and unswerving sincerity that brought him the awesome respect of his enemies and his friends.

During the ascetic days of his early manhood Channing formed a habit of deep and regular meditation. He learned to say nothing that was not the product of long mental and spiritual digestion. When finally he would set forth his thoughts, they were as natural as sunshine, completely unforced, yet the final product of his mind on a particular subject. By those conclusions he abided until within heart and mind he found fresh revelation. If his words made enemies or caused defections within his church, it hurt him sorely, but he would not for anything abandon his position.

[1] *The Works of William Ellery Channing, D.D.*, American Unitarian Association, Boston, 1877, p. 174. In subsequent footnotes this volume is referred to as *Works*.

Certain moral principles were regnant in Channing's life. First, he had a high opinion of human nature.

> Am I asked for my conception of the dignity of a human being? . . . It consists, first, in that spiritual principle, called sometimes the reason, sometimes the conscience, which, rising above what is local and temporary, discerns immutable truth and everlasting right; which, in the midst of imperfect things, conceives of perfection; which is universal and impartial . . . which says to me with authority, that my neighbor is as precious as myself . . . which commands me to receive all truth, however it may war with my pride, and to do all justice, however it may conflict with my interest; and which calls me to rejoice with love in all that is beautiful, good, holy, happy, in whatever being these attributes may be found. . . . There is another grand view of man. . . . He is a free being; created to act from a spring in his own breast, to form himself and to decide his own destiny; connected intimately with nature, but not enslaved to it; connected still more strongly with God, yet not enslaved even to Divinity, but having power to render or withhold the service due his Creator; encompassed by a thousand warring forces, by physical elements which inflict pleasure and pain, by dangers seen and unseen, by the influence of a tempting, sinful world, yet endued by God with power to contend with all, to perfect himself by conflict with the very forces which threaten to overwhelm him.[2]

Springing from this embracing conviction of essential human dignity was a burning faith in freedom, and a corresponding abhorrence of all that stifled freedom. The discourse *Spiritual Freedom,* from which the quotation at the head of this article is taken, is pure spiritual autobiography. A classic instance of Channing's practical understanding of freedom has been related by Parrington:

> With the later rationalistic phase of Unitarianism which began with Theodore Parker's memorable South Boston sermon *On the Transient and the Permanent in Christianity,* in May, 1841, [Channing] found himself only partly in intellectual sympathy . . . but his sturdy adherence to the principle of liberalism would not suffer him to join in the Unitarian hue and cry raised against the young radical. . . . "As to Mr. Parker," he wrote, "I wish him to preach what he thoroughly believes and feels. I trust the account you received of attempts to *put him down* was in the main a fiction. Let the full heart pour itself forth!"[3]

Channing's moral zeal, like that of some other pioneers in religious fields, was a kind of perfectionism. In neither the spoken nor the written word was he complacent or compromising; he always criticized, challenged, or measured the actual by the ideal. He found congeniality in the writings of John Milton, and in the essay *On the Character and Writings of John Milton* there is this sentence: "He thought, not so much of what man is, as of what he might become." Those words might well have become the epitaph of Channing.

Popularly a prophet is known as a foreteller, but a meaning of the

[2] *Works,* p. 48.

[3] V. L. Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought,* Vol. II, p. 338.

word that is equally respectable is *forthteller.* William Ellery Channing was a prophet on both counts. More than once he showed an almost uncanny ability to detect the shape of things to come. And as forthrightly as Amos or Jeremiah, he uttered the word of God as it came to him.

As a prophet of liberal Christianity Channing came into open conflict with Calvinism. Since 1620 New England had been a Calvinist stronghold. Channing was born in a Calvinist home; his father was a graduate of Princeton University and a central pillar of the Second Congregational Church of Newport, Rhode Island. Dr. Samuel Hopkins, second only to Jonathan Edwards as a Calvinist, was Channing's boyhood minister. Later it must have seemed to Calvinists that Channing was simply a renegade, and should be treated as such. But it was not so easy as that. Channing's apostasy came about gradually and upon rational grounds. On the assumption of the basic dignity of man Channing was apprehending inevitable implications, and they necessarily made him depart from Calvinism.

It was not until 1819, when Channing was nearly forty, that he preached the famous sermon in Baltimore which definitely set apart Unitarian Christianity. Before that time, however, the division in New England Congregationalism had constantly widened and deepened. The breach is indicated by Channing in 1815 in a sermon which frontally attacks the orthodox hierarchy. The liberals are not withdrawing willingly, he asserts; rather are they being forced out by "a system of exclusion and denunciation."[4]

Paradoxically, Channing tried never to think of Unitarianism as a denomination. For him it was the "unsectarian sect." Indeed, in his last years he described himself as "little of a Unitarian."[5] This was because he did not care to think of liberal Christianity as a system or institution so much as an attitude of kindness and brotherliness which might exist even among those who differed. Men of such temperament find fellowship in all communions, and it was to this universal brotherhood rather than to any one division that Channing paid allegiance.

Channing made his greatest contribution by forwarding this broad and genial attitude. Because by its very nature the Puritan theology could not promote happiness and understanding, he derided it. Because revivals stripped the mind of self-direction and encouraged a mob spirit in religion, he scored them as religious epidemics. Because priesthood chained the spirit of man while distorting the freeing power of Christ's gospel, he excoriated it sternly. Certain of Channing's words about creeds serve to describe much of his reaction to all the trappings of religion.

[4] *Works,* pp. 478 ff.
[5] John White Chadwick, *William Ellery Channing,* p. 157.

I cannot but look on human creeds with feelings approaching contempt. When I bring them into contrast with the New Testament, into what insignificance do they sink! What are they? Skeletons, freezing abstractions, metaphysical expressions of unintelligible dogmas; and these I am to regard as the expositions of the fresh, living, infinite truth which came from Jesus! I might with equal propriety be required to hear and receive the lispings of infancy as the expressions of wisdom. Creeds are to the Scriptures what rush-lights are to the sun. The creed-maker defines Jesus in half a dozen lines . . . and calls me to assent to this account of my Saviour. I learn less of Christ by this process than I should learn of the sun by being told that this glorious luminary is a circle about a foot in diameter.[6]

Time and again Channing used the term "primitive Christianity." He meant what others have intended in such phrases as "the religion of Jesus" or, perhaps, "the historical Jesus." Channing determined the content of his conception by direct reading of the gospels and from his own perceptions of the high and holy, rather than by any method of critical investigation. As a result, Christianity was primarily an ethical and moral system for him. That point of view is reflected in the liberal church of today.

In other ways as well, Channing was a major prophet of modern liberal Christianity. He rejected trinitarian worship of Jesus because it pampered the desire of men to have a god in their own image and because it took from God the worship that was his due. He supported a single and united conception of Jesus, as opposed to the dual idea then and still common in orthodox communions. On the ground of accuracy he was impressed in 1829 by a recent translation of the New Testament and recommended it unreservedly—something that some Christians will not even yet accept because they prefer the pure English that Jesus spoke!

Channing was a prophet in the field of education. When Horace Mann was just beginning his work, Channing made his acquaintance, and backed him to the limit when he became secretary of the Massachusetts Board of Education. Several times Channing spoke in behalf of Mann's advanced educational ideas.

But Channing's conception of education was broader than any particular school. Adult education was his theme in a long lecture entitled *Self-Culture* and in two addresses on the theme *On the Elevation of the Laboring Classes.* His sympathy and hope for people of small opportunity and meagre background is most apparent in these inspiring writings. After his death an eloquent letter was received from an English miner, who wrote that the lecture *Self-Culture* was being used as a text by young Englishmen. "The good man never dies; he lives and breathes in our cottages."[7]

[6] *Works,* p. 487.

[7] William Henry Channing, *The Life of William Ellery Channing, D.D.,* p. 485.

What is not yet a commonplace, that education is training the body and soul as well as the mind, was said again and again by Channing. It seemed to him that the responsibility of training the whole man made teaching the most important work in the world.

> No office should be regarded with greater respect. The first minds in the community should be encouraged to assume it. Parents should do all but impoverish themselves to induce such to become the guardians and guides of their children. . . . They should have no anxiety to accumulate property for their children, provided they can place them under influences which will awaken their faculties, inspire them with pure and high principles, and fit them to bear a manly, useful, and honorable part in the world.[8]

Education should call forth powers of every kind—of observation, reasoning, judgment, resourcefulness, control, mutual aid. Knowing how to read is not enough. Children are to be helped that they may help themselves.

Dedicating Harvard's Divinity Hall in 1826, Channing presented principles of theological education that certainly were not accepted at that time. Indeed, it is doubtful if many theological schools come up to these standards today. First, said Channing, students should be permitted to investigate for themselves. Second, teachers should be granted freedom so that they may come to love the truth for its own sake. Third, suitable conditions should be provided for creating a genuine devotional spirit. Fourth, a school should impart a faith that creates confidence in the purpose of a religion that is centred on Christ. Fifth, conditions should be such that the ministry is regarded as an adventure, filled with opportunities for enterprise and reform. Sixth, the independent spirit should be revered, not attacked; "that moral courage which . . . reverently hears and fearlessly obeys the voice of conscience and of God." Finally, a theological school should inculcate willingness to sacrifice for a worthy cause.[9]

Channing's life extended through the opening third of our nation's history; he was born in 1780 and died in 1842. That is not a long time, but it was long enough for him to sense some national trends. In many ways certain of his comments about America and her future have a contemporary sound.

For a long time after American political independence was a fact the country was still dependent culturally and intellectually. To no one was this more evident than to Channing. Again and again he pleads for self-realization. He understood the Declaration of Independence to be more than a severance of political ties—it was also a challenge to create a completely self-sufficient nation.

[8] *Works*, pp. 118-119.
[9] *Works*, pp. 263-268.

> Earnestly do I desire for this country that, instead of copying Europe with an undiscerning servility, it may have a character of its own, corresponding to the freedom and equality of our institutions. . . . How much to be desired is it that, separated as we are from the eastern continent by an ocean, we should be still more widely separated by simplicity of manners, by domestic purity, by inward piety, by reverence for human nature, by moral independence, by withstanding that subjection to fashion and that debilitating sensuality, which characterize the most civilized portions of the Old World.[10]

Sometimes Channing forgot his urbane style of address and led with his right. Of all people, he was speaking to the merchants of Philadelphia when he staunchly supported free trade![11] At another time he spoke scornfully of "the men, whose ravings resound through the halls of Congress, and are then circulated through the country as eloquence. . . ."[12]

He sensed, even more than a hundred years ago, the terrific problems that were being posed by the annihilation of space and time.

> We look forward to the approaching spring, when this metropolis is to be linked with England by a line of steamboats. . . . That a great temporary excitement will be given to industry, and that our wealth and numbers will increase, admits no dispute; but this is a small matter. The great question is, Will the mass of the people be permanently advanced in the comforts of life, and, still more, in intelligence and character, in the culture of their highest powers and affections?[13]

Today such a question is more crucial than ever.

Channing is best remembered, however, as an outstanding prophet of social reform. Considering his necessarily limited activities, the part he bore in social problems is surprising. Housing, intemperance, poverty, prison reform, the theatre, war, women's rights, slavery—all these, and more, received his extended attention.

Probably his bitterest experience resulted from his espousal of abolition. Because parishioners and mercantile interests of Boston did not wish him to mention the subject of slavery and because William Lloyd Garrison and other abolitionists desired the unreserved weight of his authority, he was severely buffeted from both sides. As usual, Channing beheld the injustice on both sides and was devastating in his criticism of both the abolitionists and the proslavery interests. As a result some of his parishioners were so hostile as even to ignore him on the street, and the abolitionist press made him the butt of ridicule and attack. Finally, however, his support of the antislavery cause was so complete as to cause him to sever his financial connection with the church which he had served for thirty-seven years.

[10] *Works*, p. 186.
[11] *Works*, pp. 166 f.
[12] *Works*, pp. 41 f.
[13] *Works*, p. 64.

During much of his life war was going on at some place in the western world. Witnessing its destruction of the works, minds, and lives of men, Channing came to hate war with complete bitterness. During the War of 1812 he preached sermons against war that were soundly supported in Boston inasmuch as the war was ruining business. His later protests were not so popular. In many ways Channing was an absolute pacifist as certain of his words on the patriotic citizen indicate: "If martial law seize on him, let him submit. If hurried to prison, let him submit. If brought thence to be shot, let him submit. There must be martyrs to peace as well as to other principles of our religion. Let the good man be faithful unto death."[14] On the other hand, while discussing with a friend a tract favoring nonresistance, it is reported by his biographer that he clenched and shook his small fist, saying, "Brother Farley, sometimes we *must* fight!"[15]

There is immortality in ethical discernment. Channing's extended study of Napoleon contains statements that have direct application today. He speaks of "the enormity of the guilt involved in the project of universal empire." "Napoleon wanted the sentiment of a common nature with his fellow-beings." "To a man whose vanity took him out of the rank of human beings, no foundation for reasoning was left. All things seemed possible."[16] The following sentences may foretell the events of a later time: "We admire nothing more in Bonaparte"—or Hitler?—"than the effrontery with which he claimed protection from the laws of nations. That a man, who had set these laws at open defiance, should fly to them for shelter; that the oppressor of the world should claim its sympathy as an oppressed man, and that his claim should find advocates; these things are to be set down among the extraordinary events of this extraordinary age."[17]

Channing's interest in the unfortunate became one of his major concerns in his last years. Together with other liberal colleagues he pioneered in social settlement work which was called "the ministry for the poor." It began a great and developing effort which has lasted.

He attacked intemperance, not as a vice but as a disease, advocating social means of treatment rather than prohibition or other forms of enforced negation. "To save the laboring and poor from intemperance we must set in action amongst them the means of intellectual, moral, and religious improvement."[18] He believed that enlightened religion, rather than a hopeless and gloomy form of religion (*i.e.,* Calvinism), would

[14] Chadwick, *op. cit.,* p. 301.
[15] *Ibid.,* p. 300.
[16] *Works,* pp. 531, 538, 539.
[17] *Works* p. 542.
[18] Chadwick, *op. cit.,* pp. 304-305.

cause people to repudiate the escape that is in strong drink.[19] A wider enjoyment of good music, as in Germany, he thought, would work against the worst forms of intemperance. It must have taken courage of a rare sort for him to uphold dancing as a way to combat intemperance, for most Puritans would far rather have been caught drunk than dancing. Not dancing at balls, Channing carefully cautioned, but as an everyday amusement in the home. "This exercise is among the most healthful. . . . No amusement seems more to have a foundation in our nature. . . . Its end is, to realize perfect grace in motion; and who does not know that a sense of the graceful is one of the higher faculties of our nature?"[20]

When Channing was in Philadelphia in 1832 he visited the penitentiary and was allowed to enter the cells and talk with the prisoners. He saw four who had committed murder in the second degree. He was hopeful of their reclamation because they had work to do—"their minds were bright and active, and . . . they seemed desirous to make a good use of their discipline." "The only bad influence which I saw came from the preaching and religious tracts. I think two of the prisoners were bewildered by what they had heard of the sinner's inability to change his heart. Truly this plague of Calvinism, like the vermin inflicted on Egypt, finds its way everywhere. I pitied the poor creatures, when I found their cells furnished with tracts of the common sort."[21]

This last quotation perhaps sums up the life and ministry of Channing: he had unbounded faith in the divine possibilities of human personality and unquenchable hatred for those forces which conspired to wreck or maim man's spirit. The life and work of this man have direct bearing upon the answers which must be given to the problems which confront the race of man today.

[19] *Works*, pp. 112-113.
[20] *Works*, p. 111.
[21] W. H. Channing, *op. cit.*, pp. 473 f.

Where Ignorance Is Bliss, 'Tis Folly

THERE have been few more thoroughly wholesome or tonic gifts to the human race than the book of Job. To many readers, accustomed to finding their mental fodder in conveniently condensed and predigested form, it is long-winded and discursive; to the conscientious commentator its text is a nightmare. Nonetheless, in the land of moral insights it is a mountain peak in the midst of sand hills. "I have been young, and now am old; yet have I not seen the righteous forsaken, nor his seed begging bread." So sang the Psalmist, and there have been many in every age, sleek and well fed, secure from the stormy blasts of life, who have piously echoed his smug refrain. From the stories in the gospels it would appear that Jesus was not one of them. But centuries before his advent another, too, had courageously voiced his opposition. It might be orthodox; it was nonetheless wrong. Misfortune was not necessarily a proof of guilt. And his hero, Job, scorns the easy and conventional answer, though he has no other solution than the consciousness of his own integrity and a groping confidence in a moral universe. What a pity that a book which gives voice to these two all-important insights should be so rarely read.

And the tragedy of it is that the verses which express that confidence perhaps most vividly are the most frequently quoted words in the whole Bible, and, should the sponsors of a Gallup poll chance to turn their attention to unearthing the most popular quotation from Scripture, would probably be found to outdistance even John 3:16, namely,

> For I know that my redeemer liveth, and that he shall stand at the latter day upon the earth:
>
> And though after my skin worms destroy this body, yet in my flesh shall I see God:
>
> Whom I shall see for myself, and mine eyes shall behold and not another; though my reins be consumed within me (Job 19:25-27).

It is a "tragedy"—not that the words are so popular but that they are so regularly misapplied and misunderstood. Every student of the Hebrew text knows that it is a sadly fallacious rendering of the Hebrew. Christian interpretation has simply read into it what is not there. By the choice of the word *redeemer* to render the Hebrew *go'el* there seemed to be a prediction or prophecy of the advent of Jesus and a clear-cut confidence of future life. As early as the end of the first century this passage had been taken as a sheet anchor for the belief in the resurrection of the just. Thus in I Clement we read: "And again Job says, 'And thou shalt raise up this my flesh which has endured all these things.'" The faulty rendering in the King James version is directly due to the Latin Vulgate which had read into the text much that neither the Hebrew nor the Greek contained or implied. Thus the Latin text read:

> For I know that my redeemer (*redemptor*) liveth, and in the last day I shall rise out of the earth. And I shall be clothed again with my skin, and in my flesh

I shall see my God. Whom I myself shall see, and my eyes shall behold, and not another: this my hope is laid up in my bosom.

It may be very true that many aching hearts have been comforted by hearing these words and by the pictures which they have conjured up. It is equally true that there is no slightest justification for them in the text of Job. Utterly alien to the author's mind are both this fancied prophecy of a coming saviour and the notion of a future life. It is not my intention in this editorial to discuss in any detail the eventual appearance in later Jewish (postexilic) thinking of notions of a future life—but always in terms of a resurrected body, never (as is popularly said) in terms of immortality of the soul. Suffice it here to say that until Jews came into contact with Persian thought the view was well-nigh universal that a dead man was utterly blotted out: "There is no work, nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom, in Sheol, whither thou goest (Eccl. 9:10). Nay more, even the memory of the dead man would be blotted out too. Thus the Psalmist laments: "I am forgotten as a dead man out of mind. It was to forestall this sorriest of fates that the curious but effective custom of the levirate was devised.

Perhaps the most clear-cut of all passages in the Old Testament expressing this utter absence of belief in any sort of future life is found in another chapter of Job itself, a chapter whose opening words are, singularly enough, also not infrequently read at funerals, namely, chap. 14. It is hard to see how anyone can still prate about immortality in Job after reading the words,

For there is hope of a tree, if it be cut down, that it will sprout again . . . but man dieth, and is laid low; yea, man giveth up the ghost, and where is he? As the waters fail from the sea . . . so man lieth down and riseth not; till the heavens be no more, they shall not awake, nor be roused out of their sleep.

But there is another side to the story. Despite the fact that there was no easy solution to hand, no convenient theory of "pie in the sky by and by," to buttress his confidence, this unknown blazer of moral trails refused to be dissuaded that virtue was its own reward, cost what it might.

Bildad has just concluded his second harangue. Will Job not quit his folly? Will he not realize that his friends are not all stupid? that the world will not be upset [*i.e.*, from its view that suffering is a consequence and proof of sin] simply on his account? Then he proceeds to paint a sorry picture of the fate of the wicked: distress while alive; oblivion when gone. To this Job retorts: Why do his friends continue to harp on that string? His afflictions are not a just punishment; he is being unjustly used by God. It is God's lack of justice, not Job's sins, which has brought these reverses. At least his friends could sympathize with him. Why must they join in the persecution? The future is black. Can his innocence be established? If only his words could be more than his fleeting voice, if they could be given permanence—written in a scroll, scratched on a lead tablet,

cut in the enduring stone! This is impossible; yet he will not despair. Three chapters before (16:18f.) he had insisted that his innocent blood would cry aloud throughout the earth, and not in vain: the witness who will vindicate him is in heaven. True he will slay him—Job can expect no mercy from God in this life; true he will not be called back from Sheol. Yet, nonetheless, eventually his name will be cleared; God will vindicate him. At this point (16:19) Job does not say that he will know of the vindication; of one thing he is sure: God will do it.

In the passage under consideration he sounds this note again. True his voice will soon be stilled; no longer can he maintain his integrity; yet that integrity will be established. His vindicator—the one responsible for avenging and defending the memory of the deceased—will rise to his feet to establish his innocence. And this vindicator—*go'el*—is none other than God himself. Though Job's body be destroyed, yet his vindication is sure. Far better than any written memorial of defiance on his grave will be the living God who will there take his stand and proclaim it.

Properly understood this is magnificent and daring courage, magnificent and daring belief in the integrity of life itself. Of course there is no slightest intimation of future life—that is not what he is concerned with. It is not redemption from Sheol but the clearing of his name and reputation that he is longing for, and, goaded by his friends—his comforters must have been far more painful than his boils!—he repeats once more his ringing defiance. He knows that this must come. Whether, as many interpreters suppose, in this passage he advances beyond his earlier confidence—now he knows that he himself will *see* his vindication—is far from certain. The text of verse 26 is too obscure—corrupt is not too strong a word—for us to be sure of its original force. Will he have a fleeting glimpse of God, no longer his tormentor but now rising to avenge him as he departs? Will he actually live to see it himself? It is impossible to say. Perhaps it is scarcely more than an impassioned repeated statement of his innocence—and thus of necessity of his coming vindication. Shall not the upright behold the face of God? (Psalm 11:7; cf. Psalm 17:15); so too must he. An overliteralness has often led to many strange mistranslations and misinterpretations in other passages. So very possibly here. True it is easy to overwork the familiar appeal to Oriental exaggeration and fondness for figurative speech; at times a solid and sober exegesis must recognize it.

Be that as it may, it can scarcely be denied that, while in consequence of reading into a text, through misunderstanding, emphases which were originally conspicuously absent from it, a favorite verse has been produced, which will probably continue through the centuries to give a seeming support for strongly held convictions, yet by the very act of so doing we have lost a magnificent support for a confidence which we sorely need today.

From Off the Campus and On

It is not rash to prophesy that the leading article in this issue, "Theological Education in the Postwar World," will receive a wide reading. The many educators and scholars representing institutions of learning and the learned societies who heard it when delivered on the occasion of Dr. Aubrey's inauguration as fourth president of Crozer Theological Seminary were outspoken in their praise and approval. The Crozer Quarterly counts it a double privilege to welcome to its pages this distinguished scholar with so important a pronouncement. Dr. Aubrey was born in Glasgow, Scotland. He came to America in 1913 and five years later became an American citizen. He did his undergraduate work at Bucknell, graduating in 1919. Twenty years later Bucknell honored him with a doctorate in divinity. He received successively his A.M., B.D., and Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. In 1926, following several years of teaching at Union Theological College, Carleton College, and Miami University, he went to Vassar as a professor of sociology and biblical literature. In 1929 he joined the faculty of the University of Chicago, where he remained as professor of Christian theology and ethics until September 1, 1944, when he became president of Crozer. During his last years in Chicago he was chairman of the theological field. He was a corporal in the U. S. Ambulance Service during the last war (1917-1919). He is the author of many significant books and articles, a fellow of the National Council on Religion in Higher Education, and a member of several learned and professional societies.

Professor Post is a distinguished classicist. His *Menander* has long been standard. He holds degrees from Haverford, Harvard, and Oxford, and has been both a Rhodes Scholar and Guggenheim fellow. Widely traveled—he saw service with the Ambulance Americaine in France in 1915; was a YMCA secretary with the British Expeditionary Force in Mesopotamia, 1916-1917; and was in the Intelligence Service in France, 1918-1919—he has been a member of the department of Greek at Haverford College since 1919. In addition to his edition of Menander he has published several important volumes on Plato and has been a frequent contributor to scholarly journals. Since 1940 he has been the editor of the *Loeb Classical Library*.

About once an issue it is pleasant to lure an author into introducing himself. The honor this time belongs without question to Professor Kraeling. (Needless to say, he did not write the following with an eye to publication.)

You want publicity about me. Well, I was born in 1897, if you want to go back that far. I hope to live long enough to vote for someone other than FDR. I graduated at Columbia University in 1918 and at the Lutheran Theological Seminary at Mt. Airy, Philadelphia, in 1921. I studied 1921 and 1928 at Heidelberg in Germany, 1922 at Union and Columbia, subsequently in 1923 I began to teach at

Mt. Airy, staying there till 1929, meanwhile taking courses at the University of Pennsylvania and at Princeton—University, not Seminary. I got my Ph.D. from Columbia in 1927 (I think) and my Dr. Theol. from Heidelberg in 1934. In 1929 I came up here [*sc.* Yale—Ed.], and they have not thrown me out yet. Generally speaking, I have toured the provinces, beginning with classics and Semitics, and adding the history of art and some archæology as I went along. Ostensibly I am Buckingham professor of New Testament criticism and interpretation.

Professor Kraeling's paper should prove of general interest although in a very technical field where exact knowledge and a saving sense of humor are both necessary to prevent one tumbling into the abyss of sacred arithmetic.

The Crozer Quarterly is glad to be able to present the brief and disarming essay by Father Pittenger. Too often our denominational fences are so high that they prevent the interchange of ideas and values and—above all—of friendship, without which all talk of ecumenicity is shallow nonsense. Father Pittenger is a graduate of Columbia, Union, and General. He has been for the past nine years a fellow and tutor in dogmatic theology on the faculty of the latter seminary. Two books, *Christ and Christian Faith* and *The Christian Way in a Modern World,* have been *Religious Book Club* selections.

Professor Douglas retired from the University of Southern California in June, 1942, after twenty-seven years in the departments of religion and Greek. Prior to joining that faculty in 1915, he had held a pastorate in West Virginia, and had subsequently been for eleven years a professor at Westminster Theological Seminary from which he had been graduated. He hold a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, is the author of *Overstatement in the New Testament* (Holt, 1931) and of many articles, some of which have appeared from time to time in earlier issues of the Crozer Quarterly.

"Is the Roman Catholic Church Democratic?" will be read with interest. It is a critique—and in the editor's judgment, a penetrating one—of a recent book which has won wide acclaim. None is more competent for this task than Dr. Widgery. Articles and reviews from his pen have been frequent and welcome in these pages, where his breadth of knowledge and his incisiveness have made him a valued contributor. As has been frequently written in this column, he is an Englishman by birth, an American by choice. Educated at Cambridge and on the Continent, a professor for six years at Bombay, since 1930 he has been head of the department of philosophy at Duke University.

Mr. Gehr, too, is no newcomer to our pages. An article of his, "Music and *Mores,*" appeared in the October, 1942, issue. At that time all necessary vital and academic statistics were tabulated in the appropriate place (p. 319). For those who have since joined our list of readers—and the number of such is large—it may be said that Mr. Gehr

is a graduate of St. Lawrence College and Canton Theological School, is a member of Phi Beta Kappa, a competent musician, and the minister of the Church of the Restoration (Universalist), Philadelphia.

No less than twenty-one experts appraise some of the recent important books. As we have said frequently—and now shamelessly repeat —we are proud of this department. The many unsolicited letters from those whose judgment we prize would appear to indicate that while shameless we are nonetheless entitled to "glory in our shame." A brief roll call must suffice, but to them all the hearty thanks of the Crozer Quarterly is extended with the assurance that one good review demands another. Dr. Aubrey and Father Pittenger have already been introduced in previous paragraphs. Eugene Ayres is director of research of the Gulf Research & Development Co., and the author of many important scientific articles and reviews. He is a trustee of Crozer Theological Seminary, where his father was for many years a professor. Professor Beare is on the faculty of the Presbyterian College in Toronto. At present he is on sabbatical leave at Union Theological Seminary, where he is studying and teaching. Professor Bertocci is a member of the department of philosophy at Bates. President Bixler, of Colby, is too well known to our readers to need more than a hearty welcome. Of Professor Brightman, of Boston University, precisely the same word may be said. Reviewers such as these make an editor's heart glad. Professor Brush is professor of church history at Andover Newton and no stranger to readers of the Quarterly. Professor Burtt has been since 1927 on the faculty of philosophy at Cornell. We hope soon to wangle an article from his gifted pen. Dean Dabney is also a professor of homiletics at Andover Newton. Dr. Davis is professor of theology at Crozer. Professor Enslin has the chair of New Testament at Crozer. Professor Gezork has the chair of social ethics at Andover Newton. To Professor Harkness, since 1927 professor of church history at Crozer, the editor extends abject apology. Inadvertently when introducing him in the last issue, he cheated his colleague out of ten years of academic life. They are returned herewith with sincerity and interest. Professor Hightower, of the department of social ethics at Kalamazoo, will have an article in the April, 1945, issue. Professor Keighton, of the department of homiletics at Crozer, is one of our most faithful and valued reviewers. It is with particular satisfaction that we welcome Dean Knudson, until his retirement for many years head of the Boston University School of Theology, and one of America's most distinguished theologians. Professor Matthews is professor *emeritus* of Old Testament at Crozer. Dr. Pritchard is his successor. Dean Van Dusen is president-elect of Union Theological Seminary. Anything from his pen is always prized. Dean Weigle has been for many years the efficient executive of the Divinity School of Yale.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Divine-Human Encounter, by Emil Brunner, Philadelphia, Westminster, © 1943, pp. 207, $2.50.

The lectures that compose this volume were delivered at the University of Upsala in the fall of 1937. But they were not translated into English and published until six years later. It is worthy of note that their original delivery fell in the same year as the publication in German of the author's larger work published two years later in English under the title, *Man in Revolt.* Both of these books are engaged with the same basic problem, that of reinterpreting or expounding Reformation Protestantism of the Calvinistic type in such a way as to conserve human freedom and responsibility. The lectures seem to go still further in the direction of Arminianism than *Man in Revolt,* and they approach the subject in a somewhat different way. They take their start from the problem of the nature of truth, and throughout contend that the biblical conception of truth is radically different from that of Greek philosophy. The latter was dominated by the subject-object antithesis. Biblical teaching, on the other hand, conceives of truth as "encounter" or as "personal correspondence." This conception of truth, according to Brunner, transcends the Greek antithesis of subject and object, and makes possible the affirmation of both the unconditional character of the divine grace and the reality of human freedom and responsibility. These two doctrines, instead of being antithetical and exclusive of each other, are from the biblical standpoint correlative. One implies the other.

In the exposition of this attempt at a synthesis of the traditional Calvinistic and Arminian doctrines there are three points to which attention may be directed. One is the author's theory of personal correspondence, the second is his conception of freedom, and the third his interpretation of election.

The "correspondence" or relation between God and man, we are told, "is wholly without analogy in the sphere of thinking. The sole analogy is in the encounter between human beings, the meeting of person with person" (p. 85). And the latter is an imperfect analogy. For the divine-human encounter is not between equals. It is a "personal correspondence between the Word of God and human obedience-in-faith." And this is something that cannot be "logically determined." It is "a logically unsatisfying paradox." It cannot be construed as a subjective-objective relation. "A Person who is revealing Himself, a Person who demands and offers Lordship and fellowship with Himself, is the most radical antithesis to everything that could be called object or objective. Likewise, the personal act of trust is something quite other than subjectivity" (p. 75). The unique thing in this type of religious epistemology, if such it may be called, is that God communicates or discloses himself directly to the believer. Their relation to each other is a "face to face relation" and in this respect resembles the relation assumed in the "immediacy" claimed for mystical experience. But it differs from the latter in that it substitutes for the psychological and metaphysical theories of mysticism a dogmatic affirmation of the fact of revelation, a fact which we must admit without any attempt to construe it rationally.

On the subject of human freedom the author expresses himself again and again in terms that would seem to be an unequivocal acceptance of the conception of freedom as the power of contrary choice and of the synergistic theory of man's relation to God. Yet along with such utterances there are others of a quite different character. He says, for instance, that the emphasis he has placed on the independence of man

"has nothing to do with the freedom-of-the-will motif of Greek or modern humanism" (p. 56). "Man's relation to God is secondary: it is consequent upon and determined by the already existing relation between God and man, established through no human effort" (p. 49). "In faith I do not think but God leads me to think" (p. 85). "It is God himself who does everything upon which doing and saying alone man's new being depends" (p. 97). "Love is actually the essence of free will, and contrariwise the essence of free will is love" (p. 61). "A maximum of freedom is at the same time a maximum of dependence. . . . Complete dependence on God is at the same time true freedom" (p. 54). "Freedom of decision and inability to decide now for the good are two sides of one and the same human reality" (p. 136).

These confused and contradictory statements with reference to freedom, in which the book abounds, are due in part to a failure to distinguish clearly between "moral" freedom and freedom as the power of contrary choice, and in part to a failure to distinguish between the language of emotion and devotion and that of theology. To express complete or absolute dependence on God is quite intelligible and permissible in worship, but to interpret these terms as a metaphysical doctrine is wholly unwarranted.

This confusion appears also in what is said about the idea of election. As a figurative expression of Christian assurance the idea is historically intelligible, and may today be used when properly explained. But as a literal and distinctive Christian doctrine it leads logically to the thought of the double decree or double predestination, which Brunner rejects, or to some other nonmoral conception of the divine sovereignty. For Brunner the doctrine of election teaches "the complete sovereignty and freedom of the divine compassion. God's compassionate love for us has no other ground than his free, unnecessitated love. The creature has no claims upon God. God owes him nothing. He after all is the creature's Lord. That he has compassion for him is due to his love given without necessity. This eternal election is the holy secret of faith" (p. 123). It is "faith's profundity." But such theological absolutism, no matter how secret and profound it may be, leads to a nonmoral conception of Deity. As Creator and Father of mankind God is the most deeply obligated being in the universe. And the only kind of election consistent with his moral character is his love freely extended to all men.

Brunner's attempt and other similar attempts, such as that of Niebuhr, to interpret the absoluteness of the divine grace and the doctrine of original sin in such a way as to conserve human freedom and responsibility must be pronounced failures. They no doubt serve a purpose in the way of humanizing and vitalizing the formal and otherworldly Protestant orthodoxy which still prevails in some quarters and also in the way of counteracting a superficial modernism. But their irrationalism and mystery mongering seem to me to be the chief scandal of present day theology.

ALBERT C. KNUDSON

Enough and to Spare, by Kirtley F. Mather, New York, Harper, ©1944, pp. 186, $2.00.

In this little book, Professor Mather has made an eloquent plea for international coöperation. His viewpoint is quite similar to that of the late Wendell Willkie, but he documents his arguments with scientific data. His main thesis is that no nation, or even continent, is possessed of all the raw materials it needs, but that the world as a whole has "enough and to spare," and that the population of the world in the future need not fear a shortage of anything essential to life and happiness if there

can be developed "complete confidence in the principle of abundance and wholehearted acceptance of the fact of interdependence."

His arguments would have been strengthened rather than weakened if his technology had been more sound—but Professor Mather is not to be blamed for inaccuracy. He has assumed, very naturally, that industrial specialists may be depended upon for factual data. Unfortunately, this is far from the case. The men who know the most cannot be trusted at all, for their publications are so often colored by the circumstances of their economic dependence. Many examples could be quoted from Professor Mather's text. There is no question that his well-authenticated estimate of 500 billion barrels of oil recoverable from shale, should have been nearer 90 billion. If coal is to be used as a source of synthetic petroleum products, his estimate of 7,000 years for our coal reserve should be reduced to about 1,000 years. He indicates that a substantial proportion of our plastics is derived from products of the soil. The figure is not over 10 per cent. His source of petroleum statistics is notorious for fanciful propaganda, prepared by selecting from numerous statistics and statements those which are wanted, disregarding those which do not fit, and then "deriving" conclusions which have been predetermined.

Scientists should not be condemned for their distortions. They are among the most emotional of men and find it quite easy to believe very sincerely what they wish to believe. In fact, they can prove it with figures.

These observations are not important, for the book should be weighed against the merits of its contribution to an understanding of the imperative need for international coöperation. In this respect it is stimulating. Professor Mather points out that "rapidly accumulating evidence indicates that the ability to persuade will have far greater survival value in the next few decades than the ability to coerce," and "the virtues extolled by the prophetic voices of religion are in complete harmony with the best interests of individuals and nations." In time, science could make all large nations self-sufficient, but "no more certain and effective program for the suicide of the human species could be concocted."

In regard to the present war, Professor Mather distinguishes between the military warfare between rival empires and the conflict of ideas and ideals, and he mentions the distressing fact that "in each of the United Nations there are loyal and patriotic citizens on either side" of the latter conflict. This will make difficult any really effective community of nations. The world has adequate material and intellectual resources but "our spiritual resources are in doubt." Freedom, in the Borgese sense of a man's right to do whatever he must do to be true to the best he knows and thinks and feels, "can be attained only by curtailing the liberty of many," and freedom can be gained "not through grabbing, but through sharing; not through hoarding, but through sacrifice." If enough of us are "true to the best we know in ethics, morals, and religion, America will not fail."

In the opinion of this reviewer, the importance of international good will to our "way of life" cannot be overestimated. Postwar plans that are being made today fall in two categories. On the one hand are the visions of a long period of security. On the other hand are the vast preparations that are under way even now in this country for a possible third world war of unprecedented ferocity in 1955. The peoples of the world will determine their fate within the next decade, and it is to be hoped that much will be written and read on the general subject of Professor Mather's book.

EUGENE AYRES

Christianity and Democracy, by Jacques Maritain, New York, Scribner, 1944, pp. 98, $1.25.

In this brief volume our eminent French philosopher adds another to the rapidly growing list of books whose main purpose is to tell us that democracy is grounded in religion, and that if it loses the religious faith which provides its foundation it is doomed.

The overt argument is very plausible, and can call upon much experiential evidence to support it. The heart of democracy, according to Dr. Maritain, lies in its conviction that all men are brothers and have a right to be treated as such, as well as an obligation to treat others as such, in all social relations and arrangements. Now this conviction weakens and tends to disappear under stress of the selfish motives and divisive forces always operating in human life, unless it is based on the further conviction that the law of brotherly love is the law of reality and not just a sentimentally appealing ideal. Moreover, in the absence of this deeper faith love does not really succeed in reaching out beyond the narrow confines set by class or national interest; beyond these confines it reduces to a theoretically accepted principle without effective power to stir action. Hence democracy needs faith in the cosmic reality and power of love, and cannot be preserved in its absence.

I believe that this argument, as thus stated, is essentially sound, provided that it is honestly interpreted in the light of the actual facts of social experience, unprejudiced by subtle appeals to partisan tradition. Who of us does not know cases where an apparently warm and fervent social idealism lapsed into a skeptical cynicism under some unexpectedly searching challenge, because its holder had no deep conviction that love is actually stronger than hate and that when the universe is viewed from the standpoint of that conviction it discloses a genuine aspect of its nature?

But Dr. Maritain adds to this argument three implicit identifications, which are necessary to his interpretation of its significance, but which are not argued for at all, although they quite lack the plausibility of the course of reasoning just summarized. Hence, when one becomes aware of these identifications, he can hardly avoid the suspicion that the real aim of the book (doubtless not consciously chosen as such) is to persuade the reader by a plausible argument, coupled with undefended suggestions at the crucial points, to accept a conclusion whose validity has nowhere been made out. Thus the book as a whole is a perfect illustration of the fallacy of irrelevant conclusion.

The first identification is that of faith in the power of brotherly love with faith in God, as religion has in the past conceived him. Does not this need justification, in view of the many earnest souls who have lived and died for high social causes without belief in this God? The second identification is that of faith in God with faith in Christianity. Does not this need justification, in view of the fact that other religions, too, teach the way of brotherly love, and that some of them, *e.g.,* Buddhism, have actually realized a greater measure of democratic tolerance than Christianity has done? The third identification is that of Christianity with Catholicism, characterized by its functional-authoritarian concept of society, still reminiscent of the era of feudalism. Does not this need justification, in view of the fact that it is not in Catholic but in Protestant countries that democracy as the political expression of love for one's brothers and respect for their equal rights has been able to grow and thrive?

Dr. Maritain owes it to his readers to fill in these yawning gaps, before he has any right to expect them to consider seriously his theory of the religious foundation of democracy.

E. A. BURTT

The Predicament of Modern Man, by D. Elton Trueblood, New York, Harper, ©1944, pp. ix, 105, $1.00.

Of diagnoses of the illness of our culture, we have had in these latter years a plethora: Spengler, Schweitzer, Berdyaev, Toynbee, Niebuhr, Tillich, Lippmann, Mumford—to mention but a few. Indeed, a reviewer confronted by the hackneyed title, *The Predicament of Modern Man,* may be forgiven an initial high, "Must I read another?"

Nevertheless, in the judgment of the present reviewer, Professor Trueblood's little book stands quite apart, in certain respects the most valuable of them all. At least three virtues entitle it to that high appraisal.

Its first virtue is *brevity.* It is less a volume than an essay. In no more than 30,000 words, contemporary civilization is explored, its ailments exposed, and the needful remedy prescribed. Here is a model of condensation without sacrifice of clarity—a treatise for "single sitting" reading.

A second virtue is *cogency.* The argument advances with a logic no less remorseless because it flows under command of distinguished power of thought and grace of style: the patent sickness of current society, therefore the need for radical measures of cure; the failure of programs based upon sheer power, therefore the need for recovery of ethical conviction; the proven impotence of mere morality, therefore the necessity of religious faith; the insufficiency of private religiosity alone, therefore the essentiality of a church; the inadequacy of the existing churches, therefore (here is the most original feature of the discussion) the need for cells of wholly committed persons. An argument so concise yet so lucid should encourage readers, whether individuals or groups, to follow it through point by point, and either to discover its flaws or to bow to its compulsion.

The final virtue is *comprehensiveness.* All of the diagnosticians named above, and others less influential, are consulted. From a discerning comparison of their several views, a weighty consensus emerges. With all the seeming inconsistencies if not contradictions in detail, it is clear that those who have plumbed the current malaise with greatest profundity are essentially at one. It is the chief merit of Professor Trueblood's essay that he has discovered this agreement and presented it with such balance that one suspects all of the physicians would assent: "Yes, that is a true diagnosis."

To have formulated such a consensus is an accomplishment of first importance. It is the basic precondition for advance. If we are to secure a united attack upon the disease, we must have a single mind as to its nature. Our greatest need today is the achievement of consensus, as to both diagnosis and cure. Recognition of this fact led the late Archbishop of Canterbury shortly before his death to attempt a summary of essential Christian belief. First published in Great Britain in the *Christian New Letter* and in this country in *Christianity and Crisis,* and subsequently reprinted in the *Christian Century* (characteristically, without acknowledgement of its source), his statement has been issued by the American office of the World Council of Churches under the title, *What Christians Stand For in the Secular World.* But Dr. Temple proceeded to positive formulation after incomplete analysis. It is this latter requirement which Dr. Trueblood now supplies. Christians concerned for the redemption of civilization can hardly do better than examine his essay to discover whether he has, in fact, declared their common conviction as to the roots of the malady, and then, from that foundation, go on to seek a comparable consensus as to the strategy of attack upon it.

HENRY P. VAN DUSEN

The Clue to Pascal, by Emile Cailliet, Philadelphia, Westminster, ©1943, pp. 187, $2.00.

Here is a compact little volume, with an amazing wealth of well-documented detail, which with a captivating enthusiasm gives the clue to Pascal. His ancestry was Huguenot, his grandfather suspected of heresy recanted during the persecutions of A.D. 1574, and his closest friends were among the Jansenists. Tutored by his scholarly father to observe accurately, to use words precisely, and above all to seek truth passionately, and with a single mind, the ground was well laid for both mental and spiritual development. Not only has he been called the creator of French prose, but as a mathematician of the first rank, among other achievements, he invented the first calculating machine and the barometer, laid the basis for differential calculus, and worked out the law of probability.

But it is as a biblical student, a theologian, and a Christian that he is here presented. He was a layman, who in 1655, aged thirty-two, joined the Jansenists of Port Royal, when they were being denounced for heresy by the Jesuits, as an *adherent,* but not as a member. Always a student of the Scriptures, during the last ten years of his life he gave himself to their intensive study, using various translations, working somewhat with the originals, but relying chiefly on the Vulgate. In his use of the Bible, he was the child of his day, and shared the superstitions, the practices, and the methods of the period. Belief in witchcraft (pp. 26, 27), hearing voices (p. 75), and seeing visions (pp. 66-68) were part of the common background, and all entered into his religious experiences. Yet on the whole, good common sense and high moral purpose kept him from foolish vagaries (p. 87). He held that the Scriptures, though there were paradoxes, were from the Holy Spirit (if the church had so decided), and were the source of all religious truth (pp. 154, 71). All Scripture culminated in Jesus Christ (p. 85), who was the object of Scripture and in the Scripture (p. 80); indeed he was the whole Bible (pp. 130-133), and in him all the paradoxes were resolved.

Further, there was a twofold meaning to Scripture, the carnal or historical, and the inner or spiritual message (pp. 85, 86, 100, 125, 127). The spiritual meaning was truth that was above sense and reason, but not contrary to them (p. 85), which could be known only to these who had repented and had been given the grace of God (pp. 73, 99, 100, 105). Also Scripture must be interpreted according to Scripture (pp. 79, 80), as it was in a world quite apart from the world of physical phenomena. It is also interesting to note that while his emphasis was on inner or spiritual authenticity, he makes an appeal also to the external. He argues that the authenticity of Scripture is guaranteed by the contemporaneity of the author with the facts reported. Thus the stories of the creation and the flood are true, for they came from Adam to Lamech to Shem to Jacob to Moses (p. 85).

In theology he rigorously followed Augustine and Paul, opposing the rationalism of the Scholastics (pp. 25, 54, 59, 109, 110, 113). He insisted that theology rested on the Scriptures (p. 59), which in turn rested on the authority of the Holy Spirit (p. 61). The truth entered the mind from the heart, and not the heart from the mind, for "God established the supernatural order [in religion], quite contrary to the order which should be natural to man in the order of nature" (p. 111). Hence, like his father, he held that an object of faith, by its very nature, could not be an object of reason (p. 34). His notable vision, which was of crucial importance to his religious life, occurring toward the end of 1654, and the words he heard which were so carefully treasured by him, have in them nothing that he did not enjoy in his waking moments as a good Roman Catholic. This, however, was the

moment of his supreme dedication to "total submission to Jesus Christ and to *my director*" (pp. 67, 68).

He was a devout Roman Catholic, always in great fear of the charge of heresy, and constantly declaring his unbroken allegiance to the director of the Church in Rome (pp. 66, 71, 154). In the Roman Catholic Church alone was there salvation (pp. 154, 155), and the sacraments duly administered were essential to the state of grace (p. 158).

Pascal was a good man, a Christian, who in general followed the finest Catholic tradition of the century. Peculiarly sensitive, emphasizing humility, holding charity (almsgiving particularly) as one of the chief graces, and withdrawing into solitary seclusion that he might thereby gain inner quiet and certitude—these marked the trends, especially of his later years. To this must be added his withering assaults on the teaching and practices of the Jesuits in his *Lettres provinciales,* which latter, intentionally no doubt, occupy scant space in this volume. But this onslaught on Jesuitic casuistry and his indictment of ecclesiastic ethics most definitely reveal his interest in ethics as well as his Christian courage. Such are the clues to the life of a great scientist and a saint of the seventeenth century (1623-1662).

Yet through life he found no rest. He was ever fearful. Though he was ecstatically joyous at times (pp. 66-68), yet beneath it all was an uncertainty that was often full of anguish (pp. 152-164). Did the causes lie in the antinomies in which by tradition and by native gifts he was always involved? Reason had authority in science, but could have no voice in religion. Faith then may be but an illusion, and precious though his *vision* was, his reason must oft have whispered to him that it was not supernatural. Sewed up in the lining of his coat it would not stand the light. The Scriptures had an inner meaning, understood only by those of faith, who were enlightened by the Holy Spirit. His certainty, then, was subjective, and as he had invalidated reason, he was left without a test. And again, his way of life was largely that of a recluse, while his principles of kindliness, love, and sturdy morality called for full play in community activities. Ethical theories wither apart from activity. Most serious of all was the fact that his authority was dualistic, and to his personal knowledge at times antagonistic. Jesus Christ, as known in the Scriptures, by means of the Holy Spirit, and *my director,* as known in the apostolic, Roman, Catholic Church, were not always in agreement. Every way he turned he was hedged about by conflicts that never could be satisfactorily solved without a round-about-face on every front. The author sums up the tragedy in a sentence, "Never was a Roman Catholic nearer evangelical Protestantism, nor farther away" (p. 166). He lived in the seventeenth century, and, though the victim of inherited prescientific traditions, was a saint. Had he lived in the twentieth century, probably he would have attained his freedom and an unshaken faith.

I. G. MATTHEWS

Sociology of Religion, by Joachim Wach, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1944, pp. xii, 412, $5.00.

The scientific investigation of religion is advancing. The oldest and best established science of religion is its history; monographs and manuals abound. Younger, and now somewhat in the doldrums, is psychology of religion; but it has many important works to its credit. Sociology of religion is the least developed of the three basic sciences of religion. Apart from anthropological studies, the special pleading of Durkheim, and researches in the biblical field, little has been accomplished. In fact, no one other than Joachim Wach has made serious attempts to view the field as a

whole. His present work, *Sociology of Religion,* may not prove definitive, but it represents so important a step forward in the organization and interpretation of the materials that we may well give Joachim Wach the title of Founding Father of Sociology of Religion. He is the first to see the problems systematically, in the full light of comparative religion. His scholarship both in sociology and in religion is mature, and he manifests sound and well-balanced judgment. He is equally familiar with German, French, Italian, British, and American research, although less acquainted with Spanish and Oriental scholarship. Although Wach's bibliography is remarkably rich, two Japanese works might have been added, namely: Genchi Kato, *A Study of Shinto, the Religion of the Japanese Nation* (Tokyo: Meiji Japan Society, 1926), and the very remarkable Buddhist-Christian collaboration in Harper H. Coates and Ryugoku Ishizuka, *Honen the Buddhist Saint* (Kyoto: Chionin, 1925).

This highly compact and thoroughly documented investigation begins with searching methodological prolegomena, and proceeds to a study of religion and society. Natural groups and the specifically religious organizations of society are treated. Then religion is studied with reference to social differentiation, followed by an examination of the relations of religion to the state. Finally, types of religious authority are investigated. The bare outline utterly fails to convey the concrete richness of the work in detail. Throughout a typological method is followed; that is, like social and religious phenomena from different cultures are compared.

It behooves the present reviewer to accept a correction which Professor Wach has made (p. 4, n. 20). In *A Philosophy of Religion* I had written that Wach, among others, regards "the social approach as the only key to all problems." It is evident from *Sociology of Religion* that this is unjust. Few writers guard more carefully against this error than does Wach. The social is "one function of religion, perhaps not its foremost but certainly an essentail one" (p. 5). Wach avoids both individualistic and collectivistic extremes (cf. p. 108, *et pass.*). His final conclusion is that "perfect integration of a society never has been nor can be achieved without a religious basis" (p. 383). Thus, instead of reducing the religious to the social, he derives the highest stage of the social from the religious.

Among the admirable qualities of this monograph are its clear distinction between the normative (social philosophy) and the descriptive (sociology: see pp. 7, 374, *et pass.*), its appreciative and critical use of Hegel's thought, its sympathetic use of the typological method, its understanding of both subjective and objective religion, and its competent evaluation of all previous work done in the field.

The book is not written in the style of William James. It is prepared as a German textbook in the grand style, and its English is so compact as to require very careful study. Much of the meat of the book is in the footnotes. Unfortunately the indices (which would be more useful if consolidated into one) fail to include references to the authorities cited in the footnotes. In fact, the wealth of scholarship lavished on the footnotes is almost inaccessible for reference purposes. A full index is the most imperative essential for a second edition.

In these times, typographical perfection is unattainable, and Professor Wach's manuscript furnished many a booby trap for his printer. On the whole, the results are surprisingly good, but on account of the importance and prospective wide use of the book a few *errata* are noted. On p. 56, end of first paragraph, for "answers" read the singular. P. 127, n. 87, *"Legacy in India"* should read "of." The "v" of "organivistic" (p. 206) should, of course, be a "c." On p. 242, "has" has crept into a French context for "a." On p. 278, n. 497, Samuel Morison's name is correct, but in the body of the text the "r" is doubled. The final "l" of "Liberal" is inverted

in n. 534, pp. 284-285. P. 294, n. 40, we read *"von religiöses Bedeutung,"* where we need *"religiöser."* A few stylistic defects cannot be blamed on the printer. "Folkdom" (p. 94) is intolerable English; "Methodist Episcopalianism" (p. 147) is an outdated name for Methodism; "exposed" (p. 258, n. 379) is inferior to "expounded." The author becomes too meticulous when he unearths "Albrecht Benjamin Ritschl" (p. 255, n. 361); delete "Benjamin." It is almost as if someone had found a middle name for George Washington.

No serious student of religion should neglect to own and study this *magnum opus.* Professor Wach's presence at Brown University is one of Hitler's uncovenanted mercies to American scholarship.

EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN

The Trail of the Florida Circuit Rider, by Charles T. Thrift, Jr., Lakeland (Fla.), Florida Southern College Press, © 1944, pp. 168, $2.00.

Just when Methodism crossed the border from Georgia into Florida may never be known, but it is certain that it followed the trails of the numerous migrations which continued to force their unwelcome way southward while still the state was Spanish territory. Certainly it was at home in the peninsula when the United States purchased Florida from Spain in 1821. Well does the author state that "Methodism and the territory grew along together through wilderness, disease, Indian troubles, and financial difficulties, both reaching maturity at the same time a few years past the age of twenty-one when in 1845 the territory became a state and the scattered charges a conference."

The illustration of that fact is one of the chief values of this excellent history of the origin, development, and activities of one of the major Protestant denominations within a specific area of America. Evidently it is the author's intent to present conclusive evidence of the close interrelationship that always exists between religion, in its doctrine and organization, and the social order within which it operates.

For instance, the long demand of the people of the territory upon the federal government for statehood found echo on the part of the Methodists in Florida for a conference, separate and distinct from that of Georgia to which they had for years belonged. The possibility of Florida being admitted into the Union was considered in Congress in 1843; the bill was reported to the House of Representatives, June 7, 1844, and was signed March 3, 1845.

The Florida Conference was created by the General Conference in 1844. It met with the Georgia Conference for the last time January 18, 1845, and assembled as the Florida Conference for the first time, February 6, 1845.

This was no mere coincidence. "The argument was advanced that if Florida had progressed sufficiently to be organized as a state, then she had advanced sufficiently to deserve a conference of her own." Methodism had become powerful in Florida, and many a prominent citizen in affairs of state was a member of that body. What seemed well for the religious organization of the people was well likewise for their political. "Militant Methodism was making a contribution to an evolving Florida culture."

Scarcely was the new conference formed than it was compelled to decide its part in the great question of slavery already convulsing the nation. In fact the first session of the Florida Conference, held February 6, 1845, was its last session as a member of the Methodist Episcopal Church. Already, in June, 1844, the delegates from the South attending the General Conference in New York City had called a convention of Southern representatives to meet in Louisville, Kentucky, May 1, 1845,

to discuss separation from the North over a question of slavery. It was decided so to do, and the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, was organized. Strangely enough, Bishop Joshua Soule, born in Maine, a resident of Ohio, was a leading spirit in determining this separation. Thus the Methodist Episcopal Church foreshadowed the tragic national events of fifteen years later.

Similar difficulties and confusion in reconstruction were experienced by the church as by the state. Never again was Florida Methodism a unit. Churches from the North, convinced that there was abundant missionary work to be done among their Southern brethren, moved into the state, as they did into others, and organized their own form of Methodism. Negro churches were likewise established, the political significance of which is manifest in the fact that the state's first Republican governor on January 4, 1870, invited the conference of the African Methodist Episcopal Church to hold its sessions in the Executive Mansion in Tallahassee, the bishop and his friends to be guests in the house.

In 1939 the three main branches of this great Christian church—Methodist Protestant, Methodist Episcopal, and Methodist Episcopal, South—fully understanding the reasons and history of the division, united to form *The Methodist Church.* New trails are to be blazed; but today, as in the century gone, there are alert, progressive, and fearless pioneers within this socially minded church to lead it on to worthy achievements.

In *The Trail of the Florida Circuit Rider* Mr. Thrift has given permanence and wide circulation to a thrilling and inspiring chapter in the records of significant Christian contributions to the culture of America.

R. E. E. HARKNESS

The Problem of Pain, by C. S. Lewis, New York, Macmillan, 1944, pp. ix, 148, $1.50.

This brilliant little book by the author of the now famous *Screwtape Letters* deserves a better notice than it can get from a reviewer who, through a combination of the race's original sin and his own original obtuseness, refuses to be convinced. It is true that Mr. Lewis has tackled the hardest of all theological problems and that he would be the first to ask the reader not to expect too much. But I think he has dodged the main issue in dismissing as meaningless the question whether existence is good or God should have created it, when actually he is himself engaged in the effort to reconcile existence with God's love and finding the effort significant. Nor do the old statements about pain as disciplinary or as necessary for love really meet the real problem which is that of pain's distribution.

One is repelled, also, by such flat statements as "A recovery of the old sense of sin is essential to Christianity. Christ takes it for granted that men are bad" (p. 45). Or "The addition of a million fellow sufferers adds no more pain" because "when we have reached the maximum that a single person can suffer . . . we have reached all the suffering there can ever be in the universe" (p. 104). Further, some of the alternatives are too sharp, *e.g.*: "[Awe is] either a mere twist in the human mind . . . or else it is a direct experience of the really supernatural, to which the name Revelation might properly be given" (pp. 8-9). The description of a possible primitive man who was "all conscious" before the fall is an interesting speculation, perhaps, but it does border on the fantastic. And the account of the fires of hell as burning in and through the agony of faithlessness seemed to this reviewer less fearsome than the actual fires of our own age.

Yet in many of its details the book *is* brilliant. It is arresting, courageous, urbane, and, within limits, cogent. The chapter on the omnipotence of God is an excellent

statement of necessary conditions for the divine activity. The discussion of God's goodness makes some very penetrating comments. Not the least of the virtues of books like this is that they force the reader to see what he can say on the subjects where he finds the author inadequate. And they do establish a warm bond between reader and author. What a companion such a writer would be for a camping trip. And what wouldn't one give to have him as a faculty colleague.

J. S. BIXLER

Carmelite and Poet, by Robert Sencourt, New York, Macmillan, 1944, pp. x, 278, $3.00.

This book is packed with rich things on the mystic way in general, on the golden age of Spain in particular, and above all on that doctor of the church and preëminent mystic, Juan de Yepes y Alvarez, Fray Juan de la Cruz, or as we know him, St. John of the Cross (1542-1591). The author is a Catholic, and the book has the official *nihil obstat.* He is, moreover, a close student of both English and Spanish literature, lover of such English mystic poets as Crashaw and Wordsworth, and author of a book on George Meredith. As to his specific competence in Spanish letters, another than this reviewer must judge; but he surely makes the poetry of John attractive to us in his English translations. It would seem that he came admirably ready to his task. The student of both literature and religion should be held by his pages. We cannot, however, call this closely-written book easy reading.

St. John of the Cross has come more and more into his own as one of the supreme figures in Catholic mystical history. Readers of Gerald Heard's recent book (*A Preface to Prayer,* 1944) will recall the attention the Spaniard receives there. Sencourt specifically criticizes Aldous Huxley's foray into the history of mystical thought (*Grey Eminence,* 1941). Into these matters we cannot enter here. But the reader unfamiliar with the subject cannot do better than to go to E. Allison Peers' delightful introductory interpretation, *Spirit of Flame,* 1944. Ten years ago Peers gave us the works of St. John of the Cross in three volumes of English translation. One may say now that this Spanish mystic has come into his own in the English language and in the English-speaking world. Less than a generation ago he was but partially and badly comprehended. The reader of this review is doubtless aware, also, of V. Sackville-West's recent work on Carmelite mysticism (*The Eagle and the Dove,* 1944), half of it concerned with St. Teresa of Avila, eminent older contemporary and devoted spiritual sister of St. John in the reform of their monastic order.

Sencourt splashes his canvas with the vivid personalities of St. Teresa, the poet Luis de Léon, Father Gracian, and other romantics of Spain's greatest creative age. In their midst John seems a small quiet figure, slight in stature as he was, lover of the lonely cell, and of the wild hideaway places in forest and mountain. Yet in the strife within the Carmelite order, rough adventure, with persecution and suffering, reaches even to John. The story of his kidnaping, his imprisonment, and his escape makes exciting reading.

Yet the supreme adventures were within, where God and the soul meet for loving converse. Sencourt anticipates all that the Freudians might make of a celibate whose favorite analogy for the relations of the divine with the human soul is the secret meeting of an ardent lover with his lady. Surely no Christian can fail to be moved by the verses to which we are treated from this very great figure in Spanish lyric poetry. The theme of all great mystical writing is, of course, the love divine. No wonder, then, St. Bernard and others, St. John included, were so enamoured of the Song of Songs—must the Christian imagination reject the traditional allegorical uses

of this ancient love song? We seem to recall the New Testament word, "God is love"; and that our Saviour never hesitated to move to the divine plane through common human experience.

The book has several interesting illustrations, and at the end twenty pages of St. John's poems in the original Spanish. The Roman *imprimatur* need not frighten away the prospective Protestant reader: Sencourt shows us a St. John of the Cross who taps the deep springs which we can all enjoy in common. Or should we say, rather, that we can enjoy if we have the will?

JOHN WOOLMAN BRUSH

The Scientific Spirit and Democratic Faith, New York, King's Crown Press, 1944, pp. xii, 92, $1.25.

The contributors to this volume seeking to determine the relationship between science and the democratic way of life are Brand Blanshard, Richard M. Brickner, Arnold Dresden, Sir Richard Gregory, Horace M. Kallen, Harold A. Larrabee, Eduard C. Lindeman, Henry Margenau, Mark A. May, Alfred Mirsky, Arthur E. Morgan, Jerome Nathanson, Max C. Otto, and Herbert W. Schneider. It is obviously impossible to state the views of each of these men on this important subject, significant though the views of many of them are. We must content ourselves with statements concerning the structure and the main emphases of the volume.

The volume is divided into three parts which receive equal attention: the authoritarian assault on democracy; science and morality; religion in relation to science and democracy. Woven through these discussions one can discern a specific philosophy of life emerging, rooting itself in the demand for freedom, the belief in democracy as the guarantor of liberty, the validity of human values apart from theological and supernatural guarantees, and the faith that education, not less, but more, is the pathway to progress.

One important emphasis of a number of the contributors is that authoritarian religion and the democratic way of life are incompatibles. The Roman Catholic Church is severely taken to task for its approval of the writings of Monsignor John A. Ryan, M. F. X. Millar, and F. J. Boland. The last two men work as collaborators of Monsignor Ryan. Their common position, which has received the *imprimatur* of the church, is that so long as Catholics are a minority in a government they are to insist strongly upon their right to religious freedom, but that as soon as they become the majority group, it is their duty to withhold a similar liberty from all minor groups. To quote Monsignor Ryan: "Constitutions can be changed, and non-Catholic sects may decline to such a point that their political proscription may become feasible and expedient" (p. 8). Such a position is entirely incompatible with the democratic way of life which offers toleration and expression to diverse points of view. Such authoritarian religion eventuates in "a spiritual fascism, a moral and intellectual totalitarianism, which has its peers in those of the Nazis and their ilk" (p. 10). Moreover, it is pointed out that the papacy itself has consistently "condemned unequivocally the kind of liberty of thought and belief that most of us have in mind when we use the words" (p. 81). The conclusion of these scientists is that the democratic spirit and authoritarian religion do not belong together.

A second important emphasis should be noted; namely, that the modern scientist must recognize his moral responsibility to the community for the fruitage of his discoveries. Too long the scientist has tended to be a strong individualist, claiming that he was concerned only about discovering the truth, and in no way responsible for what the community of men did with his findings. This traditional view is strongly contested. "The view that the sole function of scientists is to study and

discover natural facts and principles without regard to the social implications of the knowledge gained can no longer be maintained. It is now widely acknowledged that science cannot be divorced from ethics or rightly absolve itself from the human responsibilities in the uses of its powers in economic or political planning" (p. 49). So the business of building a fruitful social and world life is as much the duty of the scientist as of anyone else. The reign of scientific irresponsibility, it is held, should draw to a close.

One final emphasis should be noted. Religion's relation to the democratic way of life lies in its contention that the individual is of infinite value. Strong issue is taken, however, with any attempt to think of the value of the individual purely in theological or supernatural terms rather than in terms of his significance as a thinking, feeling, and needy being of flesh and blood. Those Christians, both of the Roman Catholic and Protestant persuasions, who have tended to sacrifice the good of man in his worldly, fleshly condition that his eternal soul might be salvaged hereafter, are taken thoroughly to task. It is held that religion aids democracy only as it supports the full and abundant life for all men here and now. Otherworldliness ill befits a democracy which is engaged in the production and extension of those values which make for the fulfillment of man's present life.

It is to be hoped that this volume of fourteen papers presented at the first Conference on the Scientific Spirit and Democratic Faith will be followed by many similar productions. They will pave the way for a philosophy of science which is urgently needed if science is to benefit rather than destroy mankind.

GEORGE W. DAVIS

Revivalism in America, by William Warren Sweet, New York, Scribner, 1944, pp. xv, 192, $2.00.

The reader of this book will do well to bear in mind the statement of the author that it "is not a history of American revivalism; rather it is an attempt at an historical appraisal." The revival is sometimes spoken of as an American phenomenon. This is scarcely correct. Revivalism partakes of two forms. It is sometimes a reinterpretation and revitalizing of religion, a reënthusing of religious people, and thus is in the nature of a reformation. In this sense it is very ancient and one of its significant manifestations is the Protestant Reformation.

But revivalism may also be spoken of as a religious creative process. It seeks the conversion experience. It issues a call to sinners to come to God, to get right with him. Its designed result is the "rebirth," the transformation from sin to righteousness, from damnation to salvation. It creates religion in the heart of the unbeliever rather than enriching the present religious life of the believer.

Revivalism in America partakes of these two forms. Her early revivals were more of the nature of reformations, the later of the conversion type.

I am not sure that Professor Sweet appreciates this fact. In his first chapter—"Setting the Stage"—among other excellent reasons given for the American revival of colonial days he emphasizes the irreligion of many of the immigrants to these shores; and for the later and Western period the destructive moral and religious effect of the barren, harsh frontier. There is much to be said for this without doubt.

On the other hand, many of the so-called irreligious of the colonies were so only in the eyes of the Establishment and the conformists. They had come from Europe as rebels and dissenters, protesting against what, to them, were arid forms of the enforced order. As Dr. Sweet states, Protestantism had halted on the march. Its promise of personal religion, the right of the individual, had not been fulfilled. The

revivalists of the colonial days made these people articulate, confirming them in their demands, and thus the revolution, civil and religious, long overdue, came to pass. The revival gave root and strength to democracy, and Christianity developed an American culture. The dissenters had triumphed.

In succeeding chapters the great revivalist leaders of the country are well characterized. Quotations are drawn from their sermons, and their methods are defined. But one would like to have a little more fully the contribution each made to the Americanizing of Christianity. However, Dr. Sweet has made a definite appraisal, as he set out to do, of this American phenomenon of religion.

Some errors in the text may be noted. At the bottom of p. 3 and the top of p. 4, the word *upon* succeeds itself. On p. 7 *concentration* is spelled *consentration.* The question arises as to whether "lay vestries" were "self-perpetuating bodies" later than the seventeenth century (p. 23). On p. 24 reference is made to the "religious situation in the American colonies at the end of the first third of the nineteenth century."

R. E. E. HARKNESS

Religion and the Issues of Life, by Eugene W. Lyman, New York, Revell, 1943, pp. v, 140, $1.00.

The Hazen Foundation, to whom the religious world is already indebted for effectively written, compact volumes on basic Christian themes, is fortunate in having Professor Lyman as author of *Religion and the Issues of Life.* This book will indeed "encourage and facilitate the serious study of religion by students and other youth." The reviewer wishes he had had this book in easy reach during collegiate religious wanderings, not because it would have solved the problems by formulas, but because of its suggestive direction as it brings into focus and relation the main problems in life and religion.

Professor Lyman guides his reader from a consideration of the four dimensions of religion as *experienced,* especially within the Christian tradition, to the evaluation of the *truth* of religion when seen not only from the vantage point of scientific method but also from its own method and light. Readers of Professor Lyman's work will recognize his fundamental conviction: "Religious truth . . . is gained through faith, but it needs to be *intelligent* faith. Religious knowledge comes through personal insight, but it should be *informed* insight" (p. 48).

As the reader moves through the chapters on "Religion and Worship," "Religion and Ethics," and "Religion and Philosophy," he is further impressed with the persistent weaving of religion into the æsthetic, moral, and theoretical issues of life, so that he cannot but notice the final religious pattern of constructive interaction and creative conflict between man and God, faith and reason, "holiness" and action. Throughout is this striving for synthesis which characterizes Dr. Lyman's thinking. "There is every reason, therefore, why we should use both philosophy's method of intellectual synthesis and religion's method of dynamic, creative synthesis, as we try to grapple with the great issues of life" (p. 106).

One is heartened, especially in our own day, by this demand for partnership as the "true relation between religion and philosophy." Professor Lyman insists that religion "must welcome the critical examination of its judgments by philosophy and the philosophic effort to set those judgments into relation with experience as a whole." But he also demands that philosophy "recognize that religion itself can be a source of truth," that "religious intuition and faith may be able to lay hold of the most basic truths concerning reality, without which philosophy will fall short of making the most adequate interpretation of the whole of experience" (pp. 105 f.).

This reviewer is not sure what Professor Lyman's last-ditch stand would be on a critical question which comes up at this point. There can be little doubt that the philosophic *attitude,* as here defined, and the religious *attitude,* as defined, must be interacting partners in a complete life in which theory cannot be dissociated from action. But can we talk about religion and philosophy *both* being sources of truth? When it comes to the *truth* of any hypothesis, or the final interpretation of any data, be the source religion, logic, æsthetics, or psychology, can there be a partnership verdict? Must not the final arbiter be the philosophic effort, which, as Professor Lyman so well says, alone sets judgments into relation with experience as a whole? The individual can—nay, must—alternate between *attitudes,* but the religious judgment of truth, so-called, must give way to the more inclusive philosophic interpretation of truth. For a philosophy which is not final judge of the *whole,* including religious data, is not living up to the specific claims of philosophy. PETER A. BERTOCCI

We Preach Not Ourselves, by Gordon Poteat, New York, Harper, ©1944, pp. 185, $2.00.

The cover of this book bears the legend "An Exposition of First Corinthians," which is not, however, used as a subtitle, and is probably not due to the author. It is in any case quite misleading, for this is a book on preaching; and far from seeking to expound I Corinthians, Dr. Poteat merely uses a few passages from that epistle to illustrate the principles and methods which he advocates. He is persuaded that preachers must go back to the Bible, not as an infallible authority to be used in "proof-text demonstration of truth," but "because it is the source of our knowledge of Jesus Christ" who must be the theme of our preaching. He shares the dissatisfaction that is widely and justifiably felt with that type of preaching which is less a proclamation of the Word of God than an expression of the preacher's personal opinions on a variety of current topics. In this book, then, he attempts to show how the Bible can be expounded in relation to contemporary problems, not by a mere arbitrary attachment of the sermon to a chosen text, but by "explicit use of the historical method which is basic in a rational interpretation of the Biblical writings . . . [giving] the text, as far as is humanly possible, the connotation which its author intended, refraining from reading into it extraneous ideas." His own handling of selected passages from I Corinthians is intended to show by practical demonstration, "how, while loyally faithful to scientific method, we may make use of the Bible."

His general principles of exposition are perfectly sound. He seeks first of all to discover precisely what St. Paul meant, what problem he was facing in the church, and how he brought the doctrine of the gospel to bear for its solution. With this clearly in mind, he proceeds to examine parallel situations in the church today, and to show how the teaching of the passage may guide us in our approach to them, and direct us to the Christian understanding and solution.

Nothing very ambitious is attempted in the way of interpretation, and nothing very startling in the way of contemporary application. On the whole, it must be said, that the weightier problems of contemporary church life are approached far too lightly, as in the very superficial and unsympathetic treatment of our existing divisions, and especially the thorny question of intercommunion. Profound theological differences are not to be dismissed with an impatient huff. The most interesting feature of the work is the use of pertinent illustrations from the foreign field, which often throw a peculiarly vivid light upon the experience of St. Paul in the evangelization of pagan peoples and the discipline of churches. FRANK W. BEARE

The Relevance of the Prophets, by R. B. Y. Scott, New York, Macmillan, 1944, pp. ix, 237, $2.50.

This book is a deal more extensive in its scope than its title would imply. Professor Scott is not content to rush in and suggest the relevance of the Hebrew prophets to our age without taking particular pains to make certain that his reader knows something of the world of the prophets. The antecedents of the institution of prophecy are described concisely and adequately in a chapter. Other sections deal with such matters as the prophetic word, the call which characterized some of the more effective prophets, the theology of the prophets, the attitude of Hebrew prophets toward such pivotal matters as history, the social order, and religion. Each of these sections is a well-organized unit. One has the feeling as he reads that a great wealth of material has been carefully sifted for just those pieces which belong to the picture to which the author has limited himself. The material has been judiciously trimmed to fit into a disciplined whole. The author modestly disclaims any pretense of giving material new to Old Testament scholars; but he has been particularly creative in giving a distinctive arrangement to a wealth of material which is so often lost for lack of well-organized presentation. In another way the book is a model of form. Professor Scott has recognized a distinction—one which the enthusiast for the work of the prophets so often fails to make—between the discussion of questions of background and text, and homiletical applications of the ancient ideas to modern problems. After devoting over two hundred pages to setting forth some solid—but interesting—facts about the material discussed, the author draws some pertinent conclusions as to the value of the prophets for our own contemporary situation.

The relevance of the prophets for our age is to be found in the prophets themselves, their understanding, their sympathy, their courage, their earnestness. These impressions are more important lessons than the content of the prophetic utterances. With certain basic attitudes they found an answer to the problems of their day; with a similar spirit we must find an answer to our problems. No mere catalogue of their insights will suffice to give us our answer; but a reading below the particular or certain basic methods will be of invaluable aid to the search for the way in this generation. Such are the lines which the author would suggest for finding value in a study of the prophetic literature. The suggestions of the final chapter are fresh and stimulating.

This is a careful and responsible job of mediating the results of technical scholarship to a wider public of intelligent readers. Professor Scott, as one would expect, exhibits a familiarity with the wealth of technical material on the subject, but he has the happy faculty of putting technical knowledge in unobtrusive phrases. The book is notably free from dogmatism and superficial moralizing. It is of interest to note that the author, who has been for thirteen years professor of Old Testament literature and exegesis at the United Theological College, Montreal, Canada, is now on a leave of absence while serving as a chaplain with the Royal Canadian Air Force.

JAMES B. PRITCHARD

The Genius of Public Worship, by Charles H. Heimsath, New York, Scribner, 1944, pp. xiv, 204, $2.50.

Here is a practical book for the general reader designed to enrich his worship experience by explaining the governing principles underlying Sunday church services. Specialists in the field and thoughtful ministers, however, will be attracted to the book because of its solid content and direct approach. Its thesis is that public worship,

as distinguished from private devotions, is ceremonial art and has a festal character. One may commune with God in a garden and pray to him in secret; yet public worship is more than communion and prayer. There is no such thing as an informal religious service. Deep spiritual experiences must be exultantly shared with others, even as the woman in the parable summoned her neighbors to celebrate the finding of a lost coin. "Worship is formal adoration and praise; worship is social celebration of common faith and purpose; worship is ordered expression of Christian devotion." Private prayer, however, is essential to effective public worship else there will be no previous experience of God's grace to celebrate.

To meet the possible objection that worship as celebration has no juncture with the divine, the author counters with the statement that response to objective reality is definitely implied. The classic pattern in the sixth chapter of Isaiah indicates the true behavior of the soul before God. From the vision of the Most High issue confession, renewal, and dedication. The author properly reminds Protestants that they are too subjective in their worship. The Almighty is present objectively as well as subjectively, on the altar as well as in the heart, manifesting himself in the corporate spirit of the devout congregation and in the moral reconciliation wrought in public worship.

About one third of the book deals with the origin and development of ancient religious rites and the different patterns of worship as seen in Protestant churches, the Hebrew synagogue, and the Roman Catholic Mass. This ambitious undertaking is succinctly and suggestively handled, and adds an ecumenical flavor to the book. The treatment of architecture and music is well done. Three of the concluding chapters are extremely relevant. For example, in the chapter on "Public Worship and Social Action," the point is well taken that worship "has forever fired the moral earnestness and enflamed the ethical passion of Christians." High school boys and girls need not fall away from the church if the suggestions in the chapter, "The Child in the Midst," are studied and applied. The author is seen at his creative best in such a chapter as "The New Worship in the New World," where he evaluates modern trends, challenges his readers to be open-minded, and insists that "worship is rooted in but not throttled by the past." Here speaks a free church prophet.

In reading this book one is impressed by its independence of thought, knowledge of sources as indicated in the bibliography, reverent yet daring outlook, vigorous style, and a democratic inclusiveness which embraces the values of worship services in Texas cowboy churches as well as in city temples. Such a book strengthens the conviction that worship abides because it is rooted in finite man's need of God. "The traffic in God's house may be modest but it is indispensable." The reader soon discovers for himself that this is a book with a mission. The time has indeed come to re-establish worship at the centre of the church, as the author insists. Ministers should read and ponder this book and put it in the hands of their people.

VAUGHAN DABNEY

Thomas Cresap, Maryland Frontiersman, by Kenneth P. Bailey, Boston, Christopher, © 1944, pp. 322, $4.00.

Most Americans believe that all was sweet peace and good will among the colonies in the period prior to the Revolution. All difficulties existed, according to this general opinion, between the colonists and the mother country and had their rise in the despotism of the latter. The hot jealousies between the various settlements, the boundary disputes resulting in armed clashes, the failure of Benjamin

Franklin's Plan of Union in 1754 are either unknown or conveniently forgotten. So also are the many times in which the mother country was forced to intervene in order to maintain the peace.

This biography of the Maryland frontiersman is an authentic story of the conflict waged for many years between Pennsylvania and Maryland over the question of the boundary line between the two. Thomas Cresap, a hotheaded, stubborn Yorkshire man who settled in Maryland early in the eighteenth century, insisted that his land was within this colony though it was far north of the fortieth parallel claimed by Pennsylvania as her southern boundary. The defense of his claims involved the two colonies in official disputes for many years.

In 1741 he moved to the extreme western frontier of Maryland, and his home became the hospitable "guest-house" for Indians, fur traders, Moravian missionaries, George Washington, and General Braddock. It may have been in the fertile mind of Cresap that the organization of the Ohio Land Company had its conception. Since it was the promotion of this company which had much to do with precipitating the outbreak of the French and Indian War, this hardy frontiersman played an active and prominent part in its prosecution. When after the peace of 1763 the Home Government sought to restrain the westward migration of the American settlers, Cresap, with Washington, was a leader in defying its authority, which bold and determined opposition was one cause of the American Revolution.

It is a good story—almost ruined by the telling. The book has little literary merit to commend it and no critical evaluation of sources. Though well documented from colonial court records, materials in the British Museum, original letters and journals, many mistakes appear. A sample of the confusion within the entire story is the uncertainty of Cresap's age. On p. 21 the author writes: "Arriving in America as a boy in 1715. . . ." And on p. 28, "at the age of about fifteen he emigrated to America." On p. 26, however, we read: "He was born in Yorkshire, England, about the year 1694"; on page 164, the final word, "In 1790 he died . . . at the good old age of ninety and six."

R. E. E. HARKNESS

Concerning Marriage and the Family, by Ernest R. Groves, New York, Macmillan, 1944, pp. vii, 138, $1.75.

Professor Groves is another student of sociology who undertakes to apply his accumulated knowledge toward the alleviation of distressing social conditions. For three decades he has directed his attention to problems of marriage and the family. He is widely known as a domestic counselor. Perhaps his early ministerial education contributed something to his achievements in this field. He received his B.D. from Yale in 1901.

We learn from the title page that we are to review "a realistic discussion of the divorce problem." In the preface we find that this is one of the three most common problems brought to the counselor. The other two are preparation for marriage and sexual adjustment, and have been treated in previous publications. "The book seeks to bring out, as the domestic counselor does in conversation, the self-understanding needed for a sensible decision" (p. vi). For the most part, it is a moral appeal to the woman planning divorce to be reasonable with respect to her own chances, and those of her children, for future happiness. Instead of arguing that it is wrong to divorce, the author merely tries to show that divorce does not pay. (This is supposed to be a technique in counseling.)

Nine chapters deal with commonly recognized motives for divorce, such as:

unhappiness, unfaithfulness, quarreling, disappointment, sexual maladjustment, in-laws money, and disagreement over children. Three chapters take up motives not recognized. These are: "Father or Mother Fixation," "Failure to Grow Up," and "Matrimonial Monotony." They average about six pages each, and are unworthy of the author. Example: "Therefore you must set aside the reason you have been giving yourself for a divorce and make a desperate effort to sound your own character" (p. 95). Part III is entitled, "When Your Decision Is Made." It has two chapters, "If You Decide to Get a Divorce," and "If You Seek a Marriage Counselor." There should be a chapter discussing the family situation if one decides *not* to get a divorce. Firmly married couples will find that the entire book can be read aloud in one brief evening. It will support their decision and furnish a certain amount of entertainment.

RAYMOND L. HIGHTOWER

The Arts and Religion, edited by Albert Edward Bailey, New York, Macmillan, 1944, pp. xiv, 180, $2.50.

The 1943 Ayer Lectures of the Colgate-Rochester Divinity School have been edited with an introduction by Albert Edward Bailey and published as *The Arts and Religion*. The "and" is definitely connective. These two "necessary drives" of man go back to antiquity, where they began to be evident as forms of magic, compelling the unseen powers. Growing up, they developed into social and devotional forms of human activity. Their relationship to each other becomes "The Expression of Religion in Painting and Sculpture" by Professor Bailey, "The Expression of Religion in Architecture" by Kenneth John Conant, "The Expression of Religion in Music" by H. Augustine Smith, and "The Dramatist and the Minister" by Fred Eastman.

While each lecturer keeps to the field of his choice, the central theme of all is the same; *viz.*, religion has found a definite, purposeful, effective, and strengthening form of expression in the arts. If there are differences and deterrents, one to the other, they are neither basic nor inherent, but the vagaries and incidentals always liable in free expression.

Bailey's technique of five rooms in the world's museum of art is good pedagogy and good mnemonics. Through them we wander and study the symbolic presentations of divine beings, the factual representation of human beings associated with the history of religion, the presentation of the dogmas of faith, (*i.e.*, propaganda) the symbolic offering of one's self or one's work to God, and, finally, social amelioration. Always we are reminded that "art holds a mirror up to the contemporary mind of man" (p. 41). Here is no mere catalogue of the items in each room, but the cultivation of understanding and the experience of impressions. (Although we allow latitude of usage in colloquial and nontechnical language, should we not insist that a writer on art use the word *replica* in its only correct technical sense?)

Kenneth Conant's lecture on architecture is the most difficult for the average reader to follow, with its specialized glossary and its restricted technicalities. Nevertheless, the point is clearly made that religion has been a creative power in the attempt of man worthily and beautifully to house the experience of the worship of God. The chapter will well repay the careful reader.

H. Augustine Smith has done much for music as a worthy expression of religion for those who believe that *sacred* is not a synonym for *sacrosanct*. The reader notes especially his description of the music of a church service in the light of Von Ogden Vogt's five points of worship, even though he does transpose the second and third

points. He succeeds in developing the impressive contrast of music in the liturgical church with that in congregations of the freer modes.

Fred Eastman presents his lecture from the viewpoint of what a minister can learn from the dramatist to make preaching and the conduct of services of worship more effective. By showing the points they have in common, the differences between them, the elements of the drama, he enlists the dramatist as a teacher worthy to be heeded by the preacher.

The effect of the whole book is salutary upon the receptive mind and heart of anyone who still yearns for a more effective way to live religiously and to lead others into the beautiful and inspiring throne room of God, where courtesy is more than a mannerism, and where dignity is a mark of respect. ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

Preaching in a Revolutionary Age, by G. Bromley Oxnam, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, © 1944, pp. 207, $2.00.

The 1918-1919 Beecher Lectures were delivered by John Kelman on the theme "The War and Preaching." Compare them with these Beecher Lectures for 1943-1944. The differences are those of the lecturers, but perhaps more of the times. Bishop Oxnam has studied at several universities in the United States, in Japan, China, India, and England; has traveled extensively abroad; and has been pastor, professor, and college president. There is ample evidence of a wide reading and of an experiential knowledge of world affairs and concerns. In fact, it is this background that becomes almost the foreground.

The major part of the lectures is concerned with world problems in the light of their political and social significance. To preach in such an age as ours one requires a basic faith and philosophy that are timeless, rather than a sensitiveness to existing conditions that produces merely a hopeless confusion and almost a despairing cynicism. The lecturer does not put his chief emphasis upon what to preach; here are no ready-made topics and outlines. He rather prefers to build the preacher and the pastor upon foundations that are eternal and that now become more valuable and imperative than ever, if Christian preaching is to be effective—or even survive. It is a consideration of the Christian minister, unchanged from the beginning, but now high-lighted by the glare from the fires of a burning world.

The book closes with "The Revolutionary Christ" a master of the revolutionary preaching which we, too, must do for our own revolutionary age. He was so by his principles, not by a plan. He gave only the rules for living that would be revolutionary in any age but the golden one. So must we.

Samples of the writer's style and thesis are:

"The counsel of winsomeness can be overdone" (p. 18).
"Men may kneel in repentance, but they must stand upon their feet to march" (p. 37).
"Christian faith does not center in explanations; it lives in experience" (p. 80).
"From the college presidency to the episcopacy is in many ways a transition from ivory tower to circus tent" (p. 120).

The hearers of these lectures must have come from them feeling that they had been pinned to a map of the world, yet with a haunting sense that they were not lost in the maze of other pins denoting armies, statesmen, and salesmen, but somehow, although unable to see whether it were true or not, inwardly conscious that the head of their pin carried a distinguishing mark, not only of identification, but also of promise.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

BOOK NOTICES

Worship and the Common Life, by Eric Hayman, New York, Macmillan, 1944, pp. viii, 155, $2.50.

This book by an English Quaker proffers an olive branch to the ecumenical movement, which has not been too hospitable to the Quakers. Two aspects of Quaker life present problems to many ecumenical leaders today, and these the author treats in irenic spirit. The first is the stress on the Holy Spirit as experienced in personal, individual life. With the current revival of Calvinist theology all mysticism in which God is present in the life of man smacks of humanism. Accordingly Mr. Hayman assures his readers that such a view is quite consonant with Calvinistic despair of human nature. He quotes Emil Brunner with approval; but this is superficially done, for on this question he should really examine Brunner's *Glaube und Mystik,* where the notion of divine indwelling in the human soul is severely castigated. The other problematic aspect of the Quaker way is its repudiation of liturgy in favor of worship without rites or ritual. The author here pleads for recognition of the similarity between the stages in liturgical worship and those of the Friends' meeting: preparation, offering, intercession, consecration, and communion. But this scarcely meets the real problem, which is whether baptism or any other rite is essential to church membership. So that the engaging personality which shines through the book fails of his purpose for lack of sufficient thoroughness in the treatment of the issues he raises.

EDWIN E. AUBREY

Race and Crime, by Willem Adrian Bonger, translated (from the Dutch) by Margaret Mathews Hordyk, New York, Columbia University Press, 1943, pp. xi, 130, $1.50.

The late author of this book was one of the leading criminologists of Europe. When Hitler's armies swept over his native Holland, when most of the universities of his country were closed and many of the Dutch scholars landed in concentration camps or died in grief, Professor Bonger, like others, found it impossible to live in a world where freedom of scientific expression had gone: thus he died of his own free will. This little volume is the last that came from his pen. In discussing the different theories about the relationship of race to psychical qualities and intellectual capacity Dr. Bonger repeatedly states that the whole science of race is still so young that no conclusive judgments, scientifically based, can be made on this question. The fact of the obvious "psychical changeableness" within a single race makes the serious scientist extremely reticent to issue sweeping statements as to definite characteristics in members of a given race. That doctrine which explains human history on the basis of racial differentiation (Gobineau, H. S. Chamberlain, Guenther, Alfred Rosenberg, etc.) he calls bitingly "no theory at all but a second-rate religion" (p. 11). The main part of the book is formed by a number of case studies on criminality among specific races. To American readers the studies on Negro and Jewish criminality will be of particular interest. On the basis of these case studies the author arrives at the conclusion that there is no special predisposition to crime in any specific race. There are, to be sure, physical and psychical characteristics, such as energy, emotionalism, etc., which appear more frequently in one race than in another, and which, under certain conditions, may lead to criminal actions; but the very same characteristics may under different conditions bring forth responses of high beneficial value to society. Thus the decisive factor as to the cause of crime is not racial predisposition, but the social and cultural milieu in which an individual has grown up and lives. The great

changes in the rate of criminality which have taken place within one single race as a result of changing circumstances are irrefutable proofs for this conclusion.

HERBERT GEZORK

Orestes Brownson, by Theodore Maynard, New York, Macmillan, 1943, pp. xvi, 456, $3.00.

This is a remarkable portrait of a remarkable man. Today the name of Orestes Brownson is almost unknown. Was it, as his biographer suggests, because he became a Catholic? While reading Professor Maynard's searching, yet sympathetic, biography, I asked several professors of English what they knew about Orestes Brownson. Their ignorance, one and all, was abysmal; in two cases it was candidly truthful. One thought that he was a relative of the Alcotts since one of the lesser of that latter breed had his name as a given name. He later blushed when he realized that *Bronson* and *Brownson* are after all not identical. All this is surprising, for in his own day he was always in the limelight; here was a man who had a loud voice and thanked God for it. For a time, after leaving the fold of Calvin, a Universalist minister; for a time, an acolyte of Frances Wright; for a time, a Unitarian—he was the only Unitarian, so far as I know, who ever preached at Brimstone Corner in Boston—but why go further? "For a time" is a quite satisfactory clue to this ancient mariner, who, under the pressure of a brand-new conviction and merciless logic, was always plunging headlong from one sect to another, always sure that "whereas I was blind, now I see," and always ready—nay, eager—to tell the world all about it. Finally he landed in Mother Church, but it was for him a storm-lashed open roadstead, not a sheltered haven. He knew everybody, and fought with them all. A prolific author and mighty able editor, the only journal he really enjoyed writing for was one which was his own and of which he was the principal, often the only, contributor. Thus for more than thirty years (with a brief interlude) he kept things humming with *Brownson's Quarterly Review,* which had succeeded the Boston *Quarterly Review.* About all this and more Professor Maynard writes with racy charm and discerning candor. The result is a biography which is after all a biography of an era as well as of a man, for everything that was happening in America (and not a few things abroad as well) were at one time or another to be affected by this rip-roaring Yankee in his tumultuous pilgrim's progress. For those, like my friends, the English professors, who are not quite certain as to what this period was, Orestes' vital statistics may be appended: born at Stockbridge, Vermont, in 1803; died at Detroit, Michigan, in 1876. May he rest in peace; in life he never did.

MORTON S. ENSLIN

Lands Away, by Earl Marlatt, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, © 1944, pp. 179, $1.50.

When two wars are fought on a battlefield a whole world wide, the period between them is likely to engender and nurture questions about the worth of life and of the presence of any real values in an apparent civilization. Moods of depression, doubt, and cynicism seem inevitable and even logical. The literature of such a period offers no definite answers to the author, but it has lifted his horizon and lengthened his perspectives. He believes that "there is no frigate like a book to take us lands away" and he shares both the experience and the resulting moods with the reader. He ventures "to find the eternal in the contemporary" and "the sublime beyond the sordid." One expression of the thesis of the book might be the author's italicized statement that the "poetry of yesterday has sometimes been the philosophy of today and the politics of tomorrow" (p. 16). That can be defended ultimately without undue

pressure upon the meanings and connotations of words, but at first one thinks that the opposite sequence might be the more accurate. For the present volume, however, the important fact is the discovery in literature of "Stars to Steer By" (chap. 2) to "Brave New Worlds" (chap. 4) in a "Grey Dawn Breaking" (chap. 9). This the book accomplishes through the easy manner of a poet-author who possesses a creative imagination that sees light denied to the critical judgment. The pathway leads through fiction, poetry, the drama—a pleasant journey for souls harassed by the imperative demands of the obvious. Occasionally, however, the traveler is disturbed by the too evident presence of the guide, desiring rather to have human silence be the fitting tribute to a scene of beauty.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

Down Peacock's Feathers, by D. R. Davies, New York, Macmillan, 1944, pp. xi, 188, $1.75.

This is an extraordinary little book. The title is taken from the "Homilies," set forth in Elizabethan times for use in the Church of England; the subject is the "general confession" found in Morning and Evening Prayer in the Anglican *Book of Common Prayer*; the author is a recent convert to Anglicanism from one of the English "Free Churches." The book itself is an attempt to show the soundness and applicability of the phrases of the "general confession"—such as "there is no health in us"—to man's present and eternal situation. Man is a sinner—he needs to recognize himself to be one. Original sin is a fact—failure to recognize this is the cause of much of our silly utopian illusion. God's forgiveness is man's only "way out"; refusal to appropriate that forgiveness is man's tragedy. To the reviewer most of what is said is quite true, but it is said, he feels, in an uncommonly lurid manner. Doubtless the author would say that this commends the book, at any rate makes it readable. That is correct; but the sometimes unguarded phraseology still leaves us unsatisfied. However, it will do us all good to read this vigorous, forthright, uncompromising statement of the Augustinianism which is so clearly a central element in the *Prayer Book.*

W. NORMAN PITTENGER

A Preface to Prayer, by Gerald Heard, New York, Harper, ©1944, pp. xvi, 250, $2.00.

In spite of a suggestive analysis of three levels of prayer and some interesting observations concerning its psychology, I cannot share the enthusiasm with which some of my good friends have welcomed this book. It impresses me as clever and confident, rather than substantial and true. The major difficulty is that the author is interested in mysticism rather than in prayer, and so turns to Roman Catholic rather than to Protestant sources, and to "Brahmanic-Buddhistic" cosmology and metaphysics in preference to Christian. Of prayer as practiced and described by such Protestants as Dr. Fosdick and Dr. Buttrick—to name two who have written with great insight concerning the experience of prayer—he knows little, and does not seem to care. Fortunately, we have another book on prayer, quite as broadly based as this, and making full use of the resources of comparative religion, which sees clearly the distinction between prayer and mysticism which this volume blurs over. Compared to Friedrich Heiler's *Prayer,* the present book is slight and inconsequential.

LUTHER A. WEIGLE

A Certain Blind Man, by Robert E. Fitch, New York, Scribner, 1944, pp. xi, 181, $2.00.

This is a book of essays which take as their points of departure passages of Scripture. They are not, however, exegetical; and the author plays freely with the

ideas the passages suggest to him. The themes dealt with are all found in the contemporary American scene: materialism, isolationism, complacency, idealism, and patriotism. Professor Fitch writes cleverly, and his style is best described in a phrase he applies to Plato's writing: "a diffuse elegance." At times his cleverness makes him a bit superficial and brash in his characterizations of thinkers and movements, as in his references to the "theology of crisis" and to pacifism. One does not have to be either a Barthian or a pacifist to protest against his cavalier treatment of them. There are many penetrating observations in the book, and it will well repay thoughtful reading.

EDWIN E. AUBREY

The Relevance of the Bible, by H. H. Rowley, New York, Macmillan, 1944, pp. ix, 192, $1.75.

This little volume has considerable worth, particularly in the author's special field of knowledge, the Old Testament. Facts that are common property are set forth frankly, yet irenically, with abundant cogent illustration. Among such are: there is no finally authoritative text of Scripture; revelation was not static; errors in fact, and contradictions within the Bible itself are so apparent that the old idea of inspiration is no longer tenable. The prophets, especially the earlier ones, often were eccentric; the later ones were instructors in ethics and religion; and all were men of like passions with ourselves. A unity exists between the Old and the New Testaments, which consists of three great streams of thought or general principles, such as hope, righteousness, and suffering, and is vital rather than artificial. In the three remaining chapters, Dr. Rowley becomes the preacher, piling up proof texts that merely prove what he wishes to prove. This will be a comforting appeasement to some.

I. G. MATTHEWS

Behold the Man, edited by Ralph L. Woods, New York, Macmillan, 1944, pp. xx, 565, $3.00.

This is an anthology of "interesting" observations (in "readable" prose) about Jesus, as uttered through the centuries by some four hundred "outstanding" men and women. The excerpts are arranged in eight groups: Man, God, Teacher, Redeemer, Leader, Messiah, Reformer, Prophet; in each of these classifications the arrangement is alphabetical by authors. Various tests were applied before the selections were included. Apparently the most important requirement was that they be complimentary:

> . . . any selection that might give offense to anyone accepting the divine nature of Christ was ruled out of the book. This does not mean, of course, that every person quoted accepts the divinity of Christ. It does mean that the passages used from those not believing in Christ's divinity nevertheless respect the feelings and faith of those who do accept Christ as God. Of course, a great number of the selections are from men and women who accept the divinity of Christ.

Because of this convenient editorial policy Irvin Cobb and F. W. Farrar, Fosdick and Jung, Klausner and Emil Ludwig, George Moore and William Lyon Phelps, Shelley and W. L. Sperry, Lew Wallace and Oscar Wilde, Annie Besant and G. K. Chesterton, Spurgeon and Brigham Young, Daniel Webster and Dean Weigle, H. L. Mencken and Daniel A. Poling utter their encomiums in tranquil proximity. An index (alphabeted by authors) provides in parentheses after the author's name the volume from which the (often expurgated) quotation is taken. This volume will undoubtedly appeal to many preachers as a convenient source from which to cull synthetic gems for a moving sermon on "What think ye of Christ?"

MORTON S. ENSLIN

BOOKS RECEIVED

The Voice in the Wilderness, by Florence L. Ives, Boston, Bruce Humphries, © 1944, pp. 239, $2.00.

By collecting various passages from all parts of the Bible which appeared to her related, and arranging them "in their appointed form," the author felt that she had achieved a "perfect picture of the Scriptural concept." It is the work of a devoted amateur.

**The Psychiatry of Robert Burton,* by Bergen Evans, New York, Columbia University Press, 1944, pp. ix, 129, $2.00.

**Son of Man and Suffering Servant,* by Edward A. McDowell, Nashville Broadman, © 1944, pp. 216, $2.00.

**The Leveller Tracts, 1647–1653,* edited by William Haller and Godfrey Davies, New York, Columbia University Press, 1944, pp. vi, 481, $6.50.

**Chronicle of an American Crusader,* by Samuel S. Mayerberg, New York, Bloch, 1944, pp. xiii, 148, $1.50.

The Snowden-Douglass Sunday School Lessons, 1945, by Earl L. Douglass, New York, Macmillan, 1944, pp. xv, 383, $1.50.

The twenty-fourth annual volume of *International Sunday School Lessons,* prepared by the pastor of the Summit Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia.

**The Radiant Life,* by Rufus M. Jones, New York, Macmillan, 1944, pp. viii, 154, $2.00.

Primary Children Learn at Church, by Ethel L. Smither, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, © 1944, pp. 170, $1.25.

A guide and source book for teachers who are preparing to teach in the Primary department of the Sunday school. It is one of the *Second Series Courses* prepared by the *Leadership Training Publishing Association.*

**A Manual of Ecclesiology,* by H. E. Dana (revised in collaboration with L. M. Sipes), Kansas City, Central Seminary Press, © 1944, pp. 358, $2.00.

**The Development of Higher Education in Mexico,* by George I. Sánchez, New York, King's Crown Press, 1944, pp. vii, 140, $1.50.

Youth Conquering for Christ, by R. L. Middleton, Nashville, Broadman, © 1944, pp. 201, $1.50.

Inspirational messages for young people by a layman long associated with the North Carolina State Mission Board.

A Great Time to Be Alive, by Harry Emerson Fosdick, New York, Harper, © 1944, pp. 235, $2.00.

Twenty-five sermons on Christianity in wartime by a preacher too well known to require eulogy.

**The Cross and the Eternal Order,* by Henry W. Clark, New York, Macmillan, 1944, pp. xiii, 319, $2.50.

**Highroads of the Universe,* by J. Glover Johnson, New York, Scribner, 1944, pp. xiv, 316, $2.50.

**The Constant Fire,* by Allan Knight Chalmers, New York, Scribner, 1944, pp. ix, 172, $2.00.

**The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness,* by Reinhold Niebuhr, New York, Scribner, 1944, pp. xiii, 190, $2.00.

**Paul for Everyone,* by Chester Warren Quimby, New York, Macmillan, 1944, pp. xv, 176, $2.00.

**The Bible and the Common Reader,* by Mary Ellen Chase, New York, Macmillan, 1944, pp. xi, 316, $2.50.

Adventures in Burma, adapted by Kenneth L. Wilson, Philadelphia, Judson, © 1944, pp. 64, $0.40 (paper).

Dr. Gordon S. Seagrave builds a hospital—a story told in pictures from *Tales of a Waste-Basket Surgeon* and news stories.

Judson Keystone Primary Department Manual, prepared by Hazel A. Lewis, Philadelphia, Judson, ©1944, pp. 98, $0.75 (paper).

**War, Peace, and Nonresistance,* by Guy Franklin Hershberger, Scottdale (Pa.), Herald Press, 1944, pp. xv, 415, $2.50.

**Edward Bellamy,* by Arthur E. Morgan, New York, Columbia University Press, 1944, pp. xvii, 468, $5.00.

**Encyclopedia of Bible Life,* by Madeleine S. and J. Lane Miller, New York, Harper, © 1944, pp. xvi, 493, $4.95.

**A Panorama of Prejudice,* by Harry Cohen, New York, Bloch, 1944, pp. 150, no price.

**The Way to Freedom,* by Meyer Edelbaum, New York, Bloch, 1944, pp. 284, $2.50.

**Church History in the Light of the Saints,* by Joseph A. Dunney, New York, Macmillan, 1944, pp. 465, $2.75.

The Fatherhood of God, by Evert J. Blekkink, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1942, pp. 120, $1.25.

**Pastoral Work and Personal Counseling,* by Russel L. Dicks, New York, Macmillan, 1944, pp. x, 230, $2.00.

**Under Orders—Autobiography of William Laurence Sullivan,* New York, Richard R. Smith, 1944, pp. viii, 200, $2.50.

**Costa Rican Life,* by John and Mavis Biesanz, New York, Columbia University Press, 1944, pp. xiv, 272, $3.00.

**Amerigo Vespucci, Pilot Major,* by Frederick J. Pohl, New York, Columbia University Press, 1944, pp. xiii, 249, $3.00.

**Early Stockaded Settlements in the Governador, New Mexico,* by Edward Twitchell Hall, Jr., New York, Columbia University Press, 1944, pp. 96, $2.00.

**The Neo-Idealist Political Theory,* by Frederick Philip Harris, New York, King's Crown Press, 1944, pp. ix, 133, $1.50.

**Emotional Factors in Learning,* by Lois Barclay Murphy and Henry Ladd, New York, Columbia University Press, 1944, pp. x, 404, $3.50.

Southern Baptist Handbook, 1944, Nashville, Broadman, pp. 400, no price.

* To be reviewed.